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ABSTRACT
WAR AND THE CREATION OF THE NORTHERN SONG STATE
PETER ALLAN LORGE 
NATHAN SIVIN
This dissertation explores the way that war formed the Northern Song 
(960-1127) state. Earlier research on the Northern Song failed to explain how 
and why the Northern Song empire established a peaceful border with the Liao 
empire to its north. This dissertation, by means of a detailed military history of 
the period from 954-1005, concludes that the Liao state did not intend to destroy 
the Song state. It was the Liao’s limited military and political goals rather than 
the strength or weakness of the Song that created a peaceful border between the 
two empires.
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CHAPTER ONE
On February 4, 960 Zhao Kuangyin MIMJiL overthrew the young emperor 
of the Latter Zhou^JfJ dynasty and established himself as the first emperor of 
the Song ^  dynasty (960-1279).1 His coup d ’etat was neither unexpected nor 
extraordinary.2 He was an ambitious military man and during the preceding fifty 
years the ruling house of north China had changed five times. The Song proved 
more enduring, li lasted in one form or another until 1279.
After consolidating his hold on the country, Zhao, posthumously known as 
Song Taizu incorporated all six of the Chinese states to the south and
west, but not to the north, under his rule either through force or diplomacy under 
the threat of force. The extension of Song rule to the south recreated earlier 
Chinese empires and restored the “proper," in the Confucian sense, political 
order of China. By establishing order and control over the territory of previous 
great dynasties the Song demonstrated that they were the new rightful rulers of 
the country. Control of that land indicated that they possessed the Mandate of
’XCB 1/4a. The entire account of the events leading up to the official overthrow is 
contained in XCB 1/1a-4a. Also see Sima Guang Sushuijiwen j£7fc§2Hfi, 1.1-3. A report
from Zhen and Ding ^  prefectures arrived on 31 January reporting a Liao and Northern Han 
invasion. Zhao Kuangyin left Kaifeng two days later leading an army to oppose it. That night, at 
Chenqiaoyi WMWf, supposedly unbeknownst to Zhao, several officers decided to place him on 
the throne. On 3 February the army returned. The Song dynasty was founded on the 4th.
2XCB 4/25b-26a for Zheng Qi’s warning concerning Zhao Kuangyin and XCB 1/5a 
for Han Tong’s son’s warning. Also Sima Guang, Sushuijiwen, 1.1-2. There is also an 
interesting anecdote concerning Cao Bin when he and Zhao Kuangyin were both generals 
under Zhou Shizong. Zhu Xi Wuchao mingchen yanxing lu a T fiL  1.2/3. John
Labadie, “Rulers and Soldiers: Perception and Management of the Military in Northern Sung 
China”, Ph.d. diss., University of Washington, 1981, 278.
1
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Heaven.3
The Mandate of Heaven was the heaven-bestowed right to rule the country. 
It was an old concept by the beginning of the Song. The Mandate could be 
withdrawn from one family and bestowed upon another. A dynasty possessing 
the Mandate was legitimate. It was part of the proper succession of ruling 
families. Only one family could hold the Mandate at any time. There was only 
one legitimate dynasty in a given period with one legitimate emperor.
The Song was not as successful as several earlier dynasties in conquering 
land. Song Taizu died with the conquest incomplete. His younger brother Zhao 
Kuangyi i l l ,  posthumously known as Song Taizong conquered one
of two remaining territories but twice failed to take the second.
The Sixteen Prefectures Problem
Taizong successfully eliminated the Northern Han ifc iI state, a client of 
the Qidan Liao dynasty to the north of China.4 Taizong then invaded
Liao territory. He wanted to take a small area of land, sixteen prefectures, near 
modern Beijing. Shi Jingtang S'fftJIr had ceded those sixteen prefectures to the
3For a discussion of the symbolic aspects of legitimation in Chinese history see Hok-lam 
Chan, Legitimation in Imperial China (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press,
1984), 3-48.
4The term “Liao” will be used throughout this dissertation to refer to the Qidan state and 
people. It has been done for simplicity’s sake in order not to confuse the reader with the dual 
problems of the Qidan people’s own alternation at different times between “Qidan" and “Liao” and 
Song references to them. The Song often referred to their opponents as the Qidan. It was a not 
very subtle rejection of the Liao dynastic designation.
2
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Liao in 936 for their aid in establishing his Jin #  dynasty. These “sixteen 
prefectures” were the northernmost tips of Hedong and Hebei provinces during 
the Tang. Almost all of the strategic north-south mountain passes lay within the 
Sixteen Prefectures. It was thus the key to controlling the invasion routes between 
China proper and the steppes. Eventually the military value of the Sixteen 
Prefectures was matched by their symbolic value. All of the issues of Song 
legitimacy were rooted in Liao control of the Sixteen Prefectures.
Taizong failed in both his attempts to capture the Sixteen Prefectures. 
Both campaigns ended in such utter disaster that the Song lost the strategic 
initiative. Taizong’s son, posthumously known as Zhenzong X tk, didn’t even try 
to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures. He endured systematic Liao raids, culminating 
in a massive invasion in 1004. As a result, Zhenzong was forced to conclude a 
treaty in 1005, the Treaty of Shanyuan, that recognized Liao sovereignty over the 
territory. The recognition that another dynasty controlled a piece of land considered 
to be Chinese by the Chinese brought Song legitimacy into question. It was not 
that Song officials doubted their own claims to sovereignty. They simply had no 
precedents for seeing their country as merely first among equals.5 The military 
exigencies of the situation forced them to find ways to deal with it.
Song emperors and officials learned to operate in a less than ideal diplomatic 
environment, but they never gave up the hope of taking the Sixteen Prefectures 
from the Liao. This study of Song military history focuses on the creation of the
5David Wright has argued persuasively that the Song and Liao only treated each other 
as equals. They treated other states, like the Xixia, as subordinate entities. David Wright,
“Sung-Liao Diplomatic Practices”, Ph.d. diss., Princeton University, 1993,17-18.
3
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Northern Song state by war and the reasons that the process reached its limit in 
1005. The Treaty of Shanyuan, and the campaign that led up to it, was a 
defining event in Song history. It was concluded at a moment of apparent Song 
weakness and its provisions always rankled Song emperors and statesmen. But 
it was also the basis for the peaceful eleventh century when Chinese culture 
flourished.6
Even after the Treaty of Shanyuan stabilized the border, Song animus 
continued. The Song ultimately allied themselves with the Jurchen Jin a 
proto-Manchurian people to the north of the Liao empire, to achieve their goal. 
The Jin destroyed the Liao in 1125 and continued on to take the Song capital of 
Kaifeng in 1127. Their desire to take the Sixteen Prefectures from the Liao 
caused the Song to follow a course of action that very nearly led to their own 
destruction.
The Liao, for their part, had good reason to suspect the Song. Song 
expansion ended any thoughts they had of extending their empire further south.7 
Song Taizu attacked their client state the Northern Han in 976.® Song Taizong
6lt is true that the Song-Xixia wars, which I hope to cover in a subsequent study, 
impinged upon the peace created by the Treaty of Shanyuan throughout the eleventh century.
But the Xixia were never as dire a threat to the Song state as the Liao.
Although they may have begun to think in more defensive terms regarding the territory 
to their south much earlier. On or about 28 October 908 the Liao emperor ordered the extension 
of the Great Wall. Karl Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society: Liao 
(Philadelphia:Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 1949), 364. The Liao actually 
ruled north China for five months in 946-47. Resistance to their rule quickly made their position 
untenable.
8Despite the failed invasion of the Northern Han, and Song clashes with Liao troops, the 
Song opened trade offices on the border with the Liao in 977. They had established some
diplomatic contacts with the Liao starting in 974. Wright, op cit., 47-48.
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destroyed the Northern Han and invaded Liao territory on two occasions. Despite 
less than friendly relations, however, the border between the Song and the Liao 
remained fairly stable for more than a century after the treaty. They managed to 
avoid major military actions. The Song, not the Liao, broke the treaty and allied 
themselves with the Jin. In the end, it was Liao, not Song, suspicion that was 
justified.
A third state arose to further complicate the power balance. The Xixia 
X  or Western Xia played the Liao and Song against each other diplomatically 
and survived in the middle. It clashed with both larger powers at one time or 
another and dealt with them diplomatically in between. The Song feared that an 
attack on the Liao would precipitate a Xixia invasion. It was not clear to them 
whether the reverse was true. Indeed, the Song were often uncertain of the 
nature of the Liao-Xixia relationship.9 The Liao often seemed similarly unclear 
about it. In any case, the presence of the Xixia did not destabilize the Song-Liao 
balance. As we will discuss later, it may even have prolonged it.
The preceding discussion of Song history draws a strong connection between 
war and diplomacy. It highlights the relationship between Song goals and Song 
policies. But what is war? And how is the process of war best understood?
®For an example of this see XCB 166/15a when the Liao informed the Song of their 
plans to attack the Xixia. See also Jingshen Tao, “Sung Policies Toward Liao and Hsia, 1042- 
1044," Journal of Asian History, vol. 6, no. 2,114-122, for a discussion of the three way 
diplomacy at the end of the Song-Xixia wars that started in 1038. Also Jing-shen Tao, Two Sons 
of Heaven (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 53-67.
5
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What is War?
Clausewitz vs. Keegan
Clausewitz wrote that “war is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means."10 John Keegan in his recent book A History of Warfare directly challenged 
that assertion in the very first line: “War is not the continuation of policy by other 
means.” He goes on to point out that the kind of war that Clausewitz was writing 
about assumed “the existence of states, of state interests and of rational calculation 
about how they may be achieved.”11 Keegan prefers to look to culture and 
anthropology in order to explain war. Our understanding of war must extend to 
cover pre-state or non-state war because war existed before states came into 
being. A true understanding of war would include “primitive" war as well as 
“civilized” war. Clausewitz, concerned only with Europe, “was struggling to advance 
a universal theory of what war ought to be, rather than what it actually was and 
had been.”12
In overly simple terms we can characterize Clausewitz as seeing war 
centered around the question of “what do you want?" and Keegan around the 
question “who are you?" The reason that others wage war in what a modern
'ta r l von Clausewitz, On War, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984 [8th printing]), 87.
11John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 1.
1%id., 6.
6
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Westerner would see as an irrational or uncivilized manner, Keegan would argue, 
is that their reasons for participating in armed conflict and the way they choose to 
do it are not based on the same assumptions as ours. They are not carrying out 
state policy by other means. Keegan believes that Clausewitz’s description of 
war only applies to people who understand war as he does. It is accurate only 
when both sides in a conflict accept his definitions. Other cultures have a 
different understanding of war and a different way in warfare. The study of Song 
Chinese military history is a good opportunity to test this thesis.13 The Song 
Chinese, the Liao, Xixia and Jin, all waged war in a manner easily explained by a 
Clausewitzian approach.
This may, however, have been rare in the imperial Chinese milieu. The 
Song, Liao, Xixia and Jin were all operating in a multi-state environment. Each 
state had its interests and its leaders pursued those interests, presumably, to the 
best of their abilities. They made choices within the constraints of their culture 
and the information available to them. The Song were not unique in imperial 
Chinese history in facing a multi-state environment, but it was not their ideal 
model for a legitimate dynasty. They preferred the examples provided by the 
militarily powerful Han and Tang dynasties, who controlled vast empires and 
dominated their neighbors. Song reality did not fit the imperial ritual framework of 
the Han and Tang. Allowances and compromises were made to accommodate
13Alastair lain Johnston in his excellent study Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and 
Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), dealt with a 
similar question regarding Ming history, albeit within the field of international relations. He 
concluded that Ming policy decisions were not culturally biased. That is, they were best
explained by a realpolitik rather than Confucian-Mencian approach.
7
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the tacts on the ground but the facts remained. It was supremely important to 
Song emperors and officials that they fit their dynasty into the proper succession 
of powerful legitimate dynasties.
It is at this point that the theories of Clausewitz and Keegan can be 
bridged. Let us first abstract from Clausewitz the thesis that war is a rational 
activity used as one more means to an end. Let us then establish, based on 
Keegan, that culture defines and motivates war. If we return to our earlier 
simplifications we can now combine them by saying that who you are tells you 
what you want. Culture establishes the values of certain goals and the costs and 
the risks involved in trying to attain them.
The Song would have liked to take the Sixteen Prefectures from the Liao 
despite the treaty. They did not make the attempt for over a century for several 
reasons. The most important reason was that they did not think that their army 
was capable of beating the Liao. A failed invasion would have left them open to 
a counter-invasion by the Liao with the possibility of a similar reaction by the 
Xixia. Even if such a counter-invasion could have been repelled and peace 
reestablished it would undoubtedly have resulted in an even more unpalatable 
treaty. Although the objective was of the greatest importance it appeared 
unattainable.
Peace with the Liao was not cheap. But the annual payments to the Liao 
court were considerably less costly than the military budget for maintaining a 
massive standing army.’4 The Song did not trust that the treaty could guarantee
14Fu Bi estimated that the annual payments were less than one or two percent of what
8
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the security of the empire. They had the worst of both worlds. An offensive 
military action was the only way to achieve a satisfactory resolution of the situation. 
But it was unlikely to succeed and risked the possible destruction of the dynasty. 
The defensive military posture adopted by default was expensive and humiliating. 
It was safer and less risky than offensive action but constant vigilance was 
required. The worst aspect of the Song’s strategic defensive posture was that it 
could not obtain the desired result: capturing the Sixteen Prefectures and humbling 
the Liao.
Even if the Song had been able to work up the political will to risk action 
against the Liao, they were distracted by the Xixia for much of the 11th century. 
The Xixia attacked in 1038 and were beaten off only with difficulty. Serious 
deterioration in the army was exposed and the leadership shaken. In the early 
1080’s the Song launched a massive assault on the Xixia. Early successes were 
overtaken by disastrous failures. A near total effort failed spectacularly.
We shall return to this discussion later. The point in introducing these 
events now is to emphasize that the Song leadership made sensible choices 
given their priorities and the information at hand. The choices available to them 
were set by the culture that they lived in. Their belief system limited their 
responses just as much as their military technology. This raises a very significant 
question for a study of Chinese military history. What about Sunzi’s Art of War ?
they would spend during a war. XCB 150/16a.
9
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Sunzi
Sunzi is probably one of the most misunderstood military manuals in current 
discussion.15 It has been mischaracterized in western scholarship as the anithesis 
of Clausewitz, the indirect method versus the direct.16 This has led some scholars 
to believe that there is a “Chinese way in warfare.”17 The Chinese way in 
warfare is characterized by: “..its emphasis on avoiding battle except with the 
assurance of victory, of disfavoring risk, of seeking to overawe an enemy by 
psychological means, and of using time rather than force to wear an invader 
down..."18 The Western way in warfare by contrast emphasizes moving to a 
direct, head-on collision of forces in order to reach a decision as swiftly as 
possible. The roots for the Western approach have been found, as one would 
expect, in ancient Greece.19 In China, Sunzi supplies the textual basis for the
15lt is also a far more famous work than Clausewitz. Even if not for its far longer 
pedigree, more than 2300 years longer than On War, it is in much wider common circulation. 
There are more than half a dozen English translations presently available.
1<The origin of this misconception can be traced to Liddell Hart’s preface to Samuel 
Griffith’s translation of Sunzi Bingfa. Hart saw it as an example of the indirect method that he had 
been championing in opposition to Clausewitz’s direct method. Even though they are inaccurate 
both characterizations have persisted, John Keegan being only one of the latest to be misled by 
them. For an interesting discussion of Clausewitz’s reception in England and America see 
Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), particularly 128-135 for Liddell Hart Johnston, op. cit., is the best discussion of Sunzi and 
the Seven Military Classics, but he is not particularly concerned with the direct versus indirect 
issue. Griffith’s translation of Sunzi may still be the best.
17Frank A. Kierman and John K. Fairbank (eds), Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, 
Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1974), 1.
18Keegan, op cit., 202.
’Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989).
10
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Chinese military method.
There is no reason to believe that Chinese military methods remained the 
same from around the fifth century BCE, when the general form of Sunzi appears 
to have taken shape, to the Song.20 The same can be said for the Western side 
of the argument.21 Sunzi was read and cited as an authority on military matters 
during the Song. There is no evidence, however, to prove that plans based upon 
Sunzi were ever carried out. Despite this, the primary sources often suggest that 
this was the case. The most obvious example of this is Wang Pu’s long-range 
plan in 955 for the Latter Zhou conquest of China.22 His plan, judged to be the 
best by Zhou Shizong, is replete with phrases from Sunzi. As we will see in the 
second part of this study, subsequent events demonstrated that Wang’s “plan” 
was either not seriously entertained to begin with or simply ignored afterward. 
Why then was it included in the historical record?
The civil officials who compiled the historical records expected a properly 
written memorial filled with extensive textual citations from appropriate sources to 
precede any major action. The generals themselves did not supply these
^ e e  Michael Loewe (ed.) and Krzysztof Gawlikowski, Early Chinese Texts: A 
Bibliographic Guide (Society for the Study of Early China, 1993), 446-455, for a bibliographic 
overview of Sunzi.
21Even Keegan, a great proponent of Hanson (he wrote the introduction to The Western 
Way of Wai) admits that: “The evidence, however, may not stand such a weight of supposition." 
op cit., 232.
22ZZTJ 292.9525-9526 and a slight variant in JWDS 128/1b-2b for Wang Pu. Wang Pu’s 
plan is translated in full in Edmund Worthy, The Founding of Sung China, 950-1000: Integrative
Changes in Military and Political Institutions,” Ph.d. diss., Princeton University, 1976,15-17.
11
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documents. Field commanders usually stated their advice simply.23 There are 
exceptions, noted for their erudition.24 Civil and military officials often wrote 
extremely long-winded proposals quoting from Sunzi and other military works. 
Many of their suggestions were impractical. Their memorials may have been 
included in the historical record in order to frame policy debates. Sometimes an 
unpleasant suggestion was made more palatable by a circuitous preamble. Song 
Taizu’s retreat from his unsuccessful siege of Taiyuan was preceded by a well- 
worded proposal. Whether the proposal caused, confirmed or excused the decision 
to retreat is unclear. But it should be pointed out that several of the long-range 
policies contained in that memorial were in fact carried out to good effect.
The compilers of the histories tried to establish cause and effect. They 
knew what had happened and they looked for documents that provided the 
cause. The problem with this basic historical desire was that actual military 
decision making was not always carried out within earshot of a recorder. There 
are two manifestations of this problem. Zhou Shizong and Song Taizu may have 
made their policy decisions in private and only held court discussion afterward. 
Later emperors may have made decisions based on court discussion only to 
have field commanders pursue their own course. That is not to say that there is 
no value in reading these discussions. They do present the opinions of
“ John Labadie, op d t, 133.
24Di Qing is an example of a general who started out as a soldier but was taken under 
the wing of Fan Zhongyan. Fan gave him the Zuozhuan and the Chunqiu to read. Di is said to 
have become well read in the military art of Qin, Han and later dynasties. SS 290.9718. Labadie, 
op cit., 273-277, provides a short biography of Di. Cao Wei is another example of a general 
noted as being well read in Zuozhuan and Chunqiu. Labadie, op cit. 282-287.
12
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contemporary individuals and their understanding of a particular situation. There 
is a great deal of very valuable information in them. But we cannot uncritically 
accept them as blueprints. We must look forward from the decision maker’s 
point of view rather than backward from the historian’s. The Song's successful 
conquest of the six Chinese states to its south and one to its north was not 
inevitable. This last point cannot be stressed enough.
Despite Sunzi’s frequent appearance in policy discussions there is no 
particular historical approach associated with him. Sunzi’s Art of War was an 
authoritative military text. By the founding of the Song, it was nearly fifteen 
hundred years old. It held pride of place as a work on military matters in a 
culture that placed great value on texts of ancient origin. If court discussion is 
any measure, civil officials considered familiarity with Sunzi to be an adequate 
substitute for battlefield experience. The generals may have felt differently, but 
after Taizong’s reign they were often marginalized in policy discussions.25 
Reference to Sunzi or other military works could only be countered by a different 
citation or the assertion that a particular citation had been inaccurately applied. It 
is almost certain that the compilers of the histories were familiar with Sunzi.
One might be tempted to say that Sunzi’s emphasis on strategy over 
tactics is responsible for the extreme paucity of battlefield accounts during the 
Song. But such a proposal is untenable. First, Sunzi wrote about tactical 
matters. Second, the lack of detailed battlefield information may only be true of 
Northern Song sources. David Graff found adequate information for his detailed
lab ad ie , op cit., 49.
13
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accounts of several battles in the early Tang. Still, those battles were the exceptions, 
rather than the rule, and were chosen for that reason. Most Tang warfare was 
also covered badly.26 Sima Guang’s battle accounts in the Zizhi Tongjian, written 
during the Northern Song, covering Chinese history up to the founding of the 
Song, are more detailed than battle accounts written during the Southern Song 
and Yuan periods covering the Northern Song.27
Chinese historians established a link between war and policy or politics 
early on and never lost that understanding.28 This connection was not formed 
from Sunzi in particular, though he explicitly made the point. Chinese officials 
were steeped in history. They were well aware of the dire consequences that 
poor policy decisions, external or internal, had caused in the past. They were 
also aware that their actions would be judged in the future. War and the decisions 
leading up to it were prominently represented in the past.
^ a v id  Graff, “Early T’ang Generalship and the Textual Tradition,” Ph.d. diss., Princeton 
University, 1995.
270uyang Xiu’s accounts are not as detailed even though he also wrote in the eleventh 
century. Compare the accounts of the battle of Gaoping, for example, dealt with in the second 
part of this work, given in Ouyang’s Xinwudai shi with Sima’s account or even the one given in 
Jiuwudai shi.
28Unlike in the West where the idea had to be rediscovered by Machiavelli. See 
"Machiavelli: The Renaissance of the Art of War,” by Felix Gilbert in Peter Paret (ed.) Makers of
Modem Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 11-31.
14
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Definition of Terms
Since the theory of war underlying the present examination of Northern 
Song military history is that war is the rational pursuit of culturally determined 
goals, it behooves us to define a few key terms. Much of the argument over 
Clausewitz and his views stems from a lack of common definitions. “War (whatever 
that is) is the continuation of politics (whatever that is) or policy (whatever that is) 
by other means.” Keegan bases war in “culture” without explaining what he 
means by culture.
War, to paraphrase the Oxford English Dictionary, is a hostile contention 
between two or more parties.29 It does not necessarily involve violence but it 
often does. We will distinguish it from battle, which is an individual violent 
encounter. In the present study, the parties involved are usually states. The 
instruments of violence are armies, which are organized groups of armed men.
Christopher Bassford defines policy as: “...rational action undertaken by a 
group that already has power, in order to maintain and extend that power. Politics, 
in contrast, is simply the process (comprising an inchoate mix of rational, irrational, 
and nonrationai elements) by which power is distributed within a given society."30 
It would be useful to expand his definitions slightly in both cases. Policy should 
not be confined to “a group that already has power” but to any group or individual.
^The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1987),
3683.
Christopher Bassford, op cit., 22.
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Consequently the aim of policy must also be expanded to include achieving 
power. Policy can also be irrational. The forum for politics should also be 
expanded beyond a “given society” to include any relationship between two or 
more parties. Bassford’s definitions were designed with Clausewitz in mind.
Culture is a much more difficult term to define. For our purposes we are 
only concerned with one particular belief related to the Chinese identity. The 
Chinese believed that China as a whole could and should be ruled by one 
government headed by a single male with the divine right to rule. Thus, in 
Keegan’s terms, war served culture when it was used to establish or maintain 
one man ruling all of China, however “China” was defined geographically.
War in Theory and Practice
The Treaty of Shanyuan ended the large-scale use of violence in Song-Liao
relations for over a century. It did not, however, end their mutual hostility. Both
sides still fought over legitimacy. After 1005, they confined themselves to non-violent
means. For the Liao, legitimacy meant treatment as an equal by the Song and
a stable border. For the Song, legitimacy meant acknowledgment by the Liao of
Song superiority despite any territorial or military conditions. Liao military superiority
established a baseline of legitimacy that the Song were forced to accept. The
cessation of military activities changed the means of contention to demonstrations
of prosperity and divine favor. The Song state was far richer than the Liao,
allowing it to carry out more extensive imperial sacrifices. While the Song could
16
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act more imperial, and thus more legitimate, because of its wealth, the Liao could 
always redress the balance by threatening to return to military means or, at least, 
reminding the Song about the reality of the military situation that underlay their 
relationship.
We are studying the external policy of the Northern Song government. 
Our emphasis will be on the military actions resulting from that policy. The clash 
of armies should not obscure the policy aims. The successes and failures of the 
military actions were clearly connected to previous and subsequent events. We 
will touch on those events only to explain the motivations for military plans and 
decisions. Our aim will be to explain why a particular campaign succeeded or 
failed.
What is Success?31
The success or failure of a campaign can be judged from several 
perspectives. A campaign that achieved its stated objectives is usually considered 
to be a success. With twenty-twenty hindsight, however, a historian may reverse 
that evaluation and find the origin of a later failure in it. The reverse may also be 
true. A historian may find the beginning of improved conditions in a failure. The 
Treaty of Shanyuan was the result of a Song military failure. At first it was
31For a recent discussion of what constitutes victory in war, albeit in Europe from the 
eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, see Brian Bond, The Pursuit of Victory (Oxford University 
Press, 1996).
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regarded as a successful negotiation, then it was vilified.32 In retrospect it gave 
the Song more than thirty years of peace ended not by the Liao but a third party, 
the Xixia. A Song victory might have sparked continued war. The point here is 
not to engage in what-if history, but to reassert the importance of looking at 
historical events from the point of view of the participants. They tried to pursue 
the best policy they could given the imperfect information they had. When we try 
to piece together the accounts of a campaign sometimes the only indication of 
what was intended is what happened. Sometimes we can only guess at events 
based on the result. In the worst case our conclusions will be based on what did 
not happen.
The Sources: Campaigns Versus Battles
The sources are strongest about strategic operations. They are weakest 
at the tactical level. This contrasts dramatically with most western military 
history. The primary sources for western military history tend to be battle-centered. 
All of the campaign coverage is simply a preamble to the high drama of the 
battlefield. It is not by choice that this military history will not follow that pattern. 
The sources for the Northern Song simply do not allow for a battle-centered 
history. Indeed, as Ken Chase so pointedly observed, unlike the West, there are
3afhe characterization of the Treaty as a failure was connected with political struggles 
within Zhenzong’s court For a detailed discussion of the political reprecussions of the Treaty see 
Karl F. Olsson, The Structure of Power Under the Third Emperor of Sung China: The Shifting
Balance After the Peace of Shan-Yuan," Ph.d. diss., University of Chicago, 1974.
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very few famous battles in Chinese history.33 Particular battles are not usually 
presented as historical turning points. This lack in battlefield information is balanced 
by extensive coverage of the smaller skirmishes, command assignments and 
march schedules that often elude historians of the west before modern times.34 
This information often seems to take over a campaign account as the list of 
commanders may exceed the length of the account of their activities.
At first it would seem a good idea to abridge the lists of commanders and 
their assignments in favor of emphasizing the battles. Battle is the core of 
military history after all and must remain the focus of any real study of it. We 
cannot increase the information that we lack by abridging what we have. Nothing 
beyond the bald statement can be squeezed out of “so-and-so broke the enemy 
at place x.” It can only be made intelligible in context with other battles. The 
sources for the Song dynasty are derived from an operational level somewhat 
distant from the battlefield. This is less true of actions that took place near the 
emperor. Unfortunately, unlike European monarchs up through the 19th century, 
Song dynasty emperors usually did not do battle. Our information is better when 
they did. Detailed information is sometimes available when the emperor was not 
present. The record is not wholly without drama.
The very first battle of the campaign part of this study, the Battle of
Personal conversation, Atlanta, Georgia, January 5,1996.
^Alfred H. Bume in his The Crecy War (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1955), went to 
great lengths to reconstruct the movements of medieval armies in order to understand the 
strategic thinking of their commanders. His aim, as suggested by the title of his book and a later 
one, The Agincourt War, was to examine medieval war at the strategic, not tactical, battle, level. 
He wanted to discuss how medieval commanders, in both books, the kings of England and
France, conducted wars, not just battles.
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Gaoping, is atypical in the detail of its account. The future Song Taizu took part, 
but we are still without detailed tactical information. Of course, Peter Paret has 
argued that battle accounts are by their very nature unreliable and should be set 
off in such a way as to warn the reader that he is entering uncertain territory.36 
Before the advent of modern communications a commander’s ability to monitor 
and control a battle was extremely limited.36 It is only very recently, with the use 
of satellite positioning, that forces distant from a well known landmark can accurately 
locate themselves on a map.37 Taken as whole, the lack of detailed battlefield 
information is not as great a problem as we might think. At least we are clear in 
knowing what we don’t have. We will not be deceived by basing our conclusions 
on unreliable information.
The lists of commanders and the march routes reveal a level of organization 
and pattern of operation that is valuable in itself. Northern Song armies developed 
a fairly regular command structure for expeditionary and peacetime forces. In 
addition to the assignment of generals to command, officials were appointed to 
manage supplies.38 Failure to properly manage logistics was punishable under 
military law. On one occasion Taizu was only persuaded not to punish an 
incompetent official (a supply officer $ f  H $ i)  because doing so would have revealed
“ Peter Paret, Understanding War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 85.
M artin  Van Creveld, Technology and War (New York: The Free Press, 1991 [Revised 
and Expanded]), 38-42.
37ibid., 43-45.
“ These zhuanyunshi later became fiscal intendants in the regular government structure. 
The military origins of the fiscal intendants may explain the large number of military men in areas 
of fiscal responsibility early in the dynasty.
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to the enemy that the supply system of the Song army was in disarray.39 Many 
campaign accounts focus on the fighting over vulnerable points in the lines of 
communication, usually pontoon bridges. Indeed, the decisive battles were often 
fought by subsidiary forces quite a distance from the campaign objective. While 
this is not surprising, the emphasis that the sources place on it is. Our picture is 
much more strategic and logistical than comparable European primary sources. 
Chinese historians were concerned with the material basis of warfare and its 
influence on the outcome of campaigns.
Our ability to follow the material basis of Song wars should not obscure 
the fact that the policy goals were accomplished by resort to battle. The results 
of battles, however unclear we may be on their details, were of crucial importance 
in shaping the history of the empire. The empire was created and maintained in 
the face of external military threat.
The Creation of the Song State by War
How was the empire created? Why was Song Taizu so successful in 
accomplishing his goals while later emperors fared so poorly? The simplest 
answer is that Taizu was better and smarter than his successors. This may be 
true, but it fails to explain the means by which he succeeded. He was not the 
only man in the middle of the tenth century with the ambition to conquer all of 
China and establish his own dynasty.
^ C B  10/3a.
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Our account of the military history of the Song begins with the reign of the 
man who preceded Taizu, Zhou Shizong. Shizong began a policy of conquest 
which Taizu took over when he overthrew the Zhou dynasty. Almost immediately, 
Taizu had to put down two other men who also aspired to be emperor.
The idea of a Chinese empire was, as we have discussed, a common part 
of Chinese culture. Previously, we examined how that idea affected the conquerors 
in their pursuit of a legitimate empire. There was another side to the issue. The 
smaller countries that surrounded the nascent Song empire were also acquainted 
with the idea of a Chinese empire uniting north and south. Several of them 
adopted names that recalled earlier empires, the Han and Tang (the Southern 
Han, the Northern Han and the Southern Tang). Their rulers sometimes styled 
themselves emperors. None of them, however, had been able to recreate the 
empires of the past. Once the Zhou and later Song conquest gained momentum 
it was clear where it was headed. There was no need to create the concept of an 
empire by conquest. It was more a matter of convincing the leadership of the 
smaller countries that the return to empire was at hand.40
One view of the conquest would be that the Song brought superior force to 
bear on the weaker countries around it. This is substantially correct but it does 
not account for the speed with which many of those countries capitulated. The 
conquest was not smooth by any means but it was accomplished with a relatively
40ZZTJ 293.9545-46; 293.9548 for Zhou Shizong’s communications with the Southern 
Tang ruler.
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small amount of destruction.41 Policy is really aimed at the hearts and minds of 
the opposition. In this respect, strategy is the technique of convincing someone 
to do what you want them to do.
Taizu’s aim was to convince the leadership of a country to capitulate. He 
did not want to destroy lands that he intended to rule. The most obvious first 
step was to defeat their armies in the field. But Taizu was more subtle than that. 
He preceded military action by diplomatic gambit. Zhou Shizong had used the 
same technique before him. A message from the emperor, Shizong or Taizu, 
with an offer of advantageous terms of surrender for the ruler of the country 
about to be invaded was sent along with similar offers for his officials. The ruler 
of the threatened country would be offered a comfortable retirement under 
supervision and the officials would be offered positions in the Zhou or Song 
administration. All offers were made in language appropriate for the emperor 
and directed downward as a demonstration of his benevolence. The offers were 
not rescinded if armed hostilities ensued. This was extremely important. As 
Song forces approached, the wisdom of resistance became increasingly doubtful. 
Often the most formidable obstacle for officials was their Confucian belief that an 
honorable man could not serve two emperors. Military commanders often held 
similar views on loyalty.42 Fortunately for the Song conquest, many officials and
4The exception to this is the Song campaign to conquer Shu (Sichuan). Except for the 
troops under Cao Bin, the looting and pillaging was so extreme that the people of Sichuan 
rebelled after the Shu goverment had surrendered.
^ o r  an extreme example of loyalty, see Liu Renshan’s execution of his son during the 
Zhou siege of Shouzhou. Liu's action was supported by his wife as a necessary example of Liu 
family loyalty to the Southern Tang ruler. ZZTJ 293.9562-63.
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commanders were not put off by such high-minded concerns.
There were certain limitations to this approach. The Southern Tang ruler 
was unaware of the armies outside the gates of his capital for months after they 
arrived. He had secluded himself from everyday affairs and delegated authority 
to two officials. They did not inform him of the battlefield losses so he was not in 
a position to accurately judge the situation. It was only after he made a personal 
tour of the walls of his capital and surveyed the Song forces surrounding him that 
he surrendered.
There was also the case of the Northern Han. The Zhou dynasty had 
been founded by overthrowing the Latter Han dynasty. The Northern Han state 
was the remnant of the Han ruling house. Wang Pu assumed that the only way 
to deal with the Northern Han was total annihilation. Song Taizu tried a diplomatic 
gambit arguing that while the Han and Zhou houses had reason to hate each 
other, he was not involved in the dispute. His conquest was not, therefore, 
personal. He was unsuccessful in persuading the Northern Han to surrender. It 
ultimately fell to Taizong to defeat them and take their capital at Taiyuan. Even 
so, Taizong was able to persuade the Northern Han ruler to surrender the city 
and capitulate. We will see several other cases where personalities interfered 
with “rational” policy. Indeed, war was an extremely personal activity for the 
leaders and officials of the Song, Liao, Xixia and Jin. Several wars were only 
settled after the death of one or both rulers.
Taizu was very successful at convincing the governments of the smaller
countries to surrender without having to completely destroy either their armies or
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the countryside. He was able to create the form of an empire through military 
means. Actual administrative consolidation took somewhat longer. He died with 
the issue of the Northern Han and the Sixteen Prefectures unresolved. Taizong 
destroyed the Northern Han but failed, as all his successors did, to conquer the 
Sixteen Prefectures. It is here that the belief in a Chinese empire blinded the 
Song leadership to an obvious point. While they saw the Sixteen Prefectures as 
a separate piece of territory which they could wage a limited war to obtain, the 
Liao had no reason to accept that a Song attack would stop at that. The Liao 
also had no reason to believe that their claim to the territory was less valid than 
that of the Song. Both sides understood the strategic value of the area. The 
attitude of the Liao put the Song in the very different circumstance of trying to 
conquer a part of the territory of a larger country.
The Song did not seriously consider trying to destroy the Liao. Their 
failure to defeat the Liao army in the field when pursuing limited objectives 
effectively removed that as a realistic option. Taking the Sixteen Prefectures 
without destroying the Liao proved impossible. To make matters worse, the 
failures on the battlefield translated into diplomatic defeats. The Song were 
forced to accept rough parity in their dealings with the Liao. Frustrated militarily, 
they could bring little pressure to bear to force the Liao into, to their mind, an 
acceptable political solution. They could neither separate the Sixteen Prefectures 
by force nor convince the Liao to give them up.
Military failure and fear of the Liao severely handicapped the Song in
dealing with the Xixia. The Xixia rulers were adept at surviving between two
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larger powers. They outlasted the Liao and the Jin until Qingis Khan crushed 
them in 1226. The Song was always wary of the connection between the Liao 
and the Xixia. An attack on the Xixia on the northwestern border would leave 
them open to attack by the Liao in the northeast. The Xixia invasion of the Song 
in 1038 exposed the weakness of the Song army. A few years later, the Song 
court thought itself fortunate to be able to buy off the Liao emperor and prevent 
an invasion.43 When the Song made their maximum military effort to destroy the 
Xixia in 1080s they had to buy off the Liao a second time. Fortunately for the 
Song, relations between the Liao and Xixia were not as cordial as they feared. 
They fought each other on several occasions with the Xixia usually coming out 
on top. Even so, the Song were forced to concede far more to the Xixia diplomatically 
than their size and power would have warranted.
The Weakness Issue
Even before Kaifeng fell in 1127 there was a feeling that the Song was a 
weak dynasty. It had failed to equal the military exploits of the Han and Tang. It 
was forced to make real diplomatic concessions and accept the existence of 
another emperor. If not for the diplomatic concessions, the annual payments of 
money and silk to the Liao and Xixia would not have been important to the Song 
administration or later historians. The Han and the Tang had also paid off their
^ o r  a more detailed discussion of the “increase of presents" diplomacy of 1042 see 
Jing-Shen Tao, “Yu Ching and Sung Policies Toward Liao and Hsia, 1042-1044,” in Journal of 
Asian History, Vol. 6, no. 2,114-122.
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neighbors in various ways. John Labadie suggested that the “weakness issue” is 
a red herring. The Song was not weaker than earlier dynasties. It was only the 
Song’s misfortune to face more powerful enemies.44 Some scholars have pointed 
out the Song’s ability to survive in the face of powerful outside threats.45
But military strength and weakness is always relative. To say that the 
Song was only weak because its enemies were strong is simply to state that it 
was weak. The Song’s ability to resist strong enemies is significant. That ability 
must be considered in light of the actual interest of those enemies in attacking 
the Song. The Song preserved itself largely intact when invaded by the Liao and 
the Xixia On the other hand, it failed in its attempts to establish political dominance 
over its neighbors. The failure to establish dominance was apparent to the Song 
emperors and officials. Their military was not succeeding as they felt it should. It 
was not accomplishing what they wanted it to accomplish.
We cannot reasonably discount the evaluations of Northern Song officials. 
Strength and weakness is not only relative to one’s opponents, it is also relative 
to one’s expectations and effort. Taizong failed to take the Sixteen Prefectures 
from the Liao. His goal was clear and he devoted considerable resources to 
achieving it. His officials did not object to the expense and effort required, but to 
the personal participation of the emperor. The officials did not think the possible 
benefit was worth risking the ruler’s life. Taizong disagreed with his advisors 
because he thought obtaining the Sixteen Prefectures was worth risking himself.
la b a d ie , op cit., 229-232. McGrath, op cit., iii.
“̂ ttfo g e l and Feng, op cit., 19.
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The Song military means were inadequate to achieve their policy ends. 
Their attempts to increase the effectiveness of those means failed. The only 
thing left to do was to change their ends to fit their means. They persisted, 
instead, in pursuing unattainable goals.46 In order to change their ends they 
would had to change their culture. They would have had to first give up their 
conception of the imperial system and the superiority of the culture that it rested 
on before they could have given up the only tangible demonstration of that 
system’s achievement. Reality forced them to live within their means while they 
continued to dream of their ends. This may have turned out to the benefit of the 
country due to long periods of peace and prosperity. They lost the war but won 
the peace.
The Roots of Failure
Up to this point we have discussed the cultural underpinnings of Song 
policy and the failure of its military to completely carry out that policy. Why did 
the Song military fail in its assigned mission? Song means were incapable of 
achieving its ends. We have already established the inflexibility of those ends. It 
seems odd that the Song government was unable to adequately increase the 
capability of its means for over a century and a half. If, as we have discussed
Political infighting may have been responsible for policy indecision and confusion. See 
Olsson, op cit., for a discussion of the use of the Treaty of Shanyuan as a partisan issue at the 
court of Zhenzong. There may also be an interesting parallel during the Qing where the issue of 
opium was possibly used as a partisan issue. See James M. Polachek, The Inner Opium War 
(Cambridge, Massachusets: Harvard University Press, 1992).
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above, the ends were so important then it would be reasonable to expect a 
commensurate effort to increase the means to an adequate level. But Song 
means were also subject to political, cultural and material constraints.
The Song distinguished itself from the Tang dynasty and the Five dynasties 
period by the lack of major internal disturbances and coup d'etats. Generals 
were kept subordinate to civil officials in authority and tied to the imperial house 
by marriage. Every effort was made to keep commanders from forming close 
attachments with their men. Troops and higher officers were regularly rotated. 
Commanders of expeditionary forces were sent out to take control of forces 
collected from various areas with appointments limited to the tenure of the campaign. 
The emperor provided detailed plans and formations. Deviation from those plans 
without good cause (victory in battle) was a serious matter.47 The positions of 
overall command were left unfilled.48 Generals were usually prohibited from 
holding both provincial and central government appointments. The system 
worked well in keeping the military under control but there is probably some truth 
in the belief that it also made them less effective. Separating the officers and 
men meant that, “the men do not know the officers and the officers do not know 
the men,” to cite a contemporary criticism.49 It is also true that a system which 
discourages personal initiative, boldness and charismatic leadership will have a
47XCB 20/17b-18b for an example of a debate between commanders over deviating from 
imperial plans.
W orthy, op cit., 173.
49SS 188.4627. Cited in Labadie, op. cit., 170-171.
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deleterious effect on military performance.
Although in earlier dynasties the distinction between civil and military 
careers for officials was not strict, the Song firmly placed the former over the 
latter. This was true even though many military officials were not soldiers and 
had no real military experience. They were bureaucrats like the civil officials. 
The status of civil officials was, however, higher than the status of military officials. 
Military officials were often engaged in more worldly tasks like collecting taxes 
and overseeing the transport of goods. It was assumed by the civil officials that 
the preferred career was one in the civil bureaucracy. Actual military service as a 
soldier was considered to be one of the lowest forms of employment.50 Soldiers 
were often tattooed to prevent desertion. Even worse, they were professional 
soldiers, not farmers temporarily serving as soldiers. The troops were thus 
composed of non-productive men who posed a real danger to society, due to 
their arrogance, but failed in battle. They were also very expensive to maintain. 
Soldiers were perceived as a necessary evil. There was no great desire to 
increase their number, but, due to the need to maintain constant vigilance along 
a long border, their numbers increased dramatically during the Song.
Paying, equipping and feeding the army was no small task. Hon-chiu 
Wong estimated that the Northern Song spent an average of sixty to seventy 
percent of the government’s annual budget on soldiers in 1065.51 The cost in
“The extent to which this view was not universal outside the shidafu, or literati, class has 
not yet been explored.
51Hon-chiu Wong, “Government Expenditures in Northern Sung China (960-1127),”
Ph.d. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1975, 60. He quotes Cai Xiang’s estimates for 1065: “that
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salaries was immense but, even so, the soldiers were often ill paid. While the 
government could manage the logistical support for large armies it was never 
able to obtain a sufficient number of cavalry mounts. As it expanded the Song 
army increasingly became an infantry force. The horse breeding areas were in 
the hands of their enemies.
There is no way to generalize about the quality of the Song army across 
all of its units and throughout its history. It is usually assumed that its quality was 
higher at the beginning of the dynasty than at the end. The prima facie case for 
this is made by the military success under Taizu and partly under Taizong compared 
with subsequent failures. Of course, Taizu never faced the Liao directly, only the 
smaller states of southern China. Some people thought that if only Taizu had 
lived, he would have been able to beat the Liao and take the Sixteen Prefectures.52 
There is no way to adequately prove such a contention but Taizu was certainly 
the most successful emperor in carrying out his foreign policy. While the military 
success of a founding emperor is proverbial, we must not lose sight of the 
difficulties of the enterprise. Success was never guaranteed.
The troops of the early empire were more experienced than later soldiers. 
In the southern conquests, Song armies maintained a cavalry advantage over 
their opponents. On one occasion Song forces captured horses that had earlier
been sent south as gifts from the Song court. The Song made great use of a
from sixty to seventy percent of state revenues was spent supporting soldiers.” That figure only 
concerns the direct support of the soldiers. It does not include other military expenses.
“ Sima Guang slyly makes this point by relating the story of Huangfu Hui’s dying words 
to Zhou Shizong concerning Zhao Kuangyin (recounted in full in part II). Huangfu praises Zhao’s 
troops as superior to the Liao forces he had fought in the past. ZZTJ 292.9539.
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riverine navy in the south. Despite the almost unalloyed success of the navy, it 
clearly functioned as an adjunct to the land forces.53 It was later to prove the 
Southern Song’s best defense against the Jin and Mongols. But in the initial 
conquests its main function was to control the rivers and protect the army’s 
communications by denying the enemy control. Experienced troops with superior 
cavalry supported by a good navy were commanded by aggressive, veteran 
commanders. The creation and stabilization of the Song was a process of 
emerging from a state of continuous war and struggle for power. As the commanders 
and men raised in that environment passed from the scene, they were replaced 
by less experienced men. In the north, it was the Liao who had the cavalry 
advantage and the navy was unimportant. The Liao cavalry was quantitatively 
and qualitatively better than the Song cavalry by virtue of superior training and 
access to more horses.
Cavalry is not necessarily superior to infantry. Well trained and appropriately 
armed infantry can defeat cavalry. At various times and places during its history 
the Song was able to field competent infantry armies supported by cavalry. The 
problem was that cavalry was the decisive arm. Cavalry had been the decisive 
arm in Chinese warfare since the Han and continued to be so until the arrival of 
the West in the Qing.54 It was not the only deciding factor. Individual battles 
were not decided simply by the presence or absence of cavalry or by which side
53Worthy, op cit., 59.
^ o r  the role of cavalry during the Tang see Li Shutong, “Tangdai zhi junshi yu
in Tangshi yanjiujfs&fiff^ (Taibei: Shangwu, 1979), 231-276. I am indebted to David 
Graff for this citation.
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had the greater number of horsemen. But we can make some generalizations 
about warfare in China during the Northern Song.
Warfare During the Northern Song
In a contest between a Song infantry army and a Liao cavalry army, the 
Song could win the field but were incapable of inflicting the disproportionate 
casualties on their opponents that would result in a truly decisive victory. But a 
Liao victory usually resulted in disproportionate casualties and the destruction of 
the Song force. This was because an army suffers the most casualties when it 
breaks and the enemy vigorously pursues it. The casualty rate of contending 
forces is usually quite close until one side gives way. Pursuit is most effective 
when fresh troops, preferably cavalry, are available to exploit the opportunity. A 
mounted man is obviously at a tremendous advantage in running down a man on 
foot. A defeated infantry army is at the mercy of the enemy’s pursuing infantry 
and cavalry, particularly the latter. In the opposite circumstance, a defeated 
cavalry army can only be effectively pursued by cavalry. It would be quite difficult 
for even a fresh foot soldier in armor to run down a mounted man even if he were 
riding a tired horse.
An infantry army is at a distinct disadvantage when fighting a cavalry army
in open terrain. If conditions are unfavorable for battle, or if the battle turns
against them, then a cavalry force can simply ride away. Thus a mounted man is
able to ride away to fight another day. If he is part of a unit which accepts that
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they may be forced to leave a battlefield and does so in good order, then little 
real damage has been done.55 The Liao were quite willing to retreat. They saw 
no particular shame in such an action. The Song, however, could not accept a 
tactical withdrawal in the face of the enemy in order to avoid battle under unfavorable 
conditions. They did not always stand and fight, but they might be punished for 
not doing so. Some Song officers clearly saw fighting to the death as an extremely 
noble act demonstrating great loyalty to one’s ruler. But it is impossible to 
determine how prevalent those values were.
It was therefore almost impossible to force battle upon a Liao army. Since 
they operated without a supply train, they could only be ambushed, trapped 
within constricting terrain or forced to fight for a strategic objective, like a city, 
which they could not abandon. The first two options were of limited use. The 
third might force the Liao to fight. It was the third option that Taizong tried to use 
on his second attempt to take the Sixteen Prefectures. The plan called for a 
small force to raid the area around Yanjing (modern Beijing) in order to bring the 
Liao army to its aid. The main army would wait for the Liao army to commit to 
the defense of the city before advancing. In the event, the plan fell apart. While 
the plan itself and Taizong came under severe criticism by Zhao Pu afterward, 
the underlying concept was not wrong. The Liao army was not invincible when it 
did not choose the time and place of battle. The success of Taizong’s Northern
^Quite strangely, the medieval European knight was prone to riding away from a battle 
that turned against him or looked unfavorable. The English innovation of dismounting knights to 
fight with the common soldiers during the Hundred Years War was not just to strengthen them by 
adding extra well-armed men, but also to reassure those troops that the nobility would remain 
with them and share the outcome of the battle.
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Han campaign relied on the ability of Song forces to defend strategic mountain 
passes from Liao relief forces. Liao success depended on superior tactical 
mobility. They were still tough opponents without it, but at a greatly reduced 
level.
The tactical reality that Song and Liao forces faced on the battlefield 
shaped strategic policy. Liao strength lay in mobility and tactical offense. Any 
condition which decreased that mobility decreased the power of their army. As 
horse-archers, they had to attack to be effective. Thus, even if they were defending 
territory, they were better suited to doing so by raiding rather than static defense. 
The Song army was stronger in static defense. Therefore on the tactical level, 
Song battlefield victories were usually indecisive while Liao battlefield victories 
were decisive. The situation was different when it came to defending cities or 
strategic points. There, simply resisting attack won the day. Superior logistics 
allowed a besieged city to hold out longer. The Liao fielded armies of cavalrymen 
without logistic support. They were expected to live off the land. Obviously, a 
stationary cavalry army would use up all of the available fodder in the surrounding 
area in short order. It is ill-suited to protracted siege.
The Liao were thus forced to act offensively on the tactical level even if
their strategic policy goals were defensive. They could only effectively adopt an
offensive-defense or an offensive-offense in carrying out their policies. The Song
could only adopt a defensive-defense or a defensive-offense in carrying out their
policies. Liao offensive actions in the war leading up to the Treaty of Shanyuan
were the expression of a defensive policy. They had to attack the Song in order
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to retain the territory they already had and to reestablish diplomatic relations.
Conclusion
Song military history was shaped by a culture that expected a legitimate 
political unit to meet its military goals. Those military accomplishments were the 
most concrete expression of possession of the Mandate of Heaven by a dynastic 
house. The Song dynastic house tried to use military means to attain those 
goals and, by their own definition, failed. They were conscious of their failure but 
their attempts to rectify matters were tempered by the fear of an even greater 
disaster that could come of further military action against the Liao.
It is hard to explain the actions of the Liao in Song terms. The behavior of 
the Liao is best explained by limited aims with regard to China and the Song. 
While the Song imagined that their own aims, the addition of the Sixteen Prefectures 
to their empire and the establishment of diplomatic dominance over their neighbors, 
were limited, they did not consider that the aims of the Liao could also be limited. 
Song emperors and statesmen did not doubt that the Liao had designs on the 
Chinese empire. That bias has continued through historians of China in general 
and the Song in particular. It is true that the Liao were interested in having 
influence over their southern neighbors and that they wanted to trade with them. 
They backed various contenders for the throne in north China during the tenth 
century. What they did not do was mount a sustained effort to take advantage of
the disunity of China following the end of the Tang in order to conquer China.
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Liao armies did try to establish more direct control over north China when the Jin, 
their client state, tried to gain independence in 943. The resistance they encountered 
convinced them to back another Chinese contender for the throne. It was easier 
be a kingmaker than to rule directly. They had their own empire to govern and 
their own concerns outside of China.
As much as the Song realized that they could not seriously undertake the 
destruction of the Liao, the Liao do not seem to have aimed to destroy the Song. 
They did not act upon several proposals for joint action by states in south China 
during the Zhou and Song conquest campaigns. They turned down Xixia proposals 
for joint action against the Song in the 1040s. It was the Zhou and then the Song 
who attacked the Liao and then broke off diplomatic relations in the late tenth 
century. Ultimately it was the Song who abrogated the Treaty of Shanyuan and 
allied with the Jin to destroy the Liao. Liao actions prior to the Treaty were 
directed toward recovering territory that had been taken from them, defending 
territory that had been ceded to them and reestablishing peaceful diplomatic and 
commercial relations with China. They succeeded in the latter two objectives. It 
was to their advantage in negotiations that they let the Song imagine that they 
were actually trying to destroy them. Thus the Liao got most of what they wanted 
and the Song thought that they had saved themselves from destruction.
Looking back from the perspective of subsequent dynasties of conquest,
the Jin, Yuan and Qing, it is natural to assume that the Liao also wanted to
conquer China. The fact that they did not conquer China must therefore be
attributed to inability, not lack of desire. Under these assumptions, Song military
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history is the story of a century-long successful defense which finally collapsed. 
Historians are then forced to ask why the defense failed when it did. There have 
already been many studies of why the Song failed. But why should we assume 
that Liao aims were the same as those of the Jin, Yuan and Qing? Nothing that 
the Liao actually did supports the view that they wanted to destroy the Song. 
Even the Jin did not begin their destruction of the Liao with the ultimate aim of 
also destroying the Song. Quite by accident, the steppe cavalry requirement to 
act offensively on a tactical level, to attack and raid, in order to pressure a 
neighbor for concessions, succeeded beyond the Jin’s intentions and destroyed 
the Northern Song. Their initial successes and the pathetic Song response 
opened up the possibility of a grander vision of conquest beyond their steppe 
environment.
Ultimately then, this study places the responsibility for the collapse of the
Northern Song on a dramatic change in the aims of the steppe peoples. The
material conditions of the battlefield forced steppe cavalry armies to fight tactical
wars of annihilation. By accident, the Jin armies stumbled upon the broader
vision of strategic annihilation. It was the first step in developing an even grander
vision that allowed the Mongols to see beyond their own steppe environment and
the edges of the sedentary communities to the very centers of the great civilizations.
Once they saw that they did not need to limit their aims as the Liao did, the
psychological barrier to deeper and more lasting conquest was destroyed. They
changed from raiders to true invaders and conquerors. The end of the Northern
Song and later the Southern Song was the result of steppe cavalrymen learning
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that China was theirs if they wanted it.
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CHAPTER TWO
Several topics must be discussed before turning to the narrative account 
of the military campaigns. In order of discussion, they are: Song military 
organization; the Yuanfeng Reorganization; Weapons, Armor and Tactics; 
Fortifications; the Liao; and the Sixteen Prefectures.
Song military organization56
The basic building block of the Northern Song army was the battalion 
If. It was also called a ying §  in garrison. Each battalion had an established 
strength of five hundred men. They were not always at full strength.57 It is 
impossible to determine if any battalion was ever at full strength. Battalions were 
further divided into five companies IP of one hundred men each.58 Every battalion
“ The following discussion of Song military organization is based on Wang Zengyu £  if  
Songchao bingzhichutan (BeijingJtK: Zhonghua shujucHbiiFflj,1983); Luo
Qiuqing “Beisong bingzhi yanjiu Xinya Xuebaoi 3:1 (August
1957,169-270; Michael Charles McGrath, “Military and Regional Administration in Northern 
Sung China (960-1126)", Unpublished Ph.d. diss., Princeton University, 1982; and Edmund 
Worthy, The Founding of Sung China, 950-1000", Unpublished Ph.d. diss., Princeton University, 
1976, esp. 101-211.
^Wang Zengyu, op. cit., 29-30. For evidence of battalions that were not up to strength 
Wang cites a report by Bao Zheng in Baozhengji ((s S H ) 8: “Qingyi jiboshen sanzhou 
bingma ( W & M W Bao was requesting that several battalions be ordered to return 
to their original posts because it was becoming impossible to supply them where they were. The 
third Brave and Keen battalion had 358 men; the eighth 449; the eleventh 473; the thirteenth 
471; the fourteenth 462; and the twenty first 470. The first Upright and Victorious Jj M  battalion 
had 439 men and the seventh 375. The third Brave and Victorious H g! battalion had 425 men 
and the fifth 450.
“ WJZY 1/16b. The description goes on to say that five companies made a battalion 
five battalions made a regiment 5 , and five regiments made a brigade fi®. The organization was
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had a complement of attached officers. It was lead by a commander and 
an assistant commander The smallest organizational unit was the
company.59 Both cavalry and infantry companies were lead by a captain
and a lieutenant respectively. Below the captain and
lieutenant each company had a squad leader -HKf, surveillance chief 
surveillance officer ;fc£j, and a military police chief If.®
The Song dynasty maintained a standing army of professional soldiers.61
In addition to the Imperial Army there were also the Provincial Armies AfPS,
local militia and barbarian auxiliaries The Imperial Army was the only
real fighting force. Provincial Army troops were used for labor and as a recruiting
and dumping ground for the Imperial Army. Soldiers of the Imperial Army who
failed their fitness review were demoted to the Provincial Armies. The local
militia helped to maintain local order. Barbarian auxiliaries were first used on the
border with the Xixia. They were used as guides and scouts for the Imperial
Army. Soldiers of the Imperial Army trained daily to respond to the sound of the
drum and received a salary of at least five hundred cash a month. Troops who
trained part of the time and acted as laborers part of the time received a salary of
less than three hundred cash a month. There were five drills for the cavalry and
not as regular as WJZY described. See Worthy, op. cit., 155-158 and 202 n.60.
5aSogabe Shizuo “Guanyu zhongguo jundui de bianzhi mingcheng, du yu
zhihui S S ftflJ? ),” Sungshiyanjiuji 5, 329-339.
“Worthy, op. cit., 155-156 and 159-160. Worthy’s description is based on SS 187/20ab 
and 166/3b-5a for the Imperial Guard and 187/16b and 166/1 a-2b for the Palace Corps.
61l have eschewed the term “mercenary” because its negative connotations are not 
always warranted with regard to the paid soldiers of the Song army.
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four for the infantry (sitting, rising, advancing and retreating [*£ fg jiil]).6e
The organization of the Northern Song military above the battalion level 
was a complex system that balanced the need to concentrate forces for attack 
and defense with the need to disperse forces for supply and internal stability. 
Internal stability was the primary concern early in the dynasty. Song Taizu’s own 
coup d'etat demonstrated the danger of any individual, apart from the emperor 
himself, holding a unified or near-unified command over the army. Apart from the 
bifurcation of civil Jc and military jg responsibilities in the government, the Imperial 
Army itself was divided into the Imperial Guard and the Palace Corps Wkm. 
The Imperial Guard was later further divided into cavalry and infantry commands. 
Neither the civil-military division nor the Imperial Guard-Palace Corps split were 
Song innovations. Indeed, Song Taizu was the Supreme Commander of Latter 
Zhou Palace Corps before his coup.
As the inheritors of an existing government and army system Northern 
Song emperors and their officials stabilized the country through modification of 
structures rather than radical reorganization. While the administrative and military 
system was not static over the first century or so of the dynasty, it only underwent 
dramatic change during the Yuanfeng 7c fi period (1078-1085). Accordingly, our 
discussion of the Northern Song will first establish the general shape of the 
pre-Yuanfeng system and then examine the changes made by the reorganization.
The Song emperor held ultimate authority over all government actions. 
The government apparatus for informing, advising and carrying out his decisions 
“ SS 195.4853.
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was divided into two parts, the civil and the military. The so-called “two authorities” 
(Mi£F) were the Secretariat-Chancellery ( ^ fH T )  for civil affairs and the Bureau 
of Military Affairs for military affairs. Financial affairs were controlled by
the Finance Commission (H bI).63 The heads of the Secretariat-Chancellery and 
the Bureau of Military Affairs were both part of the Council of State. Both 
administrations reported directly to the emperor.
Splitting the authority of the government into civil and military spheres 
prevented high officials from gaining too much power. While in 19th century 
Prussia having the military directly responsible to the Kaiser contributed to growing 
militarism and lack of control over the military, the same was not true during the 
Northern Song. The obvious difference was that in Prussia the chief of the 
General Staff was actually a military officer, a soldier, not a military bureaucrat. 
During the Northern Song, the Bureau of Military Affairs was staffed by military 
bureaucrats who were often civil officials. Military affairs were frequently controlled 
by civilians even though the direction of civil and military matters was divided 
between different officials.
The civil-military division of administration was further complicated by two 
ranking systems for government officials. Above the government clerks, all officials 
held ranks distinct from their actual duties. There was a military and a civil rank 
system. The military rank system was not reserved for military officers. It also
“ E. A. Kracke, Civil Service in Early Sung China, 960-1067 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1953), 38. An alternate translation based on slightly different 
characters, Two Administrations" (—JiT) is given in Charles 0 . Hucker, A Dictionary of Official 
Titles in Imperial China (Taipei, Taiwan: Southern Materials Center, 1988), 42.
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encompassed a variety of men whose functions were purely bureaucratic. Thus, 
many military officials, that is, men holding rank in the military system, were in 
fact civilians without real military functions.
Officers were under the jurisdiction of either the Sanya (H fr), composed 
of the Bureaus of the Imperial Guard, Palace Corps Infantry and Palace Corps 
Cavalry, or the Bureau of Military Affairs. There were two kinds of officers in the 
army: attached and unattached. Officers involved in commanding the troops of a 
battalion were “attached" to them. They came under the authority of the Sanya. 
Officers not connected to a battalion were “unattached.” They were directly 
under the authority of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Once an officer was promoted 
out of the attached ranks he could be assigned to a variety of jobs from civilian 
administration to command of expeditionary armies.
The Sanya was directly in charge of Imperial Army personnel. It recruited 
and trained the professional soldiers of the.empire and maintained troop strength. 
Every three years it reviewed the attached officers in the emperor’s presence, at 
which time it made promotions and demotions. Attached officers had to maintain 
their combat fitness. If they became physically impaired or reached the age of 
fifty-four years old (55 sui) they had to retire. Unattached officers were not 
constrained by these requirements.64
There were several large standing troop administrative units above the 
battalion level. These administrative units were not combat formations. It was
“ Winston Lo, An Introduction to the Sung Civil Service (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 
Press, 1987), 64.
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later recognized that one of the causes of the army’s weakness was the failure to 
train in larger units. The other problem was that severing the connections between 
officers and troops was politically stabilizing but militarily debilitating. As we have 
mentioned before, the Song may have traded poor military performance for political 
stability. Except during war, the most ambitious and competent officers had to 
find jobs outside of the ranks of the combat formations if they wanted to advance 
themselves. The best jobs for officers were not in the army. High ranking 
officers only returned to command larger expeditions of troops drawn from disparate 
units outside the capital. Even if we assume that the officers of the battalions 
were competent and the troops well trained, failure to coordinate the battalions in 
larger formations would be fatal in the face of highly mobile opponents like the 
Liao. The failure of any individual unit in battle would be enough to break a 
larger formation. Lack of cohesion between battalions was one of the problems 
addressed by later reforms (see below).
Expeditionary armies were formed on an ad hoc basis and dissolved at
the end of the campaign they had been assembled to prosecute. The highest
positions of command were fairly standard. In addition to the Commander in
Chief and his second in command there was a Vanguard
Commander in Chief and his second in command
as well as an Director in Chief ftfi£. If the emperor was present the command of
the cavalry and infantry was sometimes split. A theatre commander was appointed
for large campaigns. Since expeditionary armies were created from units outside
the capital the build-up often began before the commander in chief and the
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higher rank officers were assigned. Once the officers had been chosen, the 
emperor held a feast and distributed gifts to them according to their ranks. The 
emperor also gave final orders to the officers. This was the emperor’s final effort 
to strengthen his generals’ loyalty before letting them take control of an army. 
On at least one occasion Taizu sent a gift to Cao Bin, who was on campaign in 
Sichuan at the time, to show that he was thinking of him and his troops. A timely 
distribution of largesse was a good way to improve morale and reinforce loyalty.
The overall deployment of Song troops was designed to insure the security 
of the emperor. The army also had to defend the borders. A balance was struck, 
at least theoretically, between the number of Imperial Army troops stationed at 
the capital and Imperial Army troops stationed on the border. The troops were 
rotated between the capital and the border.65 Troops at the capital trained. 
Troops on the border got field experience. A balance of forces was maintained 
within the capital to insure the emperor’s safety. That was the primary reason for 
maintaining the Imperial Guard-Palace Corps division. No general was in a 
position of overall command, whether inside or outside the capital.66 Command 
was further fragmented by leaving the positions at the top of the army hierarchy 
vacant.67
The Song army grew drastically over the course of the dynasty. Some of
“ Wang Zengyu, op. eft., 55-58, for the regulations on troop rotation
“ See McGrath, op. at., 146, for a diagram with the locations of the various armies in
Kaifeng.
^Worthy, op. cit., 167, provides a chart of the top positions of the military hierarchy from 
the late Latter Zhou to 961 showing the unfilled posts.
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the early increases, particularly during Taizu's reign, were due to the expansion 
of the empire. When Taizu founded the Song he inherited about 120,000 troops 
from the Latter Zhou, probably exclusive of provincial troops. By 997 the total 
had reached 666,000 and by 1022 the figure was 912,000. Troop numbers 
peaked at 1,259,000 in 1048, decreasing slightly to 1,162,000 in 1067 and 1,063, 
688 in 1077.68 Even during Taizu’s time the difficulty of supplying a large 
standing army continually in one location was a cause for concern. It was the 
main reason that Kaifeng became the Song capital. Kaifeng was at the north end 
of the Bian canal which allowed it to be readily supplied from the south. Taizu 
wanted to move the capital to Luoyang, but the logistical problems of maintaining 
the army there were enough to dissuade him. There were also great difficulties 
in keeping the troops on the border supplied.
The survival of the Song dynasty was the result of a long process of 
centralization of military power following the Anlushan Rebellion in 755. Centralized 
political power was predicated on a militarily strong center around the emperor. 
The Northern Song military system grew out of the conditions of the late Tang 
and Five Dynasties period. It was not sufficient for the emperor to be able to 
withstand an attack on his capital. The emperor had to have enough troops at 
hand to actively destroy any and all regional warlords. The capital itself was less 
important than the person of the emperor. This was why Song Taizu could 
choose Kaifeng as his capital despite the fact that it did not have the imperial
“ McGrath, op. eft., 148, provides a chart with all of the troop numbers and their 
breakdowns by reign period and Imperial Army-Provincial Army. Also Worthy, op. cit., 181-182.
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history of Luoyang or Changan. Military logistics overrode geographic symbolism. 
But Kaifeng was not in a strong defensive position. There were no geographic 
impediments to an advancing army from the north once they were past the 
mountain passes that the Song did not hold.
As war with the Liao and then the Xixia continued, the Song was unable to 
reduce the number of troops on the northern borders. In fact the number of 
troops increased. Any increase in troops on the border had to be balanced by a 
similar increase in troops at the center. Troops stationed in Kaifeng were not 
there to defend the city from foreign invasion, they were there to prevent rebellion. 
The increase in troop numbers further exacerbated the logistical problems. The 
army gradually concentrated its armies where they were most needed, at Kaifeng 
and on the border. But there were no other defenses between the border and 
Kaifeng. When the Jin breached the border defenses they reached Kaifeng in a 
matter of days. Despite its walls and its vast armies, the city could not be 
effectively defended.
The Yuanfeng Reorganization
One of the primary purposes of the reforms of Wang Anshi and his followers 
was transforming the economic power of the Song state into military power. With 
regard to the military, the reformers went to great lengths to increase the supply 
of horses and to shift the burden of defense from the professional army to the
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militia.69 While the administration of attached officers and troops remained under
the Sanya, unattached officers, previously under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Military Affairs, now came under the authority of the Right Personnel Office of the
President Civil officials were under authority of the Left Personnel
Office of the President iiS jftfiig. The effects of the change went beyond
simplification of personnel administration.
“The impact of the Yuan-feng reorganization on the status of officials of 
military rank in the civil service may be briefly summarized as follows.
Prior to the reorganization, they were set apart from officials of civil rank 
by their own rank system with its unique terminology and by the fact that 
they belonged to a different personnel system. The Yuan-feng reorganization 
imposed a uniform terminology on the rank systems of both the civil and 
military officials and brought them under the same personnel agency. The 
barriers that used to separate them were therefore reduced and the 
psychological distance between them was shortened. On the other hand 
the Yuan-feng reorganization also had the effect of weakening the ties 
between the many military rank officials and the military establishment.
(my italics)”70
The reorganization thus raised the status of military officials with regard to civil
officials, but diluted their martial aspect.
While the higher ranks of the officer corps were being reorganized, the
Imperial Army was also being reconfigured. First, the rotation system was
abandoned. Su Shi pointed out that the system of rotating the troops between
the border and the capital every three years was as expensive as launching a
major campaign.71 Second, in 1074 troops were shifted into commands jf§ of
"For a detailed study of Wang’s efforts to increase the supply of horses see Paul Smith, 
Taxing Heaven's Storehouse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
7CLo, op dt.,73.
71Su Shi, Dongpoji, 18. Cited in McGrath, op. dt„ 165 n. 93.
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approximately three thousand men each. A command could be formed from 
different kinds of troops (Imperial Army, Provincial Army, Barbarian Auxiliary). It 
trained together as a unit and remained in one location. The changes were 
supposed to create a better-trained force with strong unit cohesion. But the 
quality of the troops did not improve.72
The final part of the new military policies was the creation of the Baojia 
^system. This system was designed to organize all of the households in the 
empire into units which would police themselves and maintain a militia. Ultimately 
the militia would become a real fighting force and replace the expensive professional 
army. While the organization of households took place, the military value of the 
militia produced is unclear.73
The reforms did not demonstrably improve the Song’s military situation. 
On the surface the policies seemed reasonable. They would increase the supply 
of horses and tremendously increase the number of soldiers while at the same 
time decrease the economic burden on the state. But as Winston Lo evaluated 
them: “There is no question that these innovations in the structure and deployment 
pattern of the army did not work as well as they were expected to. Inadequate 
provisions for monitoring the performance of the new system, together with the 
general malaise of the dynasty during the reign of Emperor Hui-tsung, contributed 
to the military debacle."74 The contribution of the reforms and of a general
^McGrath, op. dt„ 236-238; Wang Zengyu, op. cit., 107-114; Lo, op. cit., 77.
^ a n g  Zengyu, op. cit., 122-126; Lo, op. cit., 77.
74Lo, op. cit., 77.
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malaise under Huizong to the Northern Song military collapse in 1126-27 is, in 
fact, not provable.75 As I have argued in chapter one, the “decline” of the 
Northern Song army is really a tautology. It lost to the Jin because it had deteriorated. 
It's loss to the Jin proved it had deteriorated. What the reforms do show is what 
some Song officials believed were the army’s problems: insufficient horses, poor 
training, lack of unit cohesion and great expense. Ail of these problems were 
addressed, but to whatever extent they succeeded or failed they did not improve 
the situation.
Weapons, Armor and Tactics
There are three sources that provide information concerning the weapons, 
armor and tactics of Song armies: the Songhuiyao 5fc#g, the battle accounts in 
the histories and the Wujingzongyao j&Mf&g, a military encyclopedia submitted 
to the throne in 1044. The latter source is the least reliable but the most 
comprehensive, providing drawings in addition to its explanations. Unfortunately, 
some of the Wujingzongyao's contents are so fanciful that they damage the 
credibility of the more reasonable items. For example, the Elephant Cart MlM  or 
the Tiger Cart (see illustration), comprising and elephant or a tiger tied to 
the bed of their eponymous vehicles respectively, at least in one extant edition,
7SFor a discussion ot the problems of Huizong’s court see John Winthrop Haeger, 
“1126-27: Political Crisis and the Integrity of Culture,” in John Winthrop Haeger (ed.), Crisis and 
Prosperity in Sung China (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975), 143-161. As with most 
discussions of the “malaise” there is no critical consideration of the actual fighting and the 
success of the Jin is mostly attributed to the failure of the Song.
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are so ludicrous that they must have existed in some form to warrant inclusion in 
what was supposed to be a sober military manual.76 While it is easy to dispense 
with the more outlandish items and to accept the reasonable ones, like the 
ordinary varieties of swords or bows, there are certain things, particularly regarding 
tactical formations, that defy clarification. A detailed discussion of weapons, 
armor and tactics is beyond the scope of this study but some general comments 
are necessary in order to clarify the nature of warfare during the Northern Song.
The weapons ordinarily used by the Song army can be divided into four 
general categories: swords, spears, bows and crossbows. Larger and more 
variegated weapons were available, at least on paper, for siege operations. 
Some battle accounts make it clear that larger, crew-operated crossbows and 
trebuchets were sometimes used in the field. Regular army soldiers were all 
issued body armor and helmets. Horse armor existed in some form, but it is not 
clear if it was regularly used. Some kinds of standardized formations were used, 
but their exact forms are unclear. Chentu gglH, or formation plans, were presented 
to the emperor on several occasions and issued to troops. The extant chentu are 
concerned with mysticism and five phases theory rather than real military operations. 
Consequently they will not be considered here.77
The Wujingzongyao contains drawings and explanations of the five cavalry 
exercises and the four infantry exercises practiced daily by the Imperial Army.
78WJZY 13/27a and 13/28b. The Sikuquanshu H edition of the Wujingzongyao 
clearly portrays actual animals tied to the beds of carts. Another, probably more likely, version 
portrays animal shaped carts with spears protruding from the “animal” mouths.
^ibid., xx
52
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
While these exercises may have changed over the course of the dynasty, it is 
worth examining the ones available in the Wujingzongyao to get some idea of 
what sort of tactics the Song army used (see accompanying illustrations).
Cavalry Exercises
In the first cavalry exercise forty six infantry and one hundred and seventy 
four cavalry soldiers made one section At the sound of the drum the infantry 
fired three volleys of arrows and then “opened the gate” for the cavalry to charge 
out. The cavalry fired three times to the front, turned78 and fired twice to their 
rear. The infantry welcomed the cavalry back by firing three volleys, presumably 
over their heads, before the cavalry reentered the formation. This was repeated 
three times until the sound of the drums stopped.
In the second cavalry exercise one hundred and seventy four men were 
divided into three sections. Each section was separated into four lines f f . When 
the drum sounded the first section came out, each line firing three volleys of 
arrows. They stopped and the front two lines fixed their spears. The front two 
lines uttered a loud cry and made three stabs. The rear two lines also made a 
loud cry. The entire section turned their horses and fired twice to their rear 
before returning to their old places. The second and third section then performed 
the same exercise. However, when the second section charged out, the first two
7al have interpolated the turn from the text on the assumption that the cavalry would hit 
their own infantry if they did not turn before firing to their rear.
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lines fixed spears and did not fire to the front. The third section followed the 
same pattern as the first. When all three sections had gone out again, the drum 
stopped. The rear lines of the first section who had already fired arrows the first 
time did not fire arrows the second time. Those who had not fired arrows in the 
second section changed places with those who had in subsequent exercises.
In the third cavalry exercise one hundred and seventy four soldiers were 
divided into six platoons Each platoon was divided into five lines. They 
advanced and retreated as they did in the second exercise.
In the fourth cavalry exercise one hundred and seventy four soldiers were 
divided into six platoons. When they heard the drum two men first advanced 
carrying flags. The front two lines rode out and fired three volleys to the front. 
They turned, fired two volleys to the rear and stopped. The rear four lines did not 
move and welcomed back the forward two by each firing three volleys.
In the fifth cavalry exercise one hundred and seventy four men were 
divided into twelve platoons. At the sound of the drum everyone went out 
together, fired three volleys of arrows, fixed spears, gave a great cry and made 
two stabs.
Infantry Exercises
In the first infantry exercise one hundred and eighty eight infantry and
twenty seven cavalry soldiers made one formation W. At the sound of the first
drum the spear and swordsmen ItTJ stood. At the second drum the spear and
54
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
swordsmen and crossbowmen all sat and the bowmen stood and fired volleys of 
arrows just as in the first cavalry exercise.
In the second infantry exercise one hundred and eighty eight infantry 
soldiers made one formation. At the sound of the drum those holding flags left 
the lines and went forward to establish the boundaries. When the first drum 
sounded the spear and swordsmen stood. At the second drum the spear and 
swordsmen all sat and the bow and crossbowmen stood and fired three volleys. 
The drum sounded again and they advanced a little and fired another three 
volleys. The drum sounded and the front line dragged forward the spearmen and 
advanced. The bow and crossbowmen followed until they reached the point 
where the boundary flags had been set up. When they heard a drum the spear 
and swordsmen stood up. At the next drum the spear and swordsmen sat down 
and the bow and crossbowmen stood and fired three volleys. At the next drum 
the spear and swordsmen again stood up and brought their spearheads upright. 
At the sound of the gong they retreated to their old place and stopped. At one 
drum the spear and swordsmen stood. At the second they sat and unfurled the 
flags. At the third they again stood. At the fourth the spears and flags returned 
to the way they were. Then the drums stopped.
The third exercise was like the second in the number of soldiers and the 
advancing and retreating. However, the bow and crossbowmen each fired one 
volley. Apart from that there was no difference.
The fourth infantry exercise was just like the third.
It is readily apparent that the numbers given in other parts of the text
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regarding unit size conflict with the numbers of soldiers involved in the daily 
exercises. This raises the important question of whether the daily exercises were 
more parade ground performance than battlefield preparation. The number of 
soldiers required to perform a given exercise can be neither simply multiplied to 
nor evenly divided from standing troop units. This limits the conclusions we can 
draw about the tactics of the Song army. Several facts are clear. Song soldiers 
were trained to respond to the sounds of drums and gongs. They followed flags 
and their leaders advanced with those flags into battle at the head of their units. 
Cavalrymen were trained in archery and spear fighting. They could fire both to 
the front and rear while moving. Infantrymen may have been more specialized in 
their skills. No provision was made for soldiers to switch positions (from archer 
to spearman, etc.), as the cavalry did, in the course of practice. A line of 
spearmen was required to protect the archers. Provisions were made for different 
mixes of bow, crossbow and spearmen.
Archery, either with a bow or a crossbow, was the predominant skill practiced
by Song soldiers. All cavalrymen and most infantrymen were archers. Infantrymen
used crossbows slightly more often than bows. Crossbowmen always stood in
front of bowmen. No provision were made for different rates of fire for bows and
crossbows. The Wujingzongyao lists four kinds of bows and six kinds of crossbows.
There were six kinds of arrows, including fire arrows using gunpowder, for the
bows and five kinds of bolts for the crossbows. Although new varieties of crossbows,
like the Divine Elbow Bow, were invented later in the eleventh century, Song
soldiers relied solely on leg, back and arm strength to span the weapons. No
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mechanical devices were used to enhance their strength even though winches 
were used on the larger, siege crossbows.
There were two different groups of spears available, one set of three very 
long spears and one set of nine shorter ones.79 The longer spears ranged from 
5.544 meters to 5.775 meters in length. Their use appears to have been restricted 
to siege operations. The shorter set of nine spears are described as “several 
feet long." The first three were used by cavalrymen. The text notes that the Man 
tribesmen in the south used spears one-handed and threw them accurately within 
several tens of paces # , one pace being approximately 1.15 meters.80 Presumably, 
in contrast, Chinese soldiers expected to wield their spears with both hands. All 
but one of the spears had some kind of point or knob on its butt. A true 
double-ended spear is also listed amongst the swords and axes section. It 
appears to have been particularly short.
In addition to varieties of spears, there were several kinds of halberds. 
The character for halberd 77 is more often read “knife”, but the weapons represented 
are clearly long shafts with large blades on top. A “hand knife" ^77 is represented 
on the same page with the three halberds. It is clearly a sword. The two swords 
on the previous page are both referred to as swords M. The difference appears 
to be that swords have straight blades and knives have curved ones.
79Weapon lengths are calculated based on ten chi R  to the zhang X- I use the small chi 
/hRwhich is equivalent to 23.1 cm. There were several larger calculations of chi, for example 
Zhu Xi in his Jiali W &. figures a foot of doth to actually be equivalent to one chi R  one cun 
Tf three fen f t  or 27.43 cm. See Jin Qixin Zhongguo gudai jianzhu chicun shejiyanjiu
(Anhui kexue jishu chubanshe 1991), 30-31.
“tone pace is equivalent to five chi.
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Turning from hand weapons to poliorcetics, there were two varieties of 
crew-served weapons: large crossbows and trebuchets. While gunpowder MM 
was available during the Northern Song and was used in various incendiary 
devices, cannon had not been invented yet. There were six kinds of large 
crossbows. Two of the crossbows had three bows mounted on the stock, two in 
the usual bow position and one facing the opposite direction. In the Three Bow 
Crossbow” EmM, with a crew of seventy men, the three bows worked in concert 
to cast a “one spear three swords arrow” — three hundred paces. In the 
four varieties of double-bowed crossbows the two bows faced in opposite directions. 
Using crews of from four to seven, these crossbows shot arrows a hundred and 
forty to a hundred and fifty paces.
The Wujingzongyao contains seventeen varieties of trebuchet. The 
trebuchet as it was usually known in the west was a counter-weighted swape arm 
balanced on a fulcrum. In China the force was originally supplied by men pulling 
on ropes. It was only in the very late 12th century that the counterweighted 
trebuchet came into China.81 During the Northern Song, only the manned form 
of the trebuchet was available. Its power and range were dependent on the size 
of projectile fired and the number of men pulling on the ropes. The longest range 
for a manned trebuchet was about one hundred and thirty three yards, firing a 
twenty five pound projectile using one hundred haulers.82
81 Joseph Needham, Lynn White Festschriften, “China’s Trebuchets, Manned and 
Counterweighted," 1976,110.
“ibid., 112-113.
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Before concluding our consideration of weapons, armor and tactics, we 
should mention those available to the Liao, Xixia and Jin. Our information is best 
for the Liao, but their equipment was similar to the Xixia and Jin. Liao soldiers 
were almost exclusively horse-archers. Unlike the professional Song soldier, a 
Liao soldier supplied much of his own equipment. The Liao army was not 
encumbered with a supply train and its soldiers were expected to live off the land, 
particularly when campaigning in China. Most significantly, Liao cavalrymen 
were required to have at least three horses per man. Compare this with the 
Song’s inability to even supply one mount for each cavalryman on the one hand 
and the Mongol practice of six horses per man on the other. Liao horses were 
also qualitatively better because Song access to horses was limited. The Liao 
army was therefore far more mobile than the Song, able to change horses and 
unencumbered by a baggage train. Those same characteristics which were so 
advantageous when the Liao army was moving were equally disadvantageous 
when the army stopped. The large number of horses quickly ate all of the 
available grass and the lack of a supply train quickly exhausted human provisions 
as well.
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Fortifications
There were no innovations in fortification during the Song. But there were 
also no changes in siege equipment either until the 12th century (see above). 
Thus the balance between attacker and defender was static during the Northern 
Song. Which was stronger, attacker or defender? The evidence is ambiguous. 
There were simply too many independent variables affecting the outcome of 
assaults on fortifications to generalize. Herbert Franke was certainly correct 
when he said that: “...walled towns were comparatively safe if stubbornly defended," 
but the evidence does not support his further assertion that: “...in general the 
odds were certainly against the besieging forces."83 How can the first statement 
be correct and the second incorrect? The key word in Professor Franke’s first 
statement is “comparatively.” A defender in an established fortification had a 
comparative advantage over a defender in the open field. Because there was no 
possibility of the attackers bringing up artillery capable of rapidly destroying a 
town or fort’s walls a defender had a comparative advantage over an attacker. 
But a besieger usually has the advantage of initiative. He decides when and 
where to attack. Thus an attacker can defeat individual forts or towns in detail, 
bringing overwhelming force to bear at a single point. The strength of the 
attacker in China during the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries compared 
extremely favorably with that in Europe at the same time. The near impregnability
“ Herbert Franke, “Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China," in Chinese Ways in 
Warfare, Frank A. Kierman and John K. Fairbank eds., (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1974), 151-152.
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of medieval European fortresses was only overturned with the advent of cannon.
There were no private fortifications in Song China. All real military defenses 
were owned and controlled by the state. These defenses can be divided into 
three categories: towns/cities, forts and palisades. Virtually all three categories 
of defense were constructed either of tamped-earth or wood, with the former far 
more common. Wood was occasionally used in small forts and in a few smaller 
palisades. It was also used to build towers on top of tamped-earth walls. For the 
most part all of the significant sieges during the Northern Song involved attacks 
on towns or cities surrounded by a tamped-earth wall. Taller tamped-earth walls 
had broader bases than tops, making the walls slightly angled as they rose.
City or town defenses basically consisted of a moat, either dry or wet, and
a single tamped-earth wall. Cities were most often square, or at least rectilinear,
in shape. Larger cities, for example Northern Han Taiyuan, sometimes had more
than one wall in concentric rings. Between the moat and the wall was the “horse
and goat wall.” This was an area at the foot of the wall where troops could be
deployed to fire across the moat at attackers. A low wall on the edge of the moat
sometimes protected the deployed troops. The main wall itself might have a
number of “horse faces" or projecting square bastions that allowed defenders to
fire along the face of the wall and enfilade attackers. Wooden towers were
spaced along the wall and on top of the gate to shelter troops from the weather
and from missiles. A machiolated battlement, the “woman’s wall," ran along the
outside of the wall at the top to provide missile protection for the defenders. The
gates were usually thicker than the walls. They were often the focus of attacks
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since the doors could be battered down more easily than the walls. Gates were 
often reinforced with a “moon wall” in front of them. The “moon wall” was a 
semi-circular wall placed in front of the gate to add another layer of defense.
Forts and palisades were mostly smaller defensive positions than towns or 
cities, though their general form as not very different.84 A fort was usually 
established for purely military purposes at a strategic point, for defense or 
observation. Like the town or city, a wall of either tamped-earth or wood was the 
main defensive work, with one or more gates to provide access, and towers on 
the walls for observation and as fighting platforms. Sometimes villages were 
fortified or communities grew up near forts. It is virtually impossible to determine 
from the records whether a fort was simply a fort, a fort with an adjacent village, 
or a fortified village. For the purposes of this discussion of Northern Song 
military history a “fort” refers to a fortified defensive position smaller than a 
prefectural seat (which were always walled) and often smaller than a county seat. 
A palisade was simply a wall that did not enclose a space but formed a barrier 
across a position. The Great Wall of China is really a very large palisade forming 
a barrier between the northern steppes and China. The defensive value of a 
palisade is limited by the fact that it can often be outflanked.
84The following discussion of forts is based on Qiuqing Luo, “Song-Xia zhanzhengzhong 
de fanbu yu baozhai ChongjiXuebao 6 2  (May 1967),
223-243.
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The Liao M®
The first emperor of the Qidan (or Khitan) state of Liao was Abaoji PrT
posthumously known as Liao Taizu He was succeeded by his son
Deguang posthumously known as Taizong It was under Taizong that 
the name “Liao” was first proclaimed in 947.86 The Qidan were a confederation 
of nomadic steppe tribes that emerged as a powerful force during the Tang 
dynasty. In 755, Anlushan routed the Qidan, making up for his serious
defeat at their hands in 751. Qidan troops took part in Anlushan’s rebellion later 
in 755, participating in his invasion of Hebei Mifc.
After Anlushan was defeated, many Qidan surrendered to the Tang. They 
maintained close ties with the military governors of provinces in Hebei, particularly 
with the governor of Fanyang Wtk (later called Lulong M il) based at Youzhou 
# # { (modern Beijing). Thus, their attachment to part of the area which became 
known as the Sixteen Prefectures extended back to the eighth century. Considering 
the Turkic origin of many of the military governors of Fanyang, it is also not 
surprising that the Qidan did not regard the area as particularly Chinese.
In 907, the chief of the lla tribe, Abaoji, was elected leader of the Qidan 
confederation. Even before his election, Abaoji had proven himself as a military
“The following discussion of the Liao and their history is based on Denis Twitchett and 
Klaus-Peter Tietze, The Liao,” in The Cambridge History of China vol. 6, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 43-153, and Karl August Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of
Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125), (Philadelphia, 1949).
“ it is interesting to note that the proclamation of the founding of the Liao dynasty only 
took place in the brief period during the Qidan occupation of Kaifeng.
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leader, successfully attacking neighboring tribes and raiding the Chinese province 
of Hedong in 901, 902 and 903. In 905, Abaoji negotiated a treaty with Li
Keyong the military governor of Hedong, so that he could focus his
attention on attacking Lulong (previously called Fanyang). Abaoji raided Lulong 
every year from 903 to 907.
While Abaoji continued to participate in the struggle for power in China 
following the collapse of the Tang dynasty, he also had to fight to maintain his 
own position as supreme ruler of the Qidan. Abaoji established himself as 
emperor of the Qidan in 916 after suppressing two rebellions and an assassination 
plot instigated by his younger brothers. As an emperor, he was equal to any 
Chinese rulers. Abaoji built a Chinese-style capital city and established a dual 
system of administration, one for the tribal areas in the north and one for the 
sedentary, mostly Chinese, population in the south.
In 916, Abaoji invaded northern Hedong and Hebei, besieging Youzhou
for two hundred days until driven off. In 921, he invaded Hebei again and was
driven off. When the strong state of Latter Tang was established in north
China in 923, Abaoji shifted his efforts to the steppes. He conquered tribes and
territory to the north, southwest and east. In the east he conquered the Chinese-style
state of Bohai (Parhae) WjM. In 926, there was a coup d’etat at the court of the
Later Tang. The new emperor sent an envoy to Abaoji, who had just finished
conquering Bohai. Abaoji said that he would make a settlement with the Tang
after taking Youzhou and Hebei. When that was refused, he scaled down his
demands to Youzhou and Zhenzhou, an enlarged version of Lulong. Before
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negotiations could continue, Abaoji got sick and died.
Abaoji’s son Deguang became the second emperor of the Qidan. In 936, 
Deguang supported Shi Jingtang with fifty thousand cavalry in his rebellion against 
the Later Tang. The Qidan emperor appointed Shi emperor of the Jin f f  dynasty. 
Deguang refused to withdraw from Youzhou and Jizhou which he had occupied 
when he came south. Shi Jingtang was forced to formally cede sixteen prefectures 
along the northern border, which included all the strategic passes controlling 
northern China, to the Qidan. Deguang had thus achieved Abaoji’s goal of 
holding the dominant territorial position with regard to China. It proved to be a 
lasting legacy that allowed the Qidan to deal with all of the Chinese dynasties, 
including the Song, from a position of strength.
Shi Jingtang died in 942 and was succeeded by Shi Chonggui. Chonggui 
rejected Jingtang’s earlier agreements with Deguang and sent the Qidan 
representative at court home with an insulting letter for the Qidan emperor. 
Deguang invaded late in 944. After several years of hard fighting, Chonggui's 
uncle, the commander in chief of the Jin army surrendered. Deguang entered 
Kaifeng, the Jin capital, early in 947. He proclaimed a new name for the Qidan 
empire, Great Liao ;*d l. But it proved impossible to rule north China in the face 
of a hostile population. Only three months after entering Kaifeng, the Qidan, now 
Liao, emperor withdrew, carting off all the valuables, armor, weapons, books and 
personnel his forces could carry.
Deguang’s brief stint as “ruler” of China convinced him and his successors
that they could not directly rule China. Abaoji’s original territorial objectives
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proved more practical. Liao emperors could influence events in China through 
military intervention or the threat of intervention but they no longer believed that 
they could rule a large, hostile, sedentary population. Limiting their ambitions in 
the south freed Liao emperors to concentrate more attention on their other borders. 
While Liao aims with regard to the Song were limited to establishing and preserving 
their mutual border, maintaining trade and squeezing as much money and silk 
out of the Chinese court as possible, their aims in all other directions were much 
more grand.
The Sixteen Prefectures87
In 938 Shi Jingtang r ceded sixteen prefectures to the Liao to repay 
their help in establishing his Jin If dynasty. Fifty thousand Liao cavalry led by 
the Liao emperor Deguang had established Shi. But Deguang demanded real 
concessions from Shi. The Liao emperor had no intention of fully withdrawing 
either his troops or the influence that accompanied them from Chinese territory.88 
He chose to take control of the northern sections of Hedong and Hebei, containing 
all of the strategic north-south passes from the steppes to the central plain of
87This discussion of the Sixteen Prefectures is based on the following articles: Tiehan 
Zhao f&sS&i, “Yanyun Shiliuzhoudedilifenxi ; Nap-yin Lau 2 f i ,
“Song-Liao Shanyuanzhimeng Xintan ( , ” Lishi Yuyan Yanjiusuo Jikan (S?£ 
vol. 61, part 3 (Sept. 1990), Taibei, 693-747. The first footnote in Nap-yin Lau’s 
article lists twenty-two articles on the Treaty of Shanyuan.
“ it may be unduly sinocentric to call the territory controlled by Shi Jingtang “Chinese.”
Shi was Turkish, not Chinese.
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China. The area stretched from West Mountain S ill in the west to Yan Mountain 
^U j in the east. From 938 until the last years of the Liao dynasty in 1118 the 
Liao controlled those passes. Ultimately they fell to the Jurchen Jin attacking 
from the north, rather than a Chinese force attacking from the south.
Shi Jingtang's territorial concession is usually called “The Sixteen 
Prefectures of Yan and Yun (^tH -fA 'fl'l).” Strictly speaking this is anachronistic. 
Yanzhou and Yunzhou only became the capitals of the circuits comprised of the 
sixteen prefectures during the Jin dynasty. In 1122 Yanzhou became the capital 
of Yanshanfu circuit and Yunzhou became the capital of Yunzhongfu circuit. 
During the Liao dynasty’s control of the area Yanzhou became the Liao southern 
capital and was often referred to as Yanjing.89 For simplicity’s sake the territory 
will be referred to as “The Sixteen Prefectures” throughout this discussion of 
Northern Song history. For the same reason Yanzhou will only be referred to as 
Yanzhou.
The Sixteen Prefectures consisted of You M, Ji W\, Tan 1®, Shun HU, Zhuo 
gjc, Ying ft, Mo %, Wu Ru M, Gui Xin tgf, Yun ®, Ying Jgt Wei M, Shuo 
and Huan g  prefectures. The first seven were referred to as those “in front of 
the mountains (illffQ ” and the latter nine as those “behind the mountains 
Youzhou’s name was changed to Yanzhou by the Liao (see footnote). The 
prefectures “in front of the mountains” were those in the east and those “behind 
the mountains” in the west.
“ it was Liao Taizong (Deguang) who made Yanshan (Yanzhou) into Yanjing, the capital 
of Yanjing circuit with six commanderies.
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Two of the Sixteen Prefectures, Yingzhou and Mozhou, were south of the 
mountain passes. This area was therefore called Guannan, “south of the passes.” 
In 959 Zhou Shizong launched a campaign to capture the Sixteen Prefectures 
(see chapter four). He died soon after the campaign began, having captured 
only Yingzhou and Mozhou. The Guannan region later became the gravamen of 
Liao border disputes with the Song. It became a convenient casus belli for Liao 
raids.”
The significance of the Sixteen Prefectures to Northern Song history cannot 
be overstated. The territory, and the Treaty of Shanyuan in 1005 that put an end 
to the military phase of Song-Liao relations for more than a century, was the pivot 
of Northern Song history. The long Song-Liao peace of the 11th century was 
predicated on the Treaty of Shanyuan.91 And the Treaty of Shanyuan was based 
on Liao control of the Sixteen Prefectures.
’"’Nap-yin Lau, op. cit., asserts that Liao attacks were actually directed at recovering the 
Guannan region. But their actions do not support this view. The Guannan region was far more 
valuable to the Liao as a claim upon Song territory. See chapter nine for a more detailed 
discussion of this issue.
91Although the eleventh century was not wholly peaceful, it was relatively peaceful 
compared to the tenth and twelfth centuries when the Song fought for its existence.
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An Introduction to the Five Dynasties92
Since this discussion of Northern Song military history begins slightly before 
the founding of the Northern Song state, during the Latter Zhou, it is appropriate 
to first introduce the Rve Dynasties period which the Song ended. The political 
and military events of the Five Dynasties, however, can only be understood as 
they developed out of the middle and later parts of the Tang Dynasty (618-907). 
The founding of the Song state was the end of a long process of recentralizing 
military, and therefore political, power around the person of the emperor. Imperial 
control of the military had been broken during the Anlushan Rebellion in 755. 
Whatever power the Tang court recovered after the Anlushan Rebellion was 
utterly destroyed during the Huang Chao Rebellion (875-884). Even the Song 
state did not fully recover control of the Chinese empire until 979. It is therefore 
clear that the Song state was not founded by a sudden irruption of military force, 
but by a slow, uncertain accretion of power around the ruler of northern China. 
The particular importance of the five dynasties that ruled north China after the 
official end of the Tang was that the state that those dynasties ruled eventually 
formed the basis of the Song state. It is only in retrospect that a direct line 
leading up to the Song can be drawn.
92This discussion of the Rve Dynasties, including the history of the Anlushan Rebellion 
and Huangchao Rebellion during the Tang dynasty is based on Gungwu Wang, The Structure of 
Power in North China During the Five Dynasties (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press,
1963).
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From Anlushan to the End of the Tang
By 755 the Tang court had established ten regional commands along its 
northern and western borders to provide for the defense of the frontier. Jiedushi 
or military governors, were appointed to command these regions. In 
order to facilitate defense, the military governors were given both military and 
civil authority over more than one prefecture. The autonomy and concentration 
of military force on the border proved destabilizing. In 755 Anlushan, the Shatuo 
Turk military governor of Lulong (around modern Beijing), invaded Hebei after 
putting down a Liao revolt. Other military governors supported the court, but only 
at the cost of recognizing their local authority. Thus, while the Tang escaped 
destruction, real military power had been dispersed to regional warlords. After 
Anlushan’s rebellion, in an attempt to reduce the power of individual military 
governors, the central government divided up the empire into smaller regional 
commands. This created more warlords, but each one was weaker, allowing the 
court to play them off against each other.
By the time Huang Chao rebelled in 875, the imperial court had managed
to regain some control of the empire. His rebellion destroyed the power that the
central government had built up so painstakingly. Huang Chao left the governors
who submitted to him in power where they were. He reached the height of his
power in 880, when he captured Changan and the Tang court fled to Sichuan.
But many of the governors who had submitted to him changed their allegiance
back to the Tang house. Huang Chao was cut off in Changan. In 883 the Tang
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court recaptured Changan with the help of Li Keyong and his Shatuo Turk 
cavalrymen. The Tang emperor was now officially back in control of the empire. 
In reality his power was more attenuated than it had ever been.
Control of the area immediately around the capital Changan was divided 
between Li Keyong and Zhu Wen, a former general of Huang Chao who had 
switched to the Tang during the rebellion. Their rivalry formed the basis for the 
power struggle in north China for the next two generations. As Li and Zhu 
struggled for power, and various other governors tried to establish themselves, 
the Tang emperor increasingly became a political pawn. The emperor had no 
power, but he was still the only legitimate ruler of the empire. It was not a 
situation which could last very long.
Zhu Wen got control of the Tang emperor and moved him to Luoyang in 
904. Zhu was not in control of north China when, in 907, he deposed the 
emperor and ascended the imperial throne in Bianzhou (Kaifeng). Indeed, as he 
was establishing his Liang dynasty, his forces were being beaten by Li Keyong’s 
army.
From the Liang to the Latter Zhou
Zhu Wen and his successor managed to hold onto power in their capital at
Kaifeng for sixteen years. Li Keyong, Zhu’s longtime rival, died in 908 and Li’s
son Cunxu became the leader of the Shatuo Turk forces. Li Cunxu eventually
overthrew the Liang dynasty, “re-establishing’’ the Tang dynasty with himself as
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emperor in 923. This Latter Tang dynasty was, in turn, overthrown by Shi 
Jingtang, then Commander in Chief of the Emperor’s Personal Army and son-in-law 
of the fourth Later Tang emperor, in 936. Shi’s coup succeeded because of Liao 
military assistance. The Liao demanded, and received, the area which later 
became known as the Sixteen Prefectures (see chapter two). Shi’s son, Chonggui, 
succeeded him. Chonggui tried to throw off Liao control, prompting the Liao 
emperor to invade and destroy the Jin dynasty in 946.
The Liao emperor tried to keep Kaifeng and control of north China, but 
there was too much resistance to his rule. The overextended Liao army was 
most threatened by Liu Zhiyuan, the governor of Taiyuan. Once the Liao army 
retreated north, it was Liu who took Kaifeng and established the Latter Han 
dynasty. The Han lasted only until 950, when Guo Wei established the Latter 
Zhou. When Guo displaced the Han, the Liu family fell back on their power-base
at Taiyuan, establishing the Northern Han state.
74
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter Three 
Zhou Shizong I
When Guo Wei the first emperor of the Latter Zhou, posthumously 
known as Zhou Taizu, died on 22 February 954, he was succeeded by his 
adopted son, Chai Rong posthumously known as Zhou Shizong. Zhou 
Taizu took extraordinary steps to secure Shizong’s position. He commanded 
several powerful generals to swear allegiance to Shizong by his deathbed.
Taizu’s efforts to secure Shizong from internal threats were never tested. 
Immediately after Shizong became emperor Liu Chong f!J^, ruler of the Northern 
Han ibil,invaded. The Northern Han ruler was aided by a large force of Liao 
cavalry. Shizong rushed to meet the invasion as quickly, and as far from the 
capital, as he could. He needed to defeat the Northern Han invasion quickly and 
decisively. Anything less than a decisive victory would probably have ended his 
reign.
The opposing armies met at Gaoping. Shizong won, but only by throwing 
himself into the battle at a crucial moment. The Battle of Gaoping secured 
Shizong's position. It also was also notable for the participation of Zhao Kuangyin, 
the future Song Taizu, who would overthrow Shizong’s son and establish his own 
dynasty in 960. Indeed, it was at Gaoping that Zhao became Shizong’s preeminent 
general.
Shizong followed his success at Gaoping with an invasion of the Northern
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Han. He failed to destroy the Northern Han, but his campaign marked the 
beginning of Zhou, and later, Song, expansion. Shizong directed his officials to 
plan the conquest of China. Shortly afterward, Latter Zhou forces conquered four 
provinces from the kingdom of Shu. This victory set the stage for a much larger 
campaign against the Southern Tang.
The Northern Han Invasion (12 March-24 April 954)"
The death of Zhou Taizu in 954 presented Liu Chong with what he 
thought was a good opportunity to take control of northern China.94 The Northern 
Han ruler requested aid from the Liao emperor, and prepared to personally lead 
thirty thousand of his own troops south from Taiyuan his capital.95
The Liao emperor sent a force of more than ten thousand cavalry under 
the command of Yang Gun US? to Taiyuan.96 Liu Chong appointed Bai Conghui
Chief Administrator of the Expeditionary Army and Zhang Yuanhui M7CM
“The Northern Han invasion is chronicled in ZZTJ 291.9500-9504, JWDS 114/2a-3a and 
XWDS 20.118.
94Liu Chong heard about Zhou Taizu’s death several days later. He applied directly to 
the Liao for troops.
"JWDS reports Liu Chong having 30,000 cavalry. ZZTJ only says 30,000 troops. I 
accept ZZTJ because no evidence from subsequent events proved that the force was entirely 
cavalry. It is possible that JWDS connected the all-cavalry Liao force with Liu Chong’s and 
assumed that his troops were also all cavalry.
"Sima Guang I ]  *1316 discards the less reasonable figure of 50-70,000 contained in the 
Jinyang Jianwenlu ZZTJ K aoyi^^  291.9501.
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Vanguard Commander in Chief. Zhang led a force of three thousand cavalry.97 
The Liao advanced south to Luzhou SffN from Tuanbogu
Luzhou reported on 12 March that Liu Chong and Yang Gun were leading 
a large army south. The Northern Han army reached Liangsiyi located
south of Tuanbogu and northwest of Taipingyi by 19 March. Taipingyi
was 27 miles northwest of Luzhou. Li Yun sent Mu Lingjun J with a 
mixed force of two thousand infantry and cavalry across the border to oppose 
them. Li himself led a large force to screen Taipingyi.
Zhang Yuanhui and Mu Lingjun's forces clashed. Zhang feigned defeat 
and fell back to the north, leading Mu into an ambush. Mu was killed and more 
than a thousand of his soldiers killed or captured. Li Yun fell back to Shangdang
±M .
There are two possible explanations for Li Yun's initial actions. The first is 
that he had a reasonably clear idea of the size of force he was facing and 
intended, by a preemptive strike, to buy time for Zhou Shizong to send help. The 
second is that he vastly underestimated the size of the invading army and told 
the court it was large in order to increase any glory he might receive for defeating 
it.98 _______________
97JWDS gives Zhang’s name as Zhang Hui The variant of Zhang Yuanhui’s name 
and the figure for the size of his vanguard force are from the Shizong Shilu cited in
ZZTJ Kaoyi 291.9501.
“ Xu Wudang in his commentary on XWDS 20.118 states that Ouyang Xiu SKdl
0  used the character Jfc (gong) rather than (fa) in relating the notice of the Han invasion from 
Luzhou because, at the time, they couldn’t say if the force was large or small. Neither ZZTJ nor 
JWDS use either term. Both use A t §  (mkou) to enter and plunder.
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The first possibility seems highly unlikely. There would have been little 
point in sending a force of two thousand to oppose one of forty thousand in the 
open field." Mu Lingjun could hardly have been expected to seriously delay an 
opponent that so badly outnumbered him in terrain that would not have given him 
any particular advantage. His willingness to pursue Zhang Yuanhui north indicates 
that he did not believe that Zhang's force was only a vanguard. It would have 
been worse than folly to have chased Zhang for any distance if he knew that a 
greater Northern Han force was nearby. For Mu Lingjun to pursue Zhang back to 
the larger force in order to slow the general advance would have required greater 
loyalty than we might expect of someone not personally connected to Zhou 
Shizong or Li Yun. As the many coups during the period suggest, personal 
loyalty was not in great supply.
The second possibility is more likely. Li Yun's rapid retreat after Mu's 
defeat supports it. Of course Mu's defeat left Li vulnerable. But if he thought that 
he had only Zhang's three thousand men to contend with he could have rallied 
Mu's remaining men, added them to his own force and moved back to a blocking 
position on the route to Luzhou. At the very least, he could have fallen back to 
Luzhou and firmly held the city while waiting for help. The position of Li's force to 
the east, as a screen, shows that both he and Mu Lingjun thought that Mu's force 
was sufficient to deal with the Northern Han army. Li and Mu mistook the 
vanguard under Zhang Yuanhui for the entire army. Mu was then ambushed by
"That would be without considering the false report of 100,000 Liao cavalry mentioned 
by Sima Guang, ZZTJ Kaoyi291.9501. There is no indication that Mu Lingjun’s force was
heading toward any sort of strategic pass.
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some part of the main Northern Han army. Li Yun fled when he realized how 
large the Northern Han army was. Still, Mu's unintentional reconnaisance in 
force alerted the Zhou court to the seriousness of the threat.100
Zhang Yuanhui invaded Zhou territory from Tuanbogu on 29 March. He 
was still in command of his three thousand cavalry, less whatever losses he had 
sustained in his fight with Mu Lingjun.101 It was at this point that Zhou Shizong 
heard about the true extent of the invasion force. Over the protests of his 
officials, he decided to lead the Zhou army personally. They argued that Liu 
Chong would soon retreat on his own and, since Shizong was newly enthroned, 
he should not be so unconcerned about moving from the capital.102 Shizong 
responded with three reasons that Liu Chong would follow through with his 
attack: Liu Chong was taking advantage of his being in mourning for Zhou Taizu; 
the Northern Han ruler thought little of him because he was young and newly 
enthroned; and Liu's mind was set on taking the empire. Based on these arguments 
it was certain that he would personally come. Shizong therefore had to personally 
go to meet him. He correctly saw the fight for the throne as a personal duel, with 
north China going to the victor.
Feng Dao $fig, one of Shizong’s high officials, still strongly opposed 
Shizong’s personally going. Shizong said: “Formerly, when Tang Taizong
100JWDS records Mu Lingjun’s raid in much less detail but places it after Luzhou reported 
Liu Chong’s invasion. It also places Mu’s raid after Shizong resolved to personally meet the 
threat. ZZTJ’s order makes more sense.
101There are no casualty figures for Zhang’s force.
10aTheir argument was reasonable. In 951 Liu Chong retreated after surrounding, but 
failing to take, Jinzhou eHM- See Hu Sanxing’s note in ZZTJ 291.9502.
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was pacifying the empire, he did not stop personally campaigning. How can I 
dare be negligent?” Feng replied: “I cannot judge if your Majesty's ability is like 
Tang Taizong’s or not." Shizong said: “My military strength is so strong that 
breaking Liu Chong will be like a mountain crushing an egg.” Feng replied: “I 
cannot judge whether your Majesty’s capability is like a mountain or not." Shizong 
was not pleased by Feng’s pointed refutation of his arguments. When Wang Pu 
3ESI, another high official, then recommended that he go, he followed his advice.103 
In the Jiu Wudaishi version of the debate, Feng Dao questioned Shizong’s ability 
to obtain a large number of troops. His second response was: “I don’t know if 
your Majesty can raise (fF#) a mountain or not.” This problem was addressed 
to some degree by drafting bandits from the various circuits into the army. At 
best then, Shizong led an army inferior in number to Liu Chong’s commanded by 
men with only nominal loyalty.
On 8 April Luzhou reported that Liu Chong had invaded. Shizong set his 
defense plan in motion. The same day, he ordered Fu Yanqing to march 
northwest from Guzhen fgg, Cizhou 5B#| and attack the Han army in the rear. 
Next, he ordered Wang Yanchao 3Ej§j® to march northeast from Jinzhou H-Hi 
Lastly, he ordered Fan Aineng He Hui jBffft, Bai Zhongzan S fi® , Shi
Yanchao and Fu Yanneng to march to Zezhou # # [ with their
troops where Xiang Xun fojsflf would inspect them.104
103lt is worth noting that Shizong felt his actions had to follow the advice of at least one of 
his advisors.
104The xuanhuishi was the head of the xuanhuiyuan, which supervised the palace 
eunuchs. Xiang Xun was probably a eunuch. See Charles O. Hucker, A Dictionary of Official
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Shizong left the capital on 16 April and arrived in Huaizhou Hi'J'H on 21 
April. He wanted to unite his forces quickly and advance. He passed through 
Zezhou on 23 April and camped to the northeast. At the same time, the Han 
army, not realizing that the Zhou army was nearby, bypassed Luzhou without 
attacking it and continued south. That night the Han army camped south of 
Gaoping 22 miles northeast of Luzhou.
Shizong received a report that troops had been seen 5 miles to the northeast. 
The next day, the Zhou vanguard happened upon part of the Han army and 
attacked it. The Han troops pulled back and, when the van of their army came 
up, arrayed for battle on a high plateau. Shizong was afraid that they would 
evade him and he ordered his forces to advance quickly. He was hoping that he 
would have enough time to assemble his entire army. But no matter what, he 
was going to risk battle. If the Northern Han army got past him, his position 
would have been extremely tenuous. Shizong’s own claim to legitimacy was no 
better than that of Liu Chong. Unlike Liu, who could rely on his Liao allies, 
Shizong could not expect the support of anyone if he were outmaneuvered and 
cut off from his capital.
Titles in Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 250.
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The Battle of Gaoping (24 April 954)'05
The battle has previously been interpreted as follows: Liu Chong arrayed 
his troops for battle with Yang Gun on his right. When he saw the Zhou army 
formed opposite him he realized how small it was and rashly ordered Yang Gun 
to keep the Liao cavalry out of the fight. Shortly after the battle began, the Zhou 
right broke and ran. Zhou Shizong personally charged into battle and turned 
near defeat into victory. Yang Gun was frightened by the power of the Zhou 
troops and led his troops away without entering the battle. The Zhou rearguard 
under Liu Ci §>J|SI arrived and clashed a second time with the Northern Han army. 
The Northern Han was defeated again.106
Let us now try to flesh out this summary and perhaps disagree with some 
of its interpretations. The first thing to establish is the numbers involved in the 
battle. Sima Guang rJMiJt in Zizhi Tongjian reports that Liu Chong personally 
led 30,000 troops, and that Yang Gun led more than 10,000 cavalry. The Jiu 
Wudaishi uses the same figure except that Liu Chong's troops are reported to be 
30,000 cavalry. The information in this case was reportedly received from a 
deserter. Ouyang Xiu WMW in Xin Wudaishi covers the battle quite summarily 
and without numbers.
105The Battle of Gaoping is chronicled in ZZTJ 291.9504-9506, JWDS 114/3a and XWDS
12.28.
106For an example of this interpretation see Jiang Weiguo M M -M . series ed., Zhongguo 
LidaiZhanzhengshi (Taibei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise Co.
1985), vol. 10, 294-296.
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The march from Northern Han territory to Gaoping was quite short, less 
than 60 miles, and it is unlikely that there was much wastage in the army due to 
illness or casualties. Sima Guang discussed his sources in the Kaoyi. His figure 
of 30,000 troops appears to come from a different source than the Jiu Wudaishi's 
figure of 30,000 cavalry.107 The figure of 30,000 Northern Han troops is therefore 
a fairly reliable estimate. Sima Guang deals with the figure for the Liao cavalry 
as well in the Kaoyi. The figure of 10,000 is certainly reasonable given Liao 
capabilities. It is also considerably more likely than the figure of 100,000, which 
Sima rejected.108
Were the Northern Han troops all cavalry? The only piece of evidence we 
have is the report of the deserter discussed above. Several points argue against 
it. The first is Sima Guang's assertion that Liu Chong led 30,000 troops, and 
Yang Gun more than 10,000 cavalry. If Sima believed that Liu Chong's force 
was entirely composed of cavalry he would have said so. The second point is 
the slowness of the Northern Han advance. It was less than 95 miles from 
Taiyuan to Gaoping, and less than 30 miles from Luzhou to Gaoping. The terrain 
was not difficult enough to warrant a two week march for a cavalry force. Even if 
the main body of the army crossed the border a few days after the vanguard 
officially invaded, it would not have taken a cavalry force that long to reach 
Gaoping. Liu had every reason to move rapidly. If he reached Kaifeng before
107ZZTJ Kaoyi 291.9501. The figure of 30,000 troops comes from the Shizong Shilu (see 
note 4). The shilu is also Sima Guang’s source for Zhang Yuanhui commanding a vanguard of 
3000 cavalry.
108ZZTJ Kaoyi 291.9501.
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Shizong mobilized troops, the Zhou government would have been cut off. The 
third point is that Liu did not know if he would have to conduct a siege in order to 
eliminate the Zhou dynastic house. The fourth and final point is the evidence in 
the Zizhi Tongjian account that gives us reason to believe, in support of the third 
point, that the Northern Han army had some poliorcetic resources with them at 
the battle. When Zhou Shizong personally entered the battle, he faced "arrows 
and stones." Some of the Northern Han army must have been on foot during the 
battle to operate the ballistae, even if the weapons themselves had been moved 
there by animals. But there is no way to estimate the composition of the army 
more exactly.
The size of the Zhou army is much less clear than that of the Northern 
Han army. None of the sources give us an overall figure. The Zhou army was 
apparently substantially smaller than the Northern Han army, but managed to win 
through the daring of Shizong's personal participation. While Shizong's entry into 
the battle was probably the key factor in the Zhou victory, the extent to which he 
was outnumbered is less clear. Liu Chong believed the Zhou army to be so 
small when he saw it that he revised his orders to Yang Gun. He no longer felt 
that he needed the Liao troops. When Yang received the order he rode to the 
front to look at the Zhou army himself. He then rode to Liu Chong and told him 
that they were facing a powerful enemy.
How do we resolve their different evaluations of the Zhou army? It is
possible that Liu was simply incompetent and rash, but all of his generals agreed
with his evaluation of the situation. Let us then look at the scene in simple
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sequence. Liu gave his orders to array his troops while the Zhou began to do 
likewise. After doing so, he rode forward and looked at the opposing army. Here 
it should be remembered that the Zhou vanguard had run into the Northern Han 
army and attacked them. When Shizong found out, he hurriedly advanced with 
his armies. Thus, it is entirely possible that when Liu observed the Zhou army 
they were still coming up to the battlefield. Indeed, the Zhou rearguard did not 
arrive in time for the first encounter. Liu knew how many troops he had and saw 
an opportunity to defeat his hated enemy without the help of his patron. He then 
sent the order to Yang Gun that the Liao troops were not needed. Yang, who 
was probably in the process of decamping in order to proceed to the battlefield, 
received what struck him as a very strange change in his orders. When he 
personally reconnoitered the battlefield, he saw that the Zhou army was quite 
large. Liu Chong rejected Yang’s assessment of the situation, believing that it 
was not new information, but rather a different evaluation of what he had already 
seen. Liu then reconfirmed his order that Yang’s troops not participate in the 
battle. Yang watched the battle, but his army did not advance to the battlefield.
This last statement requires some explanation. It has been generally 
understood until now that the Liao force under Yang Gun was present at the 
battle but did not take part in it.109 A more careful reading of the Zizhi Tongjian 
account, and a more reasonable examination of the events, clearly demonstrates 
that this was not the case. As discussed above, the Liao force was originally
109For an example of this interpretation see Jiang Weiguo, ed., Zhongguo Lidai 
Zhanzhengshi, op. cit., vol. 10, 296.
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ordered to take up position on the Northern Han right. We are then told that Liu 
Chong changed the orders. Yang Gun galloped up, but his force is not mentioned. 
The omission is significant, as the text is fairly consistent in noting when a 
commander was leading troops. So, reading directly, Yang Gun rode up to the 
front and then rode to Liu Chong to discuss the situation. He was then told to 
watch the battle, which he unhappily did. When the battle went badly, he didn't 
dare go to the rescue. It is stated that he was afraid of the power of the Zhou 
troops, so he followed Liu Chong's orders and retreated with his entire army. If 
we understand that it was only Yang Gun with perhaps a small bodyguard present 
at the battlefield, then it makes sense that he did not personally enter the fray. It 
also makes sense that he saw that it was time to leave.
This leaves the question of why Yang did not, if we accept that his troops 
were absent, call his men to the battlefield. They were certainly nearby, otherwise 
they could not have been given a place in the original order of battle. If he had 
ten thousand fresh cavalry available why didn't he sweep the now victorious, but 
certainly disorganized, Zhou army from the field? First, Liu Chong had probably 
already left the field by this time. It may have even been uncertain where he was 
or if he was alive. Without Liu, the entire point of the battle was already decided. 
Second, Yang may have been annoyed enough at having been ordered to sit 
down and shut up that he decided to leave Liu to the fate of his own making.
We only have a few figures for parts of the Zhou army. Fan Aineng and
He Hui led several thousand cavalry when they fled the battlefield. The reserve
that followed Shizong in supporting the broken Zhou right wing was four thousand
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cavalry. There were also more than a thousand infantrymen who surrendered 
after the cavalry fled the field. Since the entire right wing did not collapse, the 
several thousand cavalry and more than one thousand infantry who fled or 
surrendered did not constitute the entire right army.
Assuming that the reserve of more than four thousand cavalry was smaller 
than either side or center force, then each side army, assuming they were 
symmetrical, would have been larger than four thousand and the center probably 
somewhat larger. If the reserve was twenty percent of the whole than the Zhou 
army could conservatively be estimated at twenty thousand men. Even though 
this figure is based on a great deal of supposition, I believe the figure of twenty 
thousand to be at the low end of the scale. It is entirely possible that the Zhou 
forces nearly equaled, or even slightly exceeded, those of the Northern Han by 
the time the battle started.110
Let us now turn to the disposition of troops. Liu Chong arrayed the center 
of his army at Bagongyuan B&-H. Zhang Yuanhui commanded the troops to 
the east. Yang Gun and his cavalry were originally intended to take up position 
to the west. That order was later changed and Yang’s cavalry did not take part in 
the battle. There were some heights on the Northern Han side. The Zhou 
arranged themselves opposite the Han with heights to their rear. Liu Ci had not 
yet arrived with the Zhou rearguard, leaving the Zhou army somewhat outnumbered
110lt is interesting that the presence of Zhao Kuangyin, the future Song Taizu, is first 
mentioned only after Shizong personally entered the battle. Considering how much coverage the 
future founder of the Song received in ZZTJ, it seems odd that his location was not mentioned in 
the original disposition of the army even though Zhang Yongde, who took part in his attack in 
support of Shizong, was noted. Perhaps he only arrived after the battle had begun.
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on the battlefield. Despite the precarious situation, Shizong was determined to 
bring on a decision. As discussed above, he had little choice. He placed Bai 
Zhongzan111 and Li Zhongjin on his left, to the west. Fan Aineng and He 
Hui commanded the right, to the east. Xiang Xun and Shi Yanchao commanded 
picked cavalry in the center. Shizong took up a position close by to observe the 
battle from horseback. Zhang Yongde guarded him.112
Apart from the positions of the generals our tactical information is extremely 
vague. This may be due to the strong connection between the generals and the 
soldiers they brought to the battlefield. It might be more correct to say, for 
example, that the right wing was made up of the forces of Fan Aineng and He 
Hui, rather than to say that they were in command of the troops of the right wing. 
Their behavior in the battle seems to support this contention, as will be discussed 
more fully below. It is also interesting that Xiang Xun was one of the commanders 
of the picked troops in the center. His earlier function as inspector of the troops 
at their marshalling point marks him as one of Shizong's most trusted men.
The troops to the left and right were conspicuously not called "wings" H, 
although this term came up later, when Zhao Kuangyin specifically used it to set 
out his strategy to Zhang Yongde. Zhao's plan of attack (below) further reinforces 
the idea that the line was not continuous. The Zhou left and right are called 
"brigades" f® in one account,113 but this adds little to our understanding. Infantry
111 At this point the text calls him Bai Zhongjin & M M .  For consistency I have used one 
name. See Hu Sanxing’s note in the inconsistency in ZZTJ 291.9504.
112Zhang Yongde was Zhou Taizu’s son-in-law.
113Xiang can have the meaning of “side rooms” and thus wings in the sense of troops on
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is mentioned only on the Zhou side during the course of the battle. The battle 
was decided through cavalry action, so a continuous line would have been neither 
necessary nor desirable. Cavalry is only useful when moving and needs space 
to maneuver. If, for example, the Northern Han army had been drawn up five 
men deep, with a yard of frontage per man or horse without break, it would have 
made a line nearly three and a half miles long. A formation like that would have 
been quite unwieldy. It would have to be broken up into manageable units, 
separated for maneuvering.
Zhang Yuanhui began the Han assault by leading one thousand cavalry 
against the Zhou right. The battle was joined but Fan Aineng and He Hui soon 
fled the field with their cavalry. The Zhou right began to collapse. A thousand 
Zhou infantry took off their armor, yelled "ten thousand years" (MM)"4 and 
surrendered to the Northern Han.
Shizong saw the danger his army was in and led his personal troops
forward to battle. Zhao Kuangyin (soon to be Song Taizu) saw the need to
support Shizong's action. He said to Zhang Yongde: "The Northern Han troops
are [now] overconfident (Presumably because of the collapse of the Zhou right
wing.) We can defeat them. You lead your unit to the left and take advantage of
the heights. You will be the left wing. I will lead my unit as the right wing and
[we] will attack them." Zhang followed Zhao’s plan and led two thousand troops
into battle. Zhao Kuangyin led his two thousand men from the front. After some
the sides. It is more often used militarily to denote simply a formation of troops or an 
administrative unit of troops.
114Thus affirming Liu Chong’s claim to the imperial throne.
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desperate fighting, they scattered the Northern Han troops. Ma Renyu MCUfi, a 
Zhou officer, said to those around him: "Let us exploit this containment and take 
the enemy." He jumped onto his horse, drew his bow and gave a great shout. 
He killed several dozen men, arousing the spirits of the other officers.
Ma Quanyi said to Shizong: 'The bandits' situation has reached its 
limit. Send me to capture them. I pray Your Highness to rein in your horse, not 
move, and watch your generals break them." Then he led several hundred 
cavalry forward to break the Northern Han line.
Liu Chong knew that Shizong was personally supervising the battle, so he 
praised Zhang Yuanhui and sent him into the fray. Zhang's horse fell down and 
the Zhou soldiers killed him. The death of such a strong general broke the 
morale of the Han army and increased that of the Zhou army. Liu fled the field. 
It was at this point that Yang Gun decided to leave the battlefield without rendering 
assistance.
Fan Aineng and He Hui led several thousand cavalry south, plundering the 
Zhou baggage wagons as they fled. Back on the battlefield, Shizong ordered his 
officers to stop the pursuing the Han army, but they didn’t receive the order 
because the messengers were uncertain which officers had been killed. He was 
concerned that there was still a large Liao army in the area that could easily 
change his victory into a defeat. There were also large numbers of surrendered 
soldiers to secure. The situation was still fluid.
Fan Aineng and He Hui met Liu Ci, the commander of the rearguard, as
he was coming up to join the Zhou forces. Fan and He stopped their flight, and
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Liu continued on to the north. As it was getting dark, Liu Ci ran into Liu Chong 
and a force of about ten thousand that he had managed to gather together from 
the torrent of fleeing men. The armies repeatedly clashed and the Han were 
defeated again. Wang Yanci died and the Han army fled all the way back to 
Gaoping, pursued by Liu Ci.
Aftermath and Followup (3 May-30 July 954)1,5
There were two immediate consequences of the victory at Gaoping: Fan 
Aineng, He Hui and seventy other top Imperial Guard commanders were executed, 
and the Zhou army invaded the Northern Han. The executions allowed Shizong 
to consolidate his position and secure control of the Guard by inserting his own 
men at the top. They also marked the beginning of the rise and expansion of the 
Palace Corps (see chapter two “Song Military Organization” for the Imperial 
Guard-Palace Corps division). Intended to balance the power of the Guard, 
Corps recruitment was entrusted to Zhao Kuangyin, who used the Palace Corps 
to overthrow the Zhou six years later. Zhao had been promoted to provost 
marshal of the Corps for his bravery at Gaoping.116
After his second loss, Liu Chong fled back to Taiyuan. Yang Gun led his 
army north, camping at Daizhou Shizong ordered an invasion of the
115Shizong’s Northern Han campaign is chronicled in ZZTJ 291.9513-292.9516.
118See Edmund Worthy, “The Founding of Sung China, 950-1000”, Unpublished Ph.d. 
diss., Princeton University, 1976, 148-151, esp.151. Worthy provides an extensive and detailed 
discussion of the institutional reforms initiated by Shizong as a result of the Battle of Gaoping.
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Northern Han on 3 May. He first sent the troops which had not participated in the 
battle at Gaoping. Fu Yanqing led a mixed force of twenty thousand infantry and 
cavalry from Luzhou. Guo Chong was his second in command, and Xiang Xun 
was his Director in Chief IP fi. Li Zhongjin was appointed Chief Inspector of 
Cavalry and Infantry and Shi Yanzhao Vanguard Commander in
Chief At the same time, Wang Yanzhao and Han Tong invaded
from Yindiguan The two armies were to link up and advance together.
Liu Ci was appointed Administrator of the Emperor’s Entourage PfiMnflfl, with 
Bai Zhongzan as his second in command.
In May the Northern Han territory of Yu county surrendered. Yu 
county was 67 miles northeast from the Northern Han capital at Taiyuan. Fu 
Yanqing's army arrived beneath the walls of Taiyuan, while Wang Yanzhao attacked 
Fenzhou #>#{. Fenzhou was 150 miles north of Jinzhou ##{. Shizong ordered 
Kang Yanzhao U S S  to attack Liaozhou jgffl. Liaozhou was 81 miles northeast 
of Luzhou. Tian Qiong EH  ̂was ordered to attack Qinzhou Li Qianpu 
M rode to Liaozhou alone and convinced Zhang Hanchao iz iltH , the governor 
of Liaozhou, to surrender.
Shizong's original intent in invading the Northern Han and sending soldiers
to Taiyuan was simply a show of force. He hadn't considered actually taking it.
However, when he was told that the people welcomed the Zhou army and how
the counties and prefectures were surrendering, he began to consider a more
serious campaign. He summoned his generals to discuss it. They all said that
there were insufficient provisions and that he should try again later. Shizong
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ignored them and began preparations to intensify the campaign.
First, he combined a variety of forces to create an army of several hundred 
thousand men. A large part of this army must have been composed of porters 
and men drafted for digging, not fighting. Next, he ordered supplies and men 
sent from ten prefectures to supply the army. He also ordered a stop to plundering 
by the Zhou army.
Fu Yanqing reported on 22 May that Han Guangyuan the prefect
of Xianzhou S ffl, and Guo Yan IP 's, the prefect of Lanzhou JSU’H had surrendered. 
Wang Yanzhao and Han Tong subdued Shizhou capturing its prefect An 
Yanjin on 23 May. Li Tinghui ^£§f§, the prefect of Qinzhou ?M'( surrendered 
on 24 May. Shizong left Luzhou for Taiyuan on 31 May. The Northern Han Army 
Supervisor of Xinzhou Li Qing killed the prefect and the Liao 
Interpreter-clerk I K ,  on 3 June. He was then appointed prefect of Xinzhou for 
the Zhou. Shizong reached Taiyuan on 6 June. The Zhou army encircled the 
entire 14 miles of the city’s walls. Meanwhile, Yang Gun was imprisoned by the 
Liao emperor for his failure to prevent the loss of Daizhou, and a general lack of 
positive results.
The Liao camped several thousand cavalry between Xinzhou and Daizhou
on 7 June to assist the Northern Han. The presence of this force interfered with
Zhou efforts to consolidate their territorial gains and was an immediate threat to
their operations. The Zhou responded quickly to try and drive out the Liao. Fu
Yanqing led a mixed force of ten thousand infantry and cavalry to attack the Liao
force on 10 June. He entered Xin prefecture, forcing the Liao to fall back on
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Xinkou Fort tff PH . Fu asked for reinforcements on 17 June. Li Yun and Zhang 
Yongde were sent out with three thousand troops on 23 June. Meanwhile, a 
second Liao force arrived beneath the walls of Xinzhou itself.
Fu and several other generals reached Xinzhou on 26 June, and arrayed 
for battle. Shi Yanzhao commanded the vanguard of two thousand cavalry.'17 
Shi saw that he badly outnumbered the Liao, so he advanced casually and was 
killed. Li Yun followed him. Two thousand Liao died in the battle, but it a was 
pyrrhic victory for the Zhou army, if not a defeat. Shi substituted bravery and 
numbers for tactical skill. A large number of Zhou troops were killed or wounded. 
Li Yun barely escaped with his life. As a result of the battle, Fu Yanqing had to 
fall back to Xinzhou and subsequently return to Taiyuan. This was the first Zhou 
military setback.
The siege of Taiyuan also failed to achieve any results. Constant heavy 
rain, and sickness among the troops, made it clear that it was time to abandon 
the invasion. They had failed to secure the territory they had taken and failed to 
drive the Liao from the field. Shizong left Taiyuan on 5 July. Lack of provisions 
does not appear to have been a factor. The sudden departure forced the Zhou to 
abandon several hundred thousand units of grain and fodder at Taiyuan.118 Shizong 
reached the capital on 30 July 954.
117Not twenty as ZZTJ reports. Yuan Shu in Tongjian Jishibenmo repeats the figure of 
twenty. I agree with Hu Sanxing that twenty is too small. A stroke must have been lost from qian 
making it into a shi -p .
naThe particular units are not mentioned. In this context a unit would have been the grain 
or fodder for one man or horse for one day.
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The Zhou Strategy for Reunification of China
Although Shizong failed in his invasion of the Northern Han, his success at 
Gaoping opened his mind to the possibility of reunifying all of China.119 He 
asked officials to submit plans to accomplish this goal and, in April of 955, 
decided that Wang Pu's was the best. The strategic debate has been 
traditionally construed as a choice between a north-first or south-first plan. A 
north-first plan would place resolving the Northern Han-Liao-Sixteen Prefectures 
situation ahead of the conquest of the kingdoms south of the Huai river and in 
Sichuan. A south-first plan would do the opposite. Once the question of south-first 
or north-first had been decided, a precise plan to carry out the strategy would 
have to be created.
One of the reasons that the strategic debate has been erroneously 
represented in this way by historians was the ultimate failure of the Zhou or the 
Song to "recover" the Sixteen Prefectures. This failure continued to rankle the 
Song government until the fall of the entire north overshadowed it. Indeed, it 
may not be too far wrong to say that the all-consuming desire to possess that 
small area of what was considered "China proper," for want of a better term, and 
the hatred of the Liao that it engendered, motivated the policies which led to the 
loss of north China to the Jin. The Song allied themselves with the Jin in order to 
recover this territory. Due to the subsequent argument over the division of 
territory, the Jin invaded the Song and captured the capital Kaifeng.
119ZZTJ 292.9524. Also see Wang Qinruo et al., Cefuyuangui, 104/29ab.
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It might seem as if our discussion has gotten far ahead of itself, but 
subsequent events profoundly affected the portrayal of the Zhou-Song strategy in 
the sources. The south-first strategy proposed by Wang Pu and later, to Song 
Taizu, by Zhao Pu has been seen as the mistake which prevented the 
recovery of the Sixteen Prefectures. We have no record of the actual strategy 
debate or the losing proposals, but they would not be too difficult to guess. The 
strategy proposals that we do have tell us more about what Chinese historians 
from the eleventh century on, looking back on the events of the second half of 
the tenth century, thought than about what the people at the time thought. An 
examination of Wang Pu's "accepted" strategy proposal should clarify this 
discussion and demonstrate the main reason the Sixteen Prefectures became so 
important to later Song historians.
Edmund Worthy has already translated the entire proposal as it is contained 
in the Zizhi Tongjian.12° Rather than retranslate or reproduce the entire document,
I will summarize its contents, illustrating several points with selections from Worthy's 
translation. I will also include the slightly different opening of the version of the 
proposal contained in the Jiu Wudaishi.
The first part of Wang's proposal is an explanation of how things came to 
be in their present state. His opening statement is particularly important:
The Middle Kingdom lost Wu Shu D (Sichuan), You M (one of the
Sixteen Prefectures here used to refer to all of them) and Bing #  (the
Northern Han territory). All this was due to the loss of the Way ft.
120Worthy, op. cit., 15-17. ZZTJ 292.9525-26.
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Alternatively, from the Jiu Wudaishi:
The Tang ®f (the Tang dynasty) lost the Way and [thus] lost Wu and 
Shu. The Jin #  (the Jin dynasty) lost the Way and [thus] lost You and 
Bing.
The loss of territory is thus connected to a loss of legitimacy for a dynasty. 
Conversely, a legitimate dynasty, one that has the Way, should possess or be 
able to retake the territory in question. This then is the Zhou casus belli and the 
conception that would haunt the Northern Song in its failure to retake the Sixteen 
Prefectures.
Wang goes on to discuss how this loss of the Way came about and what 
should be done to reverse the process. Once the internal problems of the 
dynasty are resolved, then military operations can be successfully commenced 
and the Will of Heaven will win out. The south should be conquered first beginning 
with the largest, strongest opponent, the Southern Tang MI#. In terms replete 
with strategies from Sunzi Bingfa although unattributed, he describes
how the Southern Tang should be attacked. The 700-mile border provided the 
Zhou with the opportunity to make small, harassing attacks to keep the Southern 
Tang off balance, while building up for a major campaign. After conquering the 
Tang, the smaller states in the south and Sichuan would submit to the Zhou 
without a fight. Once that was accomplished, the Sixteen Prefectures would 
either offer allegiance or be easily conquered. Finally, the Zhou would have to 
destroy the Northern Han because there was no way to induce it to submit.
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Supplies should be stored along the border during the summer and autumn. The 
campaign against the Tang would begin one year from then.
Underlying Wang's strategy are two significant assumptions. First, he 
believed, correctly, that neither the Northern Han nor the Southern Tang would 
launch major attacks against the Zhou during the period of reconquest. Second, 
he regarded the Sixteen Prefectures as a piece of territory separate from the Liao 
empire, one that could offer its allegiance to the Zhou or be taken from the Liao 
as a limited objective. That is to say, the Liao would not regard an attack on the 
Sixteen Prefectures as a threat to their empire, only as a military venture whose 
objective was limited to a certain piece of territory. This last assumption was pure 
folly and vastly underestimated the Liao strength and resolve.
Worthy states that: "In spite of his praise of Wang's strategy, Chou Shih-tsung 
[Zhou Shizong] did not follow it to the letter."121 In fact, subsequent Zhou campaigns 
had very little to do with Wang's plan. The Zhou first took four northern prefectures 
from the kingdom of Shu (Sichuan), then turned to conquer a large section of 
Southern Tang territory and, finally, began a campaign for the Sixteen Prefectures. 
Shizong turned his attention north before conquering the south. Thus, the order 
of Zhou campaigns defied both Wang's strategy and a north-first or south-first 
analysis. It seems that Zhou Shizong's decisions had more to do with serendipity 
than following a theoretically well-constructed blueprint.
121 Worthy, op. cit., 17.
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The Campaign against Shu (24 May-30 December 955)122
In March of 955 Shizong decided to capture Shu’s four northern prefectures: 
Qinzhou ^#1, Chengzhou $#1. Jiezhou RIJN, and Fengzhou A “request" 
from the “people of Qinzhou” to become part of the Zhou was duly manufactured 
and noted in the record. Although the Zhou did not invade until May of 955, the 
Shu ruler began defensive preparations as soon as he found out about Qinzhou's 
“request." He replaced Han Jixun the military governor of Xiongwu JtK ,
and Wang Wandi the prefect of Fengzhou ##{, with Zhao Lizha
because, according to Zhao Lizha, Han Jixun and Wang Wandi weren't competent 
to lead a defense against the Zhou. Slightly later, on 12 May, the Shu ruler sent 
Wang Zhaoyuan to prepare the northern fortifications and armor and
weapons.
On the same day that Wang Pu delivered his grand strategy for the conquest 
of China, or shortly thereafter, Shizong ordered Xiang Xun, Wang Jing and 
Zan Jurun to attack northern Shu. Wang Jing invaded from Sanguan ffc 
P  on 24 May, and advanced to Qinzhou. In less than ten days Wang took 
Huangniu H41 and seven other forts along the Qinzhou border. The Shu ruler 
appointed Li Tinggui the Northern Circuit Mobile Brigade Campaign
Commander on 3 June. The Northern Circuit was comprised of Qinzhou and 
Fengzhou. Gao Yanchou ftilH I was appointed Bandit Suppression 
Commissioner, with Lu Yanke as his assistant and Zhao Chongtao
122The Zhou campaign against Shu is chronicled in ZZTJ 292.9524-9533.
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$f as Director in Chief.
Zhao Lizha was at Deyang not far from Chengdu, when he heard the 
Zhou had invaded. He was petrified and requested permission to retreat to the 
west. Without waiting for orders, Zhao abandoned his troops and rode quickly 
back to Chengdu, the Shu capital, on 12 June. Everyone in the city was frightened, 
assuming Zhao Lizha had been routed. The Shu ruler was furious and had Zhao 
beheaded.
The Zhou army fought inconclusively with Li Tinggui east of Weiwu City WL
on 27 June. Weiwu City was northeast of Fengzhou. Shortly after this
encounter the Shu ruler initiated contact with the Northern Han and the Southern
Tang to see if they could act together to do something about the Zhou.
Nothing significant seems to have occurred for about a month after the
battle at Weiwu City. The prime minister pointed out to Shizong on 22 July that
Wang Jing and his fellow generals had not moved for some time. Since logistic
support was also proving to be difficult, he asked that the troops be recalled.
Shizong ordered Zhao Kuangyin investigate the situation. When Zhao returned,
he reported that Qinzhou and Fengzhou could be taken. Shizong followed Zhao's
recommendations and continued the campaign.
Wang Jing defeated a Shu force on 31 August, capturing or killing three
hundred men. This minor encounter was the first battle of any significance since
Weiwu City. There had been very few battles because the Shu army was
unwilling to leave its fortifications to fight, and because supply problems prevented
the Zhou army from pressing its attack. The Shu probably felt that they were
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more likely to outlast the Zhou than outfight them. Zhao Kuangyin's inspection 
tour and subsequent report probably compared the supply situation of both sides. 
He must have concluded that the Zhou could outlast the Shu. All this is speculation, 
but the Shu strategy, when the campaign once again became active, concentrated 
on attacking Zhou supply lines. The Shu army probably risked battle because of 
dwindling supplies. Its failure to break the Zhou lines of communication effectively 
doomed the Shu’s effort to defend the four prefectures.
Li Tinggui interdicted the Zhou army’s supply lines on 19 September.
First, he sent Li Jin to capture Maling Fort Next, he positioned
irregulars at Yegu and Baijian Finally, he sent part of his army to
Tangcangzhen BlkM , north of Fengzhou, and to Huanghuagu fc<E£r-. In order
to retake the Zhou supply lines, Wang Jing sent a force of two thousand Zhou
soldiers under Zhang Jianxiong WtMM to Huanghua in October, and a second
force of one thousand soldiers to Tangcang. Wang Luan £E8? led his troops out
from Tangcang and fought Zhang Jianxiong at Huanghua. Wang was defeated
and fled back to Tangcang. A second Zhou army was waiting for him. Wang
fought, and lost, again. He was captured with his three thousand men. The Zhou
army also dispersed the Shu forces at Maling and Baijian. Li Tinggui, Gao
Yanchou and the other Shu generals fell back to Qingniling Han Jixun
abandoned Qinzhou and fled back to Chengdu. The Zhou army then dispersed
the Shu force at Yegu. Chengzhou /£#( and Jiezhou RUM also surrendered.
The Shu ruler sued for peace on 24 November, but his letter was rejected
unanswered because he called himself the "Emperor of Great Shu." He was
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afraid and concentrated troops and provisions at Jianmen MPI and Baidi to 
prepare a defense against the Zhou. These were the strategic positions that 
defended the entry to Sichuan itself. Wang Jing surrounded Fengzhou and Han 
Tong cut off the Shu relief army at Guzhen on 29 December. Fengzhou fell the 
next day. The Zhou army captured five thousand officers and men.
The sources for this campaign are silent on most of the details of the 
fighting. Even so, the outlines of what happened are revealing enough for us to 
draw some conclusions about it. The Shu forces adopted or were forced to 
adopt a defensive strategy based on walled towns and forts. All they needed to 
do was not lose in order to win. The Zhou were thus forced to take a series of 
fortifications. At the same time, they had to keep themself supplied while denying 
the Shu the opportunity to do likewise. It was probably the logistics problem that 
kept the overall numbers and, in particular, the concentrated numbers so small. 
If we assume that logistic support was quite limited, as it seems to have been, 
then the manpower pool would have been similarly limited. Any concentration of 
men for a siege or a general action would be at the expense of some other 
objective. We must also remember that the Zhou were storing supplies and 
preparing troops for the major campaign against the Southern Tang at the end of 
the year. The Shu campaign was not Shizong's major concern at that time.
Once the Shu had more or less ceded the field to the Zhou, their own time 
became limited by whatever supplies they had already stored up. This is not to 
say that the Zhou entirely cut off the Shu from resupply, but transport of provisions
from Sichuan would have been even more difficult than from the Zhou territory.
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The Shu were betting that their stores could outlast the Zhou logistics system. 
They were not far wrong. Zhao Kuangyin's report must have argued both that 
the territory could be conquered and that it was worth the effort to do so. The 
renewed Zhou will and perhaps some additional supplies tilted the balance against 
the Shu. They realized that unless they did something their provisions would not 
outlast the Zhou's. Logistics, rather than the strength of a town's walls, was the 
issue. A besieged town could not expect to hold out against an opponent who 
controlled the field and had adequate logistic support. In many respects the 
campaign against Shu would be repeated on a larger scale with the campaign 
against the Southern Tang that began shortly afterward. The Shu forts closest to 
Zhou territory fell the fastest because they were at the end of the supply lines. 
Conversely, the Zhou were most concentrated at the beginning of the campaign 
and close to their own supplies.
Judged by the size of the forces involved or the territory conquered this 
was not a major campaign. It was, however, significant in two regards. First, it 
provided a staging area for the later Song conquest of Shu. Second, Zhao 
Kuangyin’s involvement was pivotal. It was Zhao's inspection and evaluation that 
persuaded Shizong to continue the campaign. Later, as Song Taizu, Zhao 
directed the successful campaign against Shu from the capital. In a similar 
manner, as we shall see shortly, his participation in the Huainan campaign gave 
him direct, personal knowledge of the importance of riverine naval warfare and
the capabilities of the Southern Tang.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Zhou Shizong II
With the minor campaign against Shu completed, Zhou Shizong was now 
ready to attack the Southern Tang. This was the first real step toward conquering 
the southern states that had formed when the Tang dynasty collapsed. It proved 
to be the true beginning of the consolidation of a new Chinese empire like that of 
the Han and Tang. The empire for which Zhou Shizong laid the foundation, 
however, would not be ruled by his descendants.
The Southern Tang was the largest and most wealthy of the southern 
states in the tenth century. Shizong's immediate aims were limited. He did not 
expect to destroy or completely conquer the Southern Tang in a single campaign. 
It was simply too large and powerful a state to be quickly or easily overcome. As 
his military fortunes changed, so too did his demands. At the very least, he 
wanted to take the strategic city of Shouzhou H #( (near present Huainanshi), on 
the Huai river, in order to provide a launching point for any future campaigns. 
The campaign was ultimately quite successful, entirely removing the Huai River 
MM as a defense line for the Tang. It also gave the Zhou fourteen rich prefectures, 
containing sixty counties, and an annual indemnity.
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Zhou Shizong's Southern Tang Campaign (phase 1)
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Zhou Shizong's Southern Tang Campaign (phase 2)
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31
The Huainan Campaign (17 December 955-8 April 957) r£M123
Every winter the Huai river dried up and become easily fordable. Until 955 
the Southern Tang sent troops to guard the river line during the winter. That year 
Wu Yanshao the Army Supervisor of Shouzhou HM, said that all the
troops were doing was using up supplies and the practice should be discontinued. 
Liu Renshan M tlS i unsuccessfully opposed the change. Just as the Zhou were 
planning to invade, the Southern Tang were neglecting their defenses. Apparently 
the Southern Tang leadership was not expecting a Zhou attack that year. The 
state of the Tang defenses was very important to Shizong. He must have been 
aware of the change in policy. Whether his decision to start the invasion earlier 
than Wang Pu proposed was prompted by this opportunity or whether it 
was his original intention is unclear.124
Shizong appointed Li Gu Chief Administrative Officer of the Huainan 
Route Forward Expeditionary Army on 17 December. Wang Yanchao 3E/^fg 
was his second in command. Han Lingkun the Commander in Chief of
the Imperial Guard Cavalry, and eleven other generals were under them.125
By 6 January 956, the Southern Tang had heard about the mobilization
123The Huainan campaign is chronicled in ZZTJ 292.9532-294.9581, JWDS 115/5b- 
116/5b andXWDS 12.120.
124Sima Guang 10 !§:#; seems to imply the former by the location in the text of the Tang 
policy change and it seems to be the more likely reason. ZZTJ 292.9532.
12SZZTJ seems to indicate that Hang Lingkun’s rank was a temporary duty assignment. 
JWDS does not include the prefix du Ubefore his title.
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and were preparing to resist the Zhou invasion. Liu Renshan started putting his 
defenses in order. He appointed Liu Yanzhen SSBM Northern Expeditionary 
Army Commander in Chief and ordered him to march to Shouzhou with twenty 
thousand troops.126 It is clear that the Southern Tang leadership knew that 
Shouzhou was one of the initial Zhou objectives. Huangfu Hui was
appointed Officer for Rendering Assistance and Yao Feng M L  was appointed 
Director in Chief for Rendering Assistance, under Huangfu Hui. They were 
ordered to march thirty thousand troops to Dingyuan 3 [|i. Around that time, Li 
Gu and his army crossed the Huai river using a pontoon bridge at the ford at 
Zhengyang JEdt. Zhengyang was west of Shouzhou and above it on the Huai.127
Li Gu reported on 25 January that Wang Yanchao had defeated more than 
two thousand Tang troops beneath the walls of Shouzhou. He reported on 30 
January that Bai Yanyu SJEfi, the Vanguard Commander in Chief, defeated 
more than a thousand Tang troops at Shankouzhen liiP lft. Shizong took the 
occasion of an official of the kingdom of Wuyue coming to present tribute on 
1 February to order its king to invade the Southern Tang from the south. Li Gu 
reported on 17 February another defeat of more than a thousand Tang troops at 
Shangyao ±M -
Shizong decided to take the field himself on 20 February. Xiang Xun f t i l ,
129Shouzhou HMM is sometimes called Shouchun H # .  For consistency I always use 
Shouzhou.
127ZZTJ 292.9532-33. JWDS 115/5b. XWDS 12.120. JWDS also contains a much more 
extensive edict by Shizong setting out his reasons for the invasion with reference to Sunzi and 
Wuqi in 115/5b-6a.
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Wang Pu 3E& and Han Tong 3IM were left in charge of the capital. Li Zhongjin 
^ I t j t  was first ordered to take up a position at Zhengyang. Bai Zhongzan f i l l  
M was sent to Yingshang with three thousand soldiers of the emperor’s 
bodyguard. Shizong left the capital on 22 February.
The defense of Shouzhou was more determined than expected. Li Gu 
had only been in the field for, at most, a month and a half, but both subsequent 
events and the sources make it clear that Shouzhou had not been expected to 
hold out that long.128 The strength of the city's resistance was due to the skill and 
resolve of Liu Renshan, the military governor of Qinghuai. He would prove to be 
one of the most formidable of the Southern Tang generals. His heroic defense of 
Shouzhou reconfigured the Zhou campaign, stopping the invasion and, due to its 
strategic location, leaving any territorial gains in question. Without a secure 
foothold in Southern Tang territory the Zhou army was particularly vulnerable to 
attacks on the pontoon bridge at Zhengyang. Loss of the bridge meant loss of 
communications with Zhou territory. Thus, what had been intended as a preliminary 
step in a larger plan became the focus of the campaign. Zhou success hinged 
on reducing Shouzhou and securing communications across the Huai river. The 
most important fighting took place around the pontoon bridge and around Shouzhou.
Around the time that Shizong was departing Kaifeng, Liu Yanzhen arrived 
at Laiyuanzhen 5|5tig|, 67 miles from Shouzhou, leading a Tang force to rescue 
the city. He also had a naval force of several hundred ships headed for Zhengyang
128ZZTJ 292.9534 states that: “Li Gu had attacked Shouzhou for a long time without 
taking it.” Considering that he had been attacking Shouzhou for less than two months we can 
only conclude that at least Sima Guang thought that a long time for a siege.
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to destroy the pontoon bridge. Li Gu knew the emperor was on his way to take 
the field. He also knew that he had no navy to counter the Tang's. He decided 
to fall back to Zhengyang where he could defend the bridge and await the 
emperor's arrival. Shizong was at Yuzhen MM when he heard that Li was 
planning to withdraw. He promptly sent an order to stop it, but Li had already 
abandoned his provisions and retreated to Zhengyang. Shizong arrived in 
Chenzhou on 27 February and hastily ordered Li Zhongjin to lead a force to 
Huaishang ?t£±.
Li sent a memorial to Shizong on 2 March reporting his situation: "The 
rebel (Southern Tang) warships are advancing in the river. Our crossbow and 
ballista fire cannot reach them. If the bridge is not preserved then the troops' 
morale will be shaken to the point that we will be forced to retreat. The Tang 
ships are advancing daily and the water of the Huai is rising. If Your Majesty 
arrives and by chance the supply road is obstructed or cut then the danger would 
be immeasurable. I beg Your Highness to halt at Chenzhou or Yingzhou until Li 
Zhongjin arrives. He and I can evaluate the situation together and decide if the 
rebel's ships can be repulsed and the bridge preserved. We will then send you a 
report. However, if the troops are drilled and the horses fed, after a year, the 
rebels will be exhausted and we will take them before long."129 Shizong was not 
pleased with Li’s memorial. He immediately took steps to retake the initiative Li
129JWDS 116/1 ab represents Li Gu as retreating in order to preserve the army in the face 
of a direct threat to the pontoon bridge which he had no navy to defend. Ail of his subordinate 
generals concurred with his evaluation of the situation and the army retreated in some disorder. 
The memorial to the emperor was a justification after the fact which included concern for
Shizong’s safety, which had not been a consideration in the original decision to retreat.
111
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
had lost.
Fortunately for the Zhou, the Southern Tang general Liu Yanzhen proved 
to be both overconfident and incompetent. His appointment was due to bribing 
powerful officials rather than military acumen. Liu told his subordinates to rely 
upon bravery and not make plans. When he heard that Li Gu had retreated he 
was pleased and led his soldiers directly to Zhengyang. The units and the 
baggage wagons were spread out over a hundred miles. Liu Renshan and the 
prefect of Chizhou Zhang Quanyue strongly opposed Liu
Yanzhen’s pursuit of the Zhou army. Liu Renshan said to Liu Yanzhen: "Your 
army has not arrived and the enemy is already retreating. This is because they 
fear your prestige. Why try to bring the fight to such a quick conclusion? If, by 
chance, we lose, then this important business will fail." Liu Yanzhen didn't follow 
their advice and marched on. Liu Renshan said to those around him: "When 
Yanzhen meets the enemy, he will definitely be defeated." Then he increased 
the number of troops in the cities and prepared his defenses.
While Shizong had been unable to prevent Li Gu from retreating, he
realized that he could take advantage of Li’s retreat by attacking the pursuing
Southern Tang army. Shizong ordered Li Zhongjin to hastily march to Zhengyang
and attack the Tang forces. Li Zhongjin crossed the Huai River and fought the
Tang army east of Zhengyang, defeating them after only one assault. Liu Yanzhen
was beheaded and Xian Shilang and other officers captured alive. Li decapitated
more than ten thousand (perhaps even more than twenty thousand) troops,
leaving a trail of corpses for 10 miles. He also captured more than 300,000
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pieces of armor, weapons and supplies. Zhang Quanyue gathered up the people 
and fled to Shouzhou. Huangfu Hui and Yao Feng fell back on Qingliuguan 
P. Wang Shaoyan 3E3SM, the prefect of Chuzhou $&#(, abandoned his city 
and fled.130
Shizong reached Yongningzhen on 3 March. He addressed his 
officers and officials: "I have heard that the siege of Shouzhou has been lifted. 
Many of the farmers have returned to their villages. Now that they hear a great 
army has arrived, they will return and enter the city. I have sympathy for their 
hunger. It is appropriate to first send an announcement to comfort them saying 
that each person may attend to his occupation." Shizong reached Zhengyang on 
5 March and replaced Li Gu with Li Zhongjin as Huainan Route Expeditionary 
Army Chief Bandit Suppression Commissioner. Li Gu was demoted to Acting 
Magistrate of Shou Prefecture.
Shizong crossed the Huai river on 6 March and reached Shouzhou itself 
on 7 March. He camped on the north side of the Fei river UtK, 2/3 of a mile from 
the city. The various armies were ordered to surround Shouzhou and the pontoon 
bridge at Zhengyang was ordered moved to Xiacaizhen T H H . Xiacaizhen was 
in Ying M  prefecture 19 miles west and downstream of Zhengyang. The Zhou 
levied several hundred thousand men from the surrounding prefectures to attack 
the city on 8 March. They worked ceaselessly, day and night.
130ZZIJ 292.9536. JW DS116/Ib. XWDS 12.120. ZZTJ provides the figure of more than 
ten thousand beheaded. JWDS provides the higher figure of twenty thousand. There is no way 
to resolve the descrepancy. Both are possible. The higher figure may derive from the twenty
thousand men who were directly under Liu Yanzhen’s command.
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More than ten thousand Tang troops tied up their ships on the Huai and 
camped below Tushan M ill. On 11 March Shizong ordered Zhao Kuangyin to 
attack them. Zhao sent more than a hundred cavalry to attack their camp and 
then simulate a withdrawal. He placed troops in ambush and badly beat the 
Tang at Wokou MU. Zhao beheaded He Yanxi , their Military Director in 
Chief, and several other officers. He also captured more than fifty warships.
In preparation for the arrival of Zhou troops, the Tang ruler ordered He 
Jingzhu the military governor of Wuchang 3&H, to move all of the people
into the city in order to strongly defend it. He refused and had the land near the 
city cleared in order to make a battlefield. He said: "When the enemy arrives, the 
army and the people will all fight together to the last man!" The Tang ruler was 
pleased by He Jingzhu’s plan. There is no confirmation that the plan was, in fact, 
carried out. But it is indicative of the Southern Tang strategy for dealing with the 
Zhou invasion. They intended to rely upon the defensive strength of their cities 
and avoid battle. Some commanders, like He Jingzhu, acted more aggressively.
The pontoon bridge at Xiacaizhen was in place and completed on 17 
March. Shizong personally inspected it. He ordered Kang Yan beheaded 
by the side of the road for failure to properly guard the bridge. Si Chao §]2i, the 
Patrolling Military Inspector of Lu M, Shou H, Guang and Huang ^  prefectures, 
reported on 19 March that he had defeated more than three thousand Tang 
troops at Shengtang U lr, 70 miles south of Shouzhou. He captured Gao Bi it? 
3®, the Director in Chief, and other officers, as well as more than forty warships.
When the Southern Tang ruler had heard that Shizong reached Huaishang,
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he ordered Huangfu Hui and Yao Feng to raise one hundred thousand troops to 
relieve Shouzhou, using Chuzhou as their base. Shizong heard about Huangfu’s 
and Yao’s activities. Sometime between 17 March and 23 March he ordered 
Zhao Kuangyin to force march to Qingliuguan rfsfcH in response to the mobilization 
in Chuzhou.131 Zhao arrived with several thousand troops before the Southern 
Tang army was ready. Huangfu Hui and his subordinates arrayed themselves at 
the foot of the mountain in front of the pass with about fifteen thousand troops. 
Just as the vanguards of both sides opened the battle, Zhao led some troops out 
from behind the mountain. He had managed to march a force around the 
Southern Tang army’s position and arrived in their rear. The Tang army fled 
back to Chuzhou closely pursued by the Zhou. They were going destroy the 
bridge into the city but had no time. Zhao danced his horse through the water, 
leading his troops in fording the stream and arriving directly beneath the city 
walls.
The Zhou army saved the bridge into Chuzhou by its rapid pursuit. But the 
Southern Tang still held the city. Chuzhou was strongly situated across a mountain 
pass. Zhao Kuangyin held the bottom of the pass in case Huangfu Hui ventured 
out again. At the same time, Zhao searched for a way to take the city. The local 
people directed him to a wise scholar named Zhao M who taught in the village.132
131The location is given as f# Sit ill in JWDS.
132Worthy mistakenly conflated the village scholar Zhao HI, who showed Zhao Kuangyin 
the mountain path around Chuzhou, with Zhao Pu SUP, who became one of Kuangyin’s most 
important advisors. Kuangyin met Zhao Pu shortly after taking the city. Pu had been sent from 
court as a military judge. His decisions impressed Kuangyin and he later took part in the plot that 
put Kuangyin on the throne. There is no further mention of the village scholar Zhao, but his 
convenient appearance and the way he described his plan to get behind the city fits in
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The scholar told Kuangyin that there was a small unused path that went behind 
the mountain. After fording a stream, one would arrive beneath the city walls, 
cutting the city off from the pass. Kuangyin was pleased with the plan and sent 
three regiments of cavalry to carry it out at night. They entered through an 
undefended gate. The unexpected attack panicked the Southern Tang forces. 
Huangfu Hui donned armor and led his personal troops into battle. He sought a 
direct confrontation with Zhao Kuangyin, who was still outside the city.
Huangfu Hui said: "Everyone wishes to fight for his ruler. I want to come 
out of the city and fight." Zhao laughed and agreed to it. Huangfu ordered his 
troops and deployed. The troops clashed three times. Zhao Kuangyin suddenly 
broke through the Tang lines calling out: "I only want to seize Huangfu Hui. No 
one else is my enemy." He struck Huangfu in the head with his sword and 
captured him alive. Yao Feng was also captured. The capture of Huangfu Hui 
and Yao Feng ended Chuzhou’s resistance.
As a result of the Zhou victories, the Southern Tang ruler sent a letter to 
Zhou Shizong asking him to stop his invasion. Shizong did not respond. This 
was probably due to his confidence in the success of the invasion, and the Tang 
ruler's addressing the letter from the "Tang Emperor" to the "Emperor of Great 
Zhou."
Shizong ordered Hou Zhang to attack the Shouzhou palisade of
boats on 29 March. He broke through the dike at the northwest corner of the
moat in order to lead the water into the Fei River. Meanwhile, Huangfu Hui was 
suspiciously well with literature and military theory. Worthy, op cit., 35.
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brought to see Shizong. He was badly wounded from his encounter with Zhao 
Kuangyin when he spoke to Shizong: "I was not disloyal in what I did, but not all 
of the troops were brave. Before this, I fought the Liao many times but I have 
never seen soldiers this well trained." He greatly praised Zhao Kuangyin's bravery. 
Several days later he died of his wounds.133
Shizong heard from his spies that Yangzhou was not prepared. On 
30 March he ordered Han Lingkun $ £ 4 ^  to attack it. He cautioned Han not to 
injure the population or the imperial tombs of the Li ^  family.134 Shizong sent 
troops to guard the tombs.
The series of recent defeats frightened the Southern Tang ruler. He sent 
another peace mission to Shizong led by Zhong Mo MU, a Hanlin Academician, 
and Li Deming a Wenliyuan Academician. They brought liquid medicine,
one thousand ounces of gold, five thousand ounces of silver and two thousand 
bolts of silk, as well as five hundred head of cattle and forty thousand gallons of 
wine to entertain the troops. This very large procession arrived at Shouzhou on 
2 April.
Shizong put on a display of his soldiers for the Tang emissaries. He said 
to them: "Your ruler claims to be a descendant of the Tang royal house. It is 
appropriate to know the rites and decorum to deal with him. It must be different 
from other states. His territory and mine are only separated by a river, but he
133ZZTJ 292.9539. In relating this encounter between Huangfu Hui and Zhou Shizong, 
Sima Guang is making a subtle reference to the belief that, had Zhao Kuangyin lived long
enough, he would have been able to beat the Liao and take the Sixteen Prefectures.
134The Li family was the imperial house of the Tang dynasty.
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has never sent a single emissary to establish good relations. He only sends 
missions to the Liao by sea. Abandoning the Chinese and dealing with the 
barbarians, where are the rites and decorum in this? Moreover, you want to 
convince me to order my soldiers to stop? I am not a doltish ruler of the Six 
Kingdoms [period]. How can your entreaties have the power to move me? You 
can return and tell your ruler that if he comes to see me, and apologizes, this 
whole business will be over. But, [if he doesn't, then] I will go to Jinling City (the 
Southern Tang capital) and borrow from its stores to reward my troops. Will your 
ruler and his officials not regret [if this happens]?" Zhong and Li fought their fear, 
but didn’t dare to speak. This was Shizong's first mention of any sort of a casus 
belli with the Southern Tang.
Meanwhile in the south, the king of Wuyue sent troops to camp along the 
border of the Southern Tang to wait for orders from Shizong. Chen Man 
the Commander of the Suzhou Garrison Fields HiHIHIEB, pointed out to Wu 
Cheng one of the ministers of state, that the Zhou invasion had distracted 
the Tang. Nearby Changzhou # ft[ was unprepared and could be easily taken. 
Changzhou was 60 miles northwest of Suzhou JIM. Wu then spoke to the 
Wuyue king and asked that they immediately dispatch troops to follow the Zhou 
policy. One of the other ministers of state, Yuan Dezhao opposed the
action. He pointed out that the Southern Tang was a powerful state which could 
not be taken lightly. If the Zhou troops failed to arrive then they would be in great 
danger. Wu countered that if they attacked immediately they couldn't lose. The
king agreed with Wu and sent troops to attack Changzhou.
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Han Lingkun surreptitiously moved to Yangzhou on 5 April. He arrived at 
dawn and sent Bai Yanlu with several hundred cavalry to rush into the 
city. Everyone in the city was taken by surprise. Bai opened the gates and Han 
quickly followed him with the main army. Gu Chong M 0. the Dongdu Garrison 
Commander ^11$, set fire to the government storehouses and the people's homes. 
After destroying the city, he fled south. Feng Yanlu iHM#, the Assistant Regent 
Gentleman of the Ministry of Works, shaved his head and took refuge in a 
Buddhist temple where he was seized by Zhou soldiers. Han then settled the 
situation and calmed the people.
Wang Kui .EE^135 reported on 10 April that he had taken Changshan Fort 
M lilS  in Ezhou 1$#! and killed more than three thousand Southern Tang 
troops. Changshan Fort was in the north of Ezhou. Zhao Kuangyin reported on 
11 April that Geng Qian ®ci|, the Military Commissioner of Tianchang 
surrendered. Tianchang county was in Yangzhou, 37 miles west from the prefectural 
capital. Zhao also captured more than two hundred thousand units of grain and 
fodder. On the same day, Han Lingkun attacked and took Taizhou The 
prefect fled to Jinling Taizhou was 39 miles east of Yangzhou. On 12 April 
the commander of the Jing’an Army He Jiyun captured Southern
Tang emissaries on their way to the Liao to ask for help against the Zhou.
On 13 April the king of Wuyue commanded Lu Yanzhu the
13SZZTJ gives his name as Wang Kui. JWDS gives his name as Wang Jinkui EEM M - I 
have arbitrarily followed ZZTJ.
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Commander in Chief of the Imperial Guard136 to attack Xuanzhou Jl'JH- Shizong 
went out to inspect the water palisade at Fei Bridge WM (a bridge over the Fei 
River) on 14 April. He personally picked up a ballista stone and carried it on 
horseback to the ballistae at the palisade. All of the officers in his retinue who 
passed the bridge also carried stones. Zhao Kuangyin went into the Shouzhou 
moat in a leather boat. Bow and crossbow fire rained down from the city walls. 
Zhang Qiong was struck in the thigh by an arrow. The barbed head lodged 
in the bone and could not be pulled out. Zhang drank a large goblet of wine and 
ordered the bone broken so that the arrow could be extracted. Although he lost 
several pints of blood the expression on his face was normal.137
The Tang ruler sent another delegation to Shizong, led by Sun Sheng 
H, the Minister of Works, and Wang Chongzhi the Minister of Rites.
They presented a message to Shizong which said: "Since 907, the empire has 
been divided and in ruins. Some have been able to hold one part [of the empire] 
and some have served different dynasties. I have inherited my ancestral holdings 
and possess the land north of the Yangzi. I am like a crow who doesn't know who 
to follow or which phoenix is the true one to attach myself to. Now the Mandate 
of Heaven has returned and your influence is broad. I want to submit as Liangche 
and Hunan did. I will humbly receive your calendar and cautiously guard your
13ftThe shangzhiwei were the Imperial Guard during the Ming dynasty. They were a part 
of the Capital Guards jingwei. My translation of shangzhi is anachronistic. See Hucker, A 
Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China, (Southern Materials Center: Taipei), 1975, 407.
137Zhang Qiong survived his wound. When Zhao Kuangyin became emperor he put 
Zhang in charge of the Imperial Bodyguard.
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borders. I beg your majesty to recall your forces. Please pardon my crime of 
submitting late and appoint me leader of this subordinated state so that I can 
serve as your official. Then who will not say that he submits to your far-reaching 
virtue?" Then they again presented gifts of one thousand ounces of gold, one 
hundred thousand ounces of silver and two thousand rolls of gauze silk. Shizong 
accepted the gifts, but did not alter his campaign plans. Sun Sheng stayed in the 
Zhou camp, however, keeping the channel for diplomatic communication open.
On 15 April He Chao MS, the Pacification and Military Inspection Officer 
of Guang Jt, Shu and Huang M prefectures, gathered several tens of thousands 
of troops from the prefectures of An Sui IS. Shen e£ and Cai H  and attacked 
Guang prefecture. The next day He Chao reported that the Southern Tang 
prefect of Guangzhou had fled the city. The Director in Chief, Zhang Chenghan 
surrendered it to He. Guo Lingtu the Zhou prefect of Shuzhou
took Shuzhou on 17 April. Li Fu the Southern Tang general in charge of 
Qizhou ®r#[, killed his prefect and surrendered the prefecture to the Zhou. Ji 
Cangzhen the Commissioner of the Six Residences, was sent to attack
Huangzhou. The people of Shuzhou expelled Guo Lingtu on 23 April. Wang 
Shenqi the Iron Cavalry Commander in Chief $££ chose some light
cavalry, attacked Shuzhou at night and retook it. Guo then returned to take 
control. Shu, Qi and Huang prefectures were all located along the Yangzi.
Shizong sent Sun Sheng, the Southern Tang emissary, below the walls of
Shouzhou on 30 April to convince Liu Renshan, the defending general, to surrender.
Sun told Liu: "You have received the generosity of the country (the Southern
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Tang). You cannot open the gates to the bandits (the Zhou)." When he heard 
what Sun had done, Shizong was very angry. Sun said: "I am a high official. 
How can I instruct a military governor to rebel?' Shizong then relented.
The Tang ruler sent Li Deming to talk to Shizong and ask him to cancel 
his (the Southern Tang ruler's) title of emperor. He would cede the six prefectures 
of Shou 11, Hao SE, Si jffl, Chu $£, Guang % and Hai M (all situated along the 
south side of the Huai River, also known as the Huainan region) to the Zhou and 
pay an annual indemnity of one million units of gold and silk if Shizong would 
cease military operations.
At that time, Shizong already held half of the land in the Huainan region. 
His generals reported more victories every day. Consequently Shizong decided 
to take the Jiangbei region (those prefectures north of the Yangzi and south of 
the Huainan region) as well as the Huainan region. The Southern Tang offer was 
therefore insufficient. Li Deming saw that the Zhou army was advancing daily 
and said: "The Tang ruler does not know that Your Majesty's military strength is 
so great. I beg you to give me a grace period of five days to return and report to 
him that he must also give you the Jiangbei region." Shizong allowed him to go.
Sun Sheng accordingly sent Wang Chongzhi and Li Deming back to Jinling.
Shizong sent An Hongdao a Palace Servitor, to accompany them bearing
a letter for the Southern Tang ruler. It said (in part): "If you preserve the title of
emperor our relations will be cold. Consolidate your intention to serve my power
and then, after all, I will not press others into danger." It further stated that: "I
wait for all of the counties to come and surrender. Then I will do away with this
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great army. This is my ultimatum. I will say no more." Shizong also sent along 
letters to the ministers and generals to induce them to personally submit. The 
Tang ruler sent a reply again apologizing. But he did not immediately agree to 
Shizong’s terms.
Li Deming described the strength of the Zhou forces. He suggested that 
the Tang ruler also cede the Jiangbei region to the Zhou. The Tang ruler was not 
pleased. Song Qiqiu thought that they should not cede more territory to 
the Zhou. Li spoke at length about the military situation, but no one believed him. 
He was then impeached. The Tang ruler was told that Li had sold out the 
country for profit. He was furious and had Li beheaded.
In the south, Wu Cheng from the kingdom of Wuyue, attacked 
Changzhou and broke the Tang forces outside the suburbs, taking captive 
their Military Training Commissioner, Zhao Renze fSCgL The Tang ruler was 
concerned about the Wuyue incursion and feared that they would go on to attack 
Runzhou il'j'W, 64 miles to the northwest. He sent Chai Kehong the
Right Martial Guard General to link up with Lu Mengjun the
prefect of Yuanzhou and relieve Changzhou.
At that time all of the good Tang troops were in Jiangbei, fighting the 
Zhou, so Chai led several thousand undernourished, exhausted troops. Even so, 
he defeated Wu Cheng's army at Changzhou, beheading more than ten thousand 
soldiers. His victory halted the Wuyue offensive. Chai then requested permission 
to lead troops to rescue Shouzhou. Unfortunately for the Southern Tang, he died 
before he arrived.
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On 14 May Lu Mengjun led more than ten thousand Southern Tang troops 
north from Changzhou to Taizhou ##(. The Zhou troops fell back and Lu retook 
the city. Lu next advanced on Yangzhou M 'flt He camped at Shugang Wffl to 
the west of the city. His position on the heights threatened the Zhou force's line 
of retreat, so Han Lingkun withdrew. Shizong sent a force under Zhang Yongde
to reestablish the Zhou position. Han then returned and reentered the 
city. Shizong then sent a force under Zhao Kuangyin to Liuhe /T o , in Chang 
prefecture, 44 miles northwest from the city of Yangzhou. Zhao's position allowed 
him to cut off the Tang lines of communication. Han then resolved to firmly 
defend Yangzhou.
Shizong had personally directed the siege of Shouzhou. He had ordered 
his forces to attack day and night. But after nearly three months of constant 
assault the Zhou army had failed to capture Shouzhou.138 There were several 
feet of water in the Zhou camps from heavy rains and they had lost many men 
during the attacks. Supplies were running low and the late Li Deming (executed 
by the Tang ruler) had not returned. On 19 May Shizong declared that Shouzhou 
had all but fallen. He left the siege and went to Haozhou SEW, 127 miles to the 
east, arriving there on 25 May.
Shortly after 25 May, Han Lingkun defeated a force of Tang troops east of 
Yangzhou, capturing Lu Mengjun. The Tang Prince of Qi Jing Da jiH , ied 
twenty thousand soldiers from Guabu JR#, forded the Yangzi River and approached 
to within 7 miles of Liuhe. Jing stopped there and built a stockade. Several
'“ Characterized in ZZTJ as “a long time."
124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
commanders wanted to attack Jing's force but Zhao Kuangyin refused. He said: 
"Their building a stockade for defense shows that they fear us. Presently, our 
force is less than two thousand men. If we go and attack them then they will see 
how few we are. But if we wait for them to come to us and then attack, defeating 
them will be a certainty." Several days later, the Tang forces advanced to Liuhe 
and Zhao strongly attacked them. He crushed the Tang army, killing or capturing 
nearly five thousand men. The remaining mass of more than ten thousand 
soldiers fled back to the Yangzi. A great number were killed in the struggle to get 
on board the boats. The battle at Liuhe destroyed the last of the well-trained 
Tang soldiers. During the battle, Zhao acted as if he were just directing the 
fighting, but he surreptitiously used his sword to make a cut on the leather 
helmets of the soldiers who were not fighting hard. The next day he beheaded 
the several dozen men with marked helmets. After that none of his soldiers 
dared not fight to the death.
At that time the Tang ruler heard that Yangzhou had fallen and ordered 
the neighboring regions to send troops to retake it. Han Lingkun reported on 29 
May that he had defeated more than ten thousand Yangzhou troops at Wantouyan 
WSCJIE. 3 miles north of Yangzhou. Zhang Yongde reported defeating more than 
ten thousand Sizhou S3#( troops at Quqiyan ffiilig .
Wokou jjSP reported on 5 June that the new pontoon bridge (across the
Huai River) was finished. Shizong arrived the next day from Haozhou to inspect
it. He wanted to go to Yangzhou, but his ministers dissuaded him. Chen Hui
IS, the Tang military governor of Yongan defeated a Zhou force at Nantai
125
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
river MIE£H on 15 June, capturing or killing more than a thousand men. Shizong 
headed back to Kaifeng from Wokou on 17 June. He arrived in Kaifeng on 4 
July.
Liu Renshan made a sally from Shouzhou on 21 July and attacked the 
camp of Li Jixun the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Guard Infantry.
Li was camped south of the city and Liu had found out from his spies that the 
camp was not prepared. Liu killed several hundred men and burned their weapons. 
This successful sally helped to convince the Tang ruler that he could resist Zhou 
incursions in Jiangbei. He ordered troops sent to Jiangbei from several prefectures.
For a short time, the tide of battle began to turn in the Southern Tang’s 
favor. The Tang ruler sent Zhu Yuan to retake Shuzhou on 29 August. 
Guo Lingtuan, the Zhou prefect, fled the city. Li Ping took Qizhou from the 
Zhou. Zhu also took Hezhou The local population began to resist the Zhou 
army. As the campaign dragged on, the presence of the Zhou army made life 
difficult. People formed "White Armor Annies" (S  ̂ W) of civilians wearing paper 
armor. These armies were actually able to defeat Zhou troops on several occasions 
and were responsible for much of the Tang success in recovering land. No large 
Zhou units were beaten. But these armies of civilians were able to drive off 
smaller units and thus impede Zhou efforts to control the territory around major 
strategic points.
The Southern Tang relief forces camped at Zijin Mountain south of
Shouzhou. They communicated with the city by using signal fires. On the Zhou
side, Xiang Xun sent a memorial requesting that the troops of Huangling join with
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the other troops for a concentrated attack on Shouzhou. He intensified the siege 
of the city. The troops fighting over Yangzhou and Chuzhou were also brought 
back to concentrate on Shouzhou. Although many of the Tang commanders 
wanted to directly attack the Zhou besiegers, Song Qiqiu felt that it was better to 
adopt a defensive stance. He ordered the generals to defend their positions and 
not go out to fight.
Jing Da marched to Haozhou in order to provide moral support from a 
distance for the troops attempting to relieve Shouzhou. All military orders, though 
signed by Jing Da, came from his advisor, Chen Jue They had fifty 
thousand troops but didn't want to fight a decisive battle. The commanders and 
officials were all afraid of Chen Jue and didn't dare say anything.
Zhang Yongde camped at Xiacaizhen on 15 September. The Tang sent 
Lin Renzhao with a naval force to rescue Shouzhou. Lin tried to use fire 
ships to attack the pontoon bridge at Xiacai, but the wind changed direction and 
he had to retreat. Zhang had also strung an iron cable more than a thousand 
feet long across the river about fifty feet from the bridge. The cable kept the 
Tang ships from getting too close to the bridge.
Li Zhongjin reported on 19 November that Wang Yansheng 3E/1?#, the
Iron Cavalry Commander in Chief had defeated a Tang force attacking
Shengtang MM. Wang beheaded more than three thousand men. Zhang Yongde
reported on 28 November that he had defeated a Tang army at Xiacai. The Tang
had returned to attack the bridge. Zhang ordered good swimmers to dive beneath
the Tang boats and anchor them to the river bottom with iron chains. Once the
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ships could neither advance nor retreat he let his soldiers attack them at will. A 
great number of men were killed and their ships sunk.
The Tang tried, and failed, to obtain aid from the Liao. The Liao were 
either unwilling or unable to attack the Zhou at that time. While the Zhou 
offensive had bogged down, Tang rescue efforts had also failed to produce 
decisive results. They had been beaten twice in their attempts to cut the pontoon 
bridge at Xiacai. At the same time, Shouzhou had held out far longer than 
Shizong had expected. The entire Huainan campaign became focussed on the 
siege of Shouzhou. The Zhou army had overextended itself. It had also aroused 
popular resistance to its presence. Together, these two factors had accomplished 
what the Southern Tang regular military forces had failed to do: force the Zhou to 
relinquish widespread territorial gains. Still, a Zhou victory at Shouzhou would 
allow it to quickly retake the territory it had conquered, then relinquished, earlier 
in the campaign.
By February of 957, the Tang had seen enough defeats to know that it
could not withstand the Zhou army in the field. Instead, the Tang strategy
focussed on gradually breaking the siege of Shouzhou. First, a series of forts
was set up around Zijin mountain, near the city. The positions on Zijin mountain
threatened the Zhou camps around Shouzhou. Next, the Tang army extended a
covered roadway toward the city. If the fortified passage reached the city, the
Tang would be able to resupply Shouzhou, effectively defeating the Zhou siege.
Finally, the Tang continued their efforts to destroy the pontoon bridge at Xiacai.
The bridge was the Zhou army’s only solid link to the rest of Zhou territory. If the
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bridge were broken the siege of Shouzhou would be seriously weakened, if not 
ended. If the siege of Shouzhou was broken and the bridge at Xiacai destroyed, 
then the very existence of the Zhou expeditionary army would be imperiled.
Jing Da sent Xu Wenzhen ITjtHC, the military governor of Yong’an, Bian 
Hao jSH, the Chief Military Commissioner, and Zhu Yuan, leading several myriads 
of soldiers, upstream from Haozhou to relieve Shouzhou on 3 February 957. 
They built more than ten stockades around Zijin Mountain and made contact with 
the city by signal fires. When the covered passage had almost reached Shouzhou, 
Li Zhongjin made a frontal assault on the Tang forces and badly beat them. He 
killed five thousand men and took two of the stockades. This was reported to 
Shizong on 21 February.
Liu Renshan requested that Bian Hao be put in charge of the defense of 
Shouzhou, so that Liu could personally lead his forces in a decisive battle. Jing 
Da rejected the request. Consequently, Liu became sick with anger and melancholy. 
His younger son, Chongjian tried to flee to Zhou territory by boat, but was 
captured. Liu ordered him cut in half at the waist. None of the officials or 
officers dared to try and save him, except for Zhou Tinggou the Army
Supervisor. When his pleas failed to change Liu's mind, Zhou went to the boy's 
mother to ask her to intercede. She said: "It is not that I do not love him, but 
military law cannot be adapted to individuals. It is not a lack of sentiment. If he 
is reprieved then the Liu will not be a loyal family. We will be unable to face the 
commanders and soldiers." The sentence was carried out. All of the commanders 
and soldiers were touched.
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At about that time, Shizong was having a policy review. Most of his 
advisors felt that the Tang relief forces were still strong. They advised Shizong to 
stop the campaign. He was still uncertain so, on 12 March, he sent Fan Zhi mST 
and Wang Pu to get Li Gu's opinion. Li was ill at home. He sent a memorial 
saying: "Shouzhou is in difficult straits and will soon fall. If Your Majesty personally 
goes into the field then [our] commanders and men will fight hard and the relieving 
troops [of the Tang] will be afraid. Those in the city will know that they will be 
destroyed and must submit." Shizong was pleased with this.
Shizong left the capital to take the field again on 21 March. He brought a 
new riverine navy of several hundred vessels with him. When the Zhou began 
their campaign they had no naval forces whatsoever. The course of the campaign 
had made it clear to Shizong that he would need to remedy this weakness if he 
wanted to take Shouzhou. Surrendered and captured Tang sailors were forced 
to teach Zhou troops naval warfare. Meanwhile, ships were built west of the 
capital on the Bian River. Wang Huan 3EM, the Right Brave Guard Great 
General was placed in command of the navy and its several thousand
sailors. The Tang troops were quite alarmed when they saw the Zhou navy.
Shizong reached Xiacai on 31 March. He crossed the Huai river during
the night of 4 April and arrived at Shouzhou. At dawn on 5 April he donned
armor and, with the Zhou army south of Zijin Mountain, ordered Zhao Kuangyin
to attack the Tang vanguard stockade to the north of the mountain (the one
closest to the city). Zhao defeated the Tang and captured or killed more than
three thousand men. He also cut the covered passage into the city. Shizong
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divided his troops up and had them guard the other stockades. He then returned 
to Xiacai. Zhu Yuan, the Vanguard Moat and Stockade Commander, surrendered 
his stockade along with more than ten thousand men the night of 6 April.
Shizong's army was at Zhaobu on 7 April, on the north bank of the 
Huai River. All of the Zhou commanders commenced their attack on the remaining 
stockades around Zijin Mountain. They broke them all and killed or captured 
more than ten thousand men. The Tang generals Xu Wenjin, Bian Hao and 
Yang Shouzhong HKf/S were captured. The remains of the Tang forces retreated 
east along the Huai River. Shizong had anticipated this and earlier positioned 
several hundred cavalry on the north bank, infantry and cavalry on the south 
bank and the navy on the Huai river to pursue them. Nearly forty thousand Tang 
troops were killed, drowned or captured in the 70 mile pursuit. More than a 
hundred thousand boats and units of grain were also taken. When Liu Renshan 
heard the next day that the rescue force had been defeated he choked and 
sighed.
Shizong next shifted his efforts to cutting off Haozhou, reasoning that any
further relief forces would have to come through there. Laborers were drafted
from the nearby counties to build two forts on either side of the Huai River at
Zhenhuaijun The pontoon bridge at Xiacai was then moved between the
forts. The Haozhou Director in Chief, Guo Yanwei IP M ii, planned to sail up the
Huai on 9 April, take the Zhou by surprise and burn the pontoon bridge. Zhao
Kuangzan m g # , the Right Dragon Martial Commander-general knew
about the attack and ambushed the Tang force when it arrived, defeating it. Jing
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Da and Chen Jue fled back to Jinling leaving Chen Decheng and the rest
of the army to retreat without them.
Shizong returned to Xiacai on 14 April and sent an edict to Liu Renshan 
the following day commanding him to surrender. Shizong assembled his troops 
to the north of Shouzhou on 19 April. Liu was very ill and couldn't recognize the 
people around him. His subordinates drafted a letter of surrender for him on 21 
April and sent it to the Zhou. The city was formally surrendered over the next two 
days, although Liu himself was too sick to actively participate. Shizong rewarded 
Liu for his spirited defense of the city. The siege had lasted fifteen months, from 
25 January 956 to 23 April 957.
After the fall of Shouzhou very little occurred until the winter of that year. 
Shizong returned to the capital on 14 May. Another attack upon the pontoon 
bridge at Wokou by Guo Yanwei was successful on 11 June. Guo defeated \Mj 
Xingde the military governor of Wuning ji£Jp, at Dingyuan g[Ji. Shizong
apparently took the time to prepare for another push in the campaign. He may 
have been resting and refitting his troops or training new ones to replace his 
losses.
Shizong left the capital to take the field again on 13 November. He
crossed the Huai River on 27 November and arrived west of Haozhou the next
day. Six miles northwest of the city of Haozhou there was an island on which
the Tang had built a palisaded outpost. Since it was surrounded by water they
thought they were secure from attack. They believed the Zhou troops would be
unable to cross the water. Shizong personally commanded the attack on the
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outpost on 29 November. He ordered Kang Baoyi a Palace Duty Officer,
to lead several hundred armored soldiers using camels to attack it, taking advantage 
of their greater height. Zhao Kuangyin reinforced him with an additional force of 
cavalry (more camels?) and the outpost was taken. Meanwhile, Li Zhongjin 
broke the through the south gate of Haozhou.
Shizong turned his attention to Haozhou itself on 4 December. Wang 
Shenqi was ordered to take the water fort. Several hundred Tang warships were 
camped west of the city. They built a palisade wall of logs along the river bank to 
defend themselves. Shizong ordered the navy to attack the position. They 
pulled up the palisade wall, burned more than seventy ships and beheaded more 
than two thousand men. The Zhou forces also took Haozhou's goat and horse 
wall (see chapter two). The Tang commander of Haozhou, Guo Yanwei, sent 
Shizong a letter on 7 December saying that he would hand over the city if the 
emperor would send an order to Jinling first. He was afraid for his family in 
Southern Tang territory. Shizong did so.
Shizong had heard that there was a Tang fleet of several hundred ships 
on the Huan River planning to relieve Haozhou. He sent troops on the night 
of 12 December to attack the fleet. Two days later the Zhou force badly beat the 
Tang fleet at Tongkou p P , beheading more than five thousand men and taking 
more than two thousand prisoners.
Shizong advanced to Sizhou arriving there on 16 December. Sizhou
was 60 miles downstream from Haozhou. Zhao Kuangyin first attacked the south
of the city, burning the city gate and breaking the moon wall (see chapter two) of
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the water fort. Shizong then established himself in the tower of the moon wall so 
that he could oversee the attack on the city. Ten days later, on 26 December, 
Fan Zaiyu the defending general of Sizhou, capitulated. Another Tang
force of several hundred warships was driven from Tongkou by Zhou cavalry. 
They retreated to defend Qingkou flfp , the mouth of the Qing River. Shizong 
had now secured the second of the major anchors of the Huai River defense line. 
Sizhou was also close to the point where the Bian Canal entered the Huai.
Shizong then gave orders to sweep the Tang from the river. He advanced 
east on the northern bank with his personal troops. Zhao Kuangyin commanded 
infantry and cavalry on the south bank. The navy sailed down the middle of the 
river. The Zhou forces were headed downstream to Chuzhou ^j-H, 73 miles 
northwest of Sizhou. They advanced marching and fighting, The sounds of the 
signal drums could be heard for miles. Shizong arrived northwest of Chuzhou on 
1 January, driving all of the Tang troops before him. There were further Tang 
forces to the east, below Chuzhou. Shizong personally pursued them. Zhao 
Kuangyin was in the vanguard and chased them for 20 miles, capturing Chen 
Chengzhao §, the military governor of Baoyi In addition, they captured, 
burned or sank more than three hundred warships and killed or drowned more 
than seven thousand men. The Tang navy was now eliminated from the Huai 
River.
Shizong crossed the Huai River on 2 January and camped northwest of
Chuzhou. He commenced the attack on the city on 8 January, taking their moon
wall. On 10 January Guo Yanwei came to see Shizong. The emperor said:
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"Since I've come south, the various Southern Tang generals have been continuously 
defeated and have forgotten to think of cutting [the pontoon bridge across the 
Huai]. Only you were able to cut the bridge at Wokou and take Dingyuan Fort 
[see above]. You have sufficiently paid back your country."
Shizong sent Wu Shouqi the Commander in Chief of the Left
Brigade of the Iron Cavalry, to Yangzhou with several hundred cavalry. When 
Wu reached Gaoyou 34 miles to the northwest, the Tang evacuated Yangzhou, 
moving the people south of the Yangzi and burning down the official buildings 
and the peoples’ houses. Yangzhou was only 15 miles north of the Yangzi. 
When Wu arrived several days later there were only a few sick people left. 
Shizong had also heard that Taizhou was unprepared and sent a force to attack 
it. They took it on 17 January.
Wang Hanzhang SEgiit, the Right Dragon Martial General reported
on 27 January that he had taken Haizhou. Shizong wanted to send his warships
from the Huai River to the Yangzi. But there was no pre-existing way to crossover.
The only waterway that came close to connecting the two rivers was the Guan
River i^fc, northwest of Chuzhou. The initial survey of the river was discouraging:
the terrain was not favorable for building an extension of the river to connect the
Huai and Yangzi. It could be done, but only with a vast expenditure of time and
labor. Shizong went to see for himself and then drew up a plan. They drafted
labor from the surrounding prefecture and completed the extension in less than
ten days. Several hundred Zhou warships then sailed into the Yangzi. The Tang
were terribly alarmed at the news. The defensive line of the Yangzi had just
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been compromised. Jinling itself was now threatened.
Chuzhou finally fell on 16 February, after more than forty days of siege.
The stubborn defenders had fought until their arrows and swords were gone.
Then they took poison and committed suicide. Over one thousand men died.
When the Zhou took the city not a single person was alive to surrender.
Tian Chang surrendered on 23 February. Shizong left Chuzhou on
27 February and reached Yangzhou on 8 March. Ci Chao nJ2S, the prefect of
Huangzhou H#I, reported on 16 March that Wang Shenqi had attacked Shuzhou
and captured its prefect Shi Renwang SS{zM. Shizong arrived at Yingluanzhen
on 1 April. He heard that several hundred Tang warships were at Dongfuzhou
preparing to sail to Suzhou M'Hi and Hangzhou tnl'M. He sent Murong
Yanzhao M&MM, the Palace Corps Provost Marshal, commanding the army,
and Song Yanwo 5fc£Eil, the Right Divine Martial Commander General
commanding the navy, to set up an ambush on the Yangzi. Murong reported on
4 April that they had badly beaten the Tang at Dongbuzhou. Shizong sent Li
Zhongjin to attack Luzhou Jjsgffl.
The Tang ruler heard that Shizong was on the Yangzi and feared that the
Zhou army would cross over and advance south. At that point only four prefectures
in the Huainan region, Lu, Shu, Qi and Huang had not fallen. The Tang ruler
sent Chen Jue to Shizong, offering him the remaining prefectures in order to
make the Yangzi the new border. Shizong agreed and sent back a decree which
addressed the Southern Tang ruler as "King of Jiangnan." On 8 April the Tang
ruler again sent Liu Chengyu to Shizong, this time with a petition from the "Ruler
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of the Country of Tang" asking to present the four prefectures and a yearly tribute 
of one hundred thousand units. The settlement gave the Zhou fourteen prefectures, 
containing sixty counties. This was approximately half of the Southern Tang’s 
territory.
The Sixteen Prefectures Campaign (29 April-27 July 959)139
Shizong ordered the dredging of various rivers and canals in Hebei and 
Hedong on 12 March 959. This was done in order to facilitate the movement of 
supplies and troops north in preparation for a campaign to retake the Sixteen 
Prefectures. On 29 April Shizong announced that he was going to Cangzhou zt 
'Hi on the northern border. He ordered Sun Xingyou the military governor
of Yiwu H:®, to guard Xishan Pass fSiii5&. This was the pass which the 
Northern Han forces would use to come to the aid of the Liao. Han Tong 
the Imperial Guard Bodyguard Provost Marshal, and his subordinates were sent 
ahead with the navy on 2 May. Shizong left the capital on 9 May.
Han Tong reported on 25 May that he had repaired the waterways and 
entered Liao territory from Cangzhou. He built a stockade south of Qianningjun 
Qianningjun was in Cang prefecture’s Yongan county 34 miles
west of Cangzhou. Repairs were made on the damaged embankments and thirty 
six locks were opened, allowing the Ying M and Mo M rivers to flow. Shizong
13SThe Sizteen Prefectures campaign is chronicled in ZZTJ 294.9594-9602, JWDS 120/4b
and XWDS 20.124.
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reached Cangzhou on 26 May. He immediately led several tens of thousands of
infantry and cavalry from Cangzhou to cross the Liao border. The next day he
arrived at Qianningjun. The Liao prefect of Ningzhou sp-Ki Wang Hong 3*
surrendered the city to him. Shizong put the navy in order on 30 May, making
the command assignments for the various generals. Han Tong was made Chief
Administrator of Land Routes and Zhao Kuangyin was made Chief
Administrator of Water Routes 7fcg§.
Shizong boarded ship on 1 June and sailed north to Chuoliukou UcitP
and then west to Yijinguan 53 miles northwest from Qianningjun. Zhong
Tinghui the Liao Defending General, surrendered the city to him. From
that point west the waterway was unnavigable, so Shizong abandoned it.
Zhao Kuangyin went ahead to Waqiaoguan "MMISR, 27 miles east of
Yijinguan, arriving on 7 June. Yao Neibin the Liao Defending General,
surrendered the city to him. Shizong then arrived and entered the city. The next
day, the prefect of Mozhou M'J'H, Liu Chuxin surrendered Mozhou. Li
Zhongjin and his subordinates led troops forward and cut off Yingzhou aHM on 9
June. The prefect, Gao Yanhui Hi JrHff, then surrendered the city. This completed
the conquest of the Guannan H it region by the Zhou. It was now time to
advance through the passes into the Shanqian region.
Liu Zhongjin took Gu'an on 10 June, 40 miles southeast from Yanzhou
Shizong arrived at Anyang River and ordered a bridge built over
the river. But he was feeling ill and returned to Waqiao. The Liao had sent a
messenger to the Northern Han ordering it to attack the Zhou flank. When they
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heard that Shizong had returned south, they ceased military preparations.
Sun Xingyou reported on 12 June that he had taken Yizhou M'Hi capturing 
its prefect Li Zaiqin and beheading its army commander. On 14 June Li
Zhongjin was ordered to attack the Northern Han from Tumen Shizong left 
Waqiaoguan140 and returned south on 16 June. On 3 July Li Zhongjin reported 
defeating Northern Han troops at Baijing & # . Shizong reached the capital on 8 
July, after his 400-mile journey from the border. The next day Li Yun reported 
that he had attacked the Northern Han and taken Liaozhou He captured 
the prefect Zhang Pi
Shizong died on 27 July 959, leaving a young son to succeed him. It was 
not an opportunity that any of his ambitious generals could pass up. The question 
was not if, but who would seize power and when would they do it. Perhaps an 
even more important question was whether a single individual would succeed in 
taking over the Zhou state whole, or whether it would be dismembered by competing 
factions. Shizong’s legacy was a powerful state which had expanded dramatically, 
and was poised to expand even more in the future. He had doubled the size of 
Zhou territory and vastly increased its wealth. Whether his attempt to capture the 
Sixteen Prefectures would have succeeded had his death not brought all of the 
generals rushing back to the capital is unclear. Several later attempts started out 
well, only to fail once the Liao military was mobilized. Regardless, the Guannan 
region remained in the hands of the Zhou’s successor, the Song, until 1127.
’^Waqiaoguan had its name changed to Xiong prefecture J t# (. For consistency I have 
retained its old designation in the text.
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Of all of the contenders for the Zhou throne, it was Zhao Kuangyin who 
turned out to have been best prepared to seize power. His supporters were 
well-positioned to control the main military forces of the Zhou. In short order 
Zhao took control of the capital and most of the army. It was then only a matter
of isolating his opponents and then destroying them.
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Chapter Five 
Song Taizu 1 I
Zhao Kuangyin's MlUiL most important task in the year following his coup 
in 960 was to secure his throne against several contenders for power. He only 
had to use force against two, Li Yun and Li Zhongjin. Apart from the campaigns 
against the two Lis, Zhao (posthumously known as Song Taizu) did not go to war 
in the first two years of his reign. He consolidated his political and military power 
by inducing several powerful generals to retire and by continuing the governmental 
reforms begun by Zhou Shizong. It was only in 963 that he sent out troops to 
take Jingnan fIM  and to “assist" Zhou Baoquan in Hunan. That same
year Song forces raided Northern Han territory in the wake of a revolt by mid-level 
officials there. Late in 964 he began the conquest of Shu D (Sichuan), which 
was completed early in 965. Another attempt was made on the Northern Han in 
968, which failed the following year. The conquest of the Southern Han, begun 
in 970, was completed in March of 971. Zhou Shizong’s partial conquest of the 
Southern Tang was completed from 974 to 975. Finally, Taizu's campaign against 
the Northern Han in 976 was recalled because of his death.
The rebellions of the two Lis in the first year of Taizu's reign were resolved 
fairly quickly. But it was not just luck that they were not simultaneous. Li 
Zhongjin had intended to coordinate his uprising with that of Li Yun. He was 
unfortunate in choosing Di Shouxun as his messenger to Yun. Di secretly
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went to Taizu and revealed the plan. Taizu had Di convince Zhongjin to delay 
the beginning of his uprising.141 Di was successful in his persuasion, allowing 
Taizu to deal with Yun in the north before turning to the south to deal with 
Zhongjin.
The Rebellion of Li Yun (10 May-15 July 960)142
Li Yun, the military governor of Zhaoyi 0gH, had defended the border for 
more than eight years. On 10 May 960 Taizu sent an envoy to Li with Zhou 
Shizong's son's edict of abdication.143 Li didn't want to accept it (and thereby 
accept Taizu's coup) even though his advisors and his son pleaded with him to 
do so. When Taizu's envoy arrived, Li had a banquet set out. After a while he 
ordered a portrait of Zhou Taizu brought in and hung up. Li then began to cry in 
front of the picture. His officials assured the envoy that this expression of Zhou 
loyalty was due to drunkenness.
The ruler of the Northern Han knew that Li intended to rebel and sent him 
a secret letter. Li reported the letter to the court, in order to demonstrate his 
loyalty, and then accelerated his preparations for rebellion. Taizu personally 
ordered Li's eldest son, Shoujie to come to the court. Li sent him with 
instructions to observe what was happening there. When he arrived for his
141XCB 1/20b.
142The Rebellion of Li Yun is chronicled in XCB 1/12b-15a and SS 1.6.
'"Correcting guisi to xinsi 3&E.
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imperial audience Taizu first called him "heir-apparent" in order to make clear his 
knowledge of Li Yun's imperial ambitions. Shoujie protested and said his father 
was being slandered. Taizu replied: "I have heard that you have often remonstrated 
with him. But that old rebel wouldn't listen to you. He won't submit to me but 
sends you here. This is only because he wants me to kill you, [and thus give him 
a reason to rebel] that is all. Return and tell your father: ‘When I was not the 
emperor he was allowed to do what he wanted. [Ask him] why he can't give me 
a few concessions now that I am the emperor?’" Shoujie returned and told his 
father. Li Yun then set his rebellion in motion.
On 12 May Li sent emissaries to the Northern Han ruler seeking military 
assistance. He also sent troops to Zezhou j$ft[ to kill the prefect Zhang Fu 5g|g, 
who was loyal to Taizu, and take the city. Lu Qiuzhong advised Li that his 
plan was risky. If he advanced south, toward the capital, he would directly clash 
with the superior capital armies. The best plan, Lu felt, was to wait for Taizu to 
attack in a defensive position west of the Taihang ± f r  mountains. Lu knew that 
Taizu would have to respond quickly and actively to Li’s rebellion. The empire 
would fragment if uprisings by military governors weren’t rapidly, and decisively, 
crushed. Li rejected Lu’s advice. He felt he could rely on three things to bring 
him victory in his direct approach, his general Dan Gui his good horse and 
the fact that ail of the top commanders in Kaifeng were his old comrades and 
subordinates.
Li's declaration of war arrived at the Song court on 15 May. Wu Yanzuo
pointed out that if Li Yun took and strongly defended Luzhou $&#[ it would
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be extremely difficult to dislodge him. But Li was arrogant and didn't plan. If
Taizu quickly met Li’s advance, Li would seek battle with the Song army. Taizu
would then be able to beat Li Yun in the field, which would be much quicker and
easier than besieging him in Luzhou or some other city. Taizu agreed and, on 17
May, sent Shi Shouxin and Gao Huaide i f  m u  north with advance units
of the army. He ordered them to force march to Xiataihang and take the pass.
Once the pass was under Song control Li Yun would be blocked from advancing
further south. On 29 May Taizu sent Zan Jurun to Shanzhou to
block Li from crossing the Yellow River there if he turned east. Murong Yanzhao
and Wang Quanbin led troops from the east to link up with Shi
Shouxin and Gao Huaide.
Li Yun exchanged envoys with the Northern Han ruler on 30 May. Li
wanted the Han ruler to assist him and send troops south, but asked that no Liao
soldiers be involved. Li's stipulation was accepted. The Han ruler immediately
prepared to lead his troops south from Tuanbogu At the farewell banquet
before he was going to cross the Fen River, Zhao Hua said to him: "Li Yun
is taking this business very lightly and cannot succeed. Your Majesty should not
leave your territory and go to him. I cannot see that this will work." The Han
ruler stared at him and said: "My plan has already been decided. How do you
know it will not succeed? Do you have a better plan?" Before Zhao could reply
the Han ruler got on his horse and rode to Taipingyi
Li met the Han ruler at Taipingyi. Their meeting did not go well. Li felt that
the Han ruler's personal guard were small and weak and not befitting a king. On
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the Han side, the problems were more substantive. To begin with, although the 
Han ruler tried to discuss strategy with Li several times he was unable to do so. 
Li was then heard to lament that he had been unable to repay the Zhou family's 
benevolence. Considering the enmity which had existed between the Zhou and 
Northern Han, it was not surprising that the Han ruler would be displeased to 
hear Li's comments. The Han ruler appointed Lu Zan s i®  to observe Li’s army, 
which annoyed Li.
Lu Zan also tried to discuss campaign strategies with Li. Li refused to 
discuss plans. He had a special corps of three thousand cavalry that he trained 
day and night. He planned to head straight for the capital. Li said: "The soldiers 
of the capital were all my subordinates before. When they see me they will 
surrender." Lu left in disgust. The Han ruler hurriedly patched things up between 
Lu and Li, allowing the campaign to go forward. Li left his oldest son behind in 
Taipingyi and led his army of thirty thousand troops south from Shangdang 
On 1 June Shi Shouxin reported defeating Li's forces at Changping ft^F.144 
They beheaded more than three thousand men and attacked and took Dahui Fort
On 15 June Han Lingkun set out for Heyang from Kaifeng to prepare 
the way for Taizu. Taizu left the capital two days later. When he reached 
Yingyang ;§tB§14S on 20 June he called upon Xiang Gong |t]g£ and Zhao Pu 
to discuss the situation. Xiang recommended crossing the Yellow River and
144XCB erroneously locates the battle at Changan
14SAIso pronounced Yongyang.
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advancing to the Taihang mountains. Li should be attacked while his forces were 
dispersed. Zhao added that Li thought that Taizu would be unable to come out to 
fight because the Song regime was new. If they force-marched to meet Li they 
would catch him unprepared and be able to defeat him in a single battle. Taizu 
accepted their advice.
Taizu reached Huaizhou on 24 June. On 25 June Shi Shouxin and Gao 
Huaide defeated Li Yun's army of more than thirty thousand south of Zezhou and 
captured the Northern Han military governor of Heyang MU. Fan Shoutu 
Lu Zan and Li Yun retreated into the city of Zezhou and prepared to defend it.146 
Meanwhile, Li's son Shoujie, retreated into Luzhou Sfrffl. Taizu arrived at Zezhou 
on 27 June to supervise the attack on the city. The Song army erected stockades 
around the city to besiege it.
When Zezhou had not fallen after more than ten days, Taizu ordered Ma 
Quanyi I f  i£ X '47 to come and discuss plans. Ma asked to concentrate the army 
and storm the city. He said: "If we delay the attack I fear the situation will 
deteriorate." This was exactly the situation Taizu had been trying to avoid, a 
protracted struggle to dislodge Li Yun from strong defensive positions. He ordered 
the army to storm the city. Ma lead several dozen “Death-Defying Soldiers” Wfc 
± . An arrow lodged in his arm, breaking the bone and causing blood to pour
148XCB and SS disagree on the fate of Lu Zan. SS reports that he was killed in the battle 
south of Zezhou. XCB reports that he retreated into the city with Li Yun. There is no way to 
resolve the issue so I have arbitrarily followed XCB.
147XCB and SS disagree on the last character of Ma’s name. XCB agrees with ZZTJ. SS 
uses H  instead.
146
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
out. Ma pulled out the arrow and advanced fighting. He set fire to the battlements 
and scaled the wall. Taizu led his own guard in supporting Ma. They took the 
city on the 9 July. Li threw himself into the fire. The Northern Han prime 
minister, Wei Rong f t r l i  was taken captive.
The Northern Han ruler heard that Li had been defeated and returned to 
Taiyuan. When he arrived he said to Zhao Hua: “Li Yun was not heroic and died 
just as you said...I regret losing Wei Rong and Lu Zan, that’s all." On the 13 July 
Taizu advanced and attacked Luzhou. Two days later, Li Shoujie surrendered 
the city. Taizu pardoned him and made him the Military Training Commissioner 
of Junzhou ^ 'J fi148
The Rebellion of Li Zhongjin ^ £ 3 1  (15 October-2 December 960)149
When Zhao Kuangyin usurped the Zhou throne, Li Zhongjin was the Military 
Governor of Huainan the area Zhou Shizong had captured from the Southern 
Tang only a few years before. He had been the nephew of Zhou Taizu, and 
therefore had a personal interest in the success of the Zhou dynasty. During 
Zhou Shizong's reign military power had been divided between Zhao and Li. Li 
had always recognized, and feared, Zhao’s ambitions. The beginning of the 
Song Dynasty justified his fears. Zhao, now the Song emperor, tried to conciliate
148XCB and SS disagree as to which prefecture Li Shoujie was appointed Military Training 
Commissioner. SS gives Danzhou ipt'j'H instead of Junzhou.
149The Rebellion of Li Zhongjin is chronicled in XCB 1/20a-24a and SS 1.7.
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Li by adding the title Secretariat Director to his existing central government 
position of Commander in Chief of the Cavalry and Infantry. Taizu’s attempt to 
win-over Li was not a cynical gesture that he knew would fail. He would have 
preferred Li to accept his overthrow of the Zhou dynasty.
Li's loyalty to the new dynasty was, at best, uncertain. Taizu took steps to 
weaken him and cut off his influence at court. First, he replaced Li with Han 
Lingkun as Commander in Chief of the Cavalry and Infantry. Taizu then ordered 
Li to move from Yangzhou MW to Qingzhou WW- When Li requested leave to 
come to court, Taizu refused. Li was now effectively isolated.
When Li received Taizu’s refusal he began to recruit bandits, heighten the 
walls of Yangzhou and deepen the moat. Li, intending to coordinate his uprising 
with Li Yun's in the north, sent Di Shouxun g tFJ&j, a close aide, to contact Yun. 
But Di secretly went to Taizu and reported the plot. Taizu sent Di back with 
instructions to convince Li to delay his uprising. He wanted to avoid having to 
fight two rebellions at the same time. Di returned and successfully convinced Li 
to delay his rebellion.
Once Li Yun had been crushed, Taizu turned his attention south and
began preparations to move into Huainan. On 4 October he made Li Zhongjin
the military governor of Pinglu. This aroused Li's suspicions. On 6 October
Taizu sent Chen Sihui to Li with a token of imperial favor in order to
reassure him. Li wanted to travel to court to thank Taizu, but his advisors
dissuaded him. He couldn't decide what to do. Eventually he locked up Chen
and sent a message to the Southern Tang seeking assistance. The Tang ruler
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reported the request to the Song court.
An Yougui the Director in Chief of Yangzhou H'M, knew that Li
was going to rebel and fled the city. Li became suspicious of the other military 
commanders and arrested several dozen of them. Although they pleaded that 
they had also served the Zhou their whole lives and wanted to take part in the 
uprising, Li was not convinced and had them all killed. On 15 October Li's 
declaration of war arrived at court. Taizu appointed Shi Shouxin Chief Administrative 
Officer of the Yangzhou Expeditionary Army. Wang Shenqi jEE#J£f was appointed 
Assistant Commissioner of the Northern Court of Palace Attendants, Li Chuyun
Director in Chief, and Song Yanwo Chief Formation Monitor. They 
were ordered to converge on Li Zhongjin from several routes.
On 11 November Taizu called in Zhao Pu to discuss the situation in 
Yangzhou concerning Li Zhongjin. Zhao said: "Li Zhongjin's defense policy is 
worse than that of the Duke of Xue P fi-.150 Its flavor is far from the formations of 
Zhuge Liang He relies solely on the Huai and Yangzi rivers,
repairing equipment and the ramparts of the city. He does not nourish his troops 
with benevolence and therefore does not hold their affection. He does not plan. 
Rescue from outside is cut off. He is low on supplies. If we attack slowly we will 
take him. If we attack quickly we will also take him. According to military art, 
faster is better. Taking someone slowly cannot compare to taking them quickly."
150Xue was a small feudal state in what is now Shandong province.
151Zhuge Liang (the Marquis of Martiality) was a general of almost supernatural skill 
during the Three Kingdoms (220-280) particularly known for his army formations.
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Zhao further advised Taizu to personally take part in the campaign. Taizu accepted 
his advice and announced the next day that he would personally take the field.
Taizu left the capital on 15 November. He embarked with the entire army 
on ships to go east. On 29 November he and the army disembarked at Sizhou 
$g#|. When they arrived at Dayiyi on 2 December, Shi Shouxin sent an
urgent memorial to Taizu reporting that Yangzhou was about to fall. He would 
have to hurry if he wanted to see it. Taizu reached Yangzhou that night. Just as 
he arrived, Shi attacked and took the city. Li Zhongjin gathered his family 
together in a house and set fire to it, killing himself and his family.
The defeat of the two Lis was the first step in securing Taizu's position 
against rival contenders for power. It was still not certain that the Song Dynasty 
would last longer than the five dynasties that had immediately preceded it. Taizu 
had to find a way to convince the other generals to accept his rule before he 
could begin to expand his territory. As part of the same process, he had to 
reform both civil and military administration and return power to the central 
government. The solution to the problem had eluded every emperor since the 
Anlushan Rebellion in 755. The administrative and political changes that Taizu 
made have already been described by Edmund Worthy. They are not the focus 
of this study, but some discussion of them is warranted at this point.
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Dissolving Military Power with a Cup of Wine
How was Song Taizu able to secure his own position and begin to wean
the military governors from their power bases? As Worthy wrote:
"...after the coup, he [Song Taizu] adroitly avoided repaying obligations 
to cohorts in a manner that might jeopardize his own power. In other 
words, he was able to control the army and effectively subordinate the 
generals. This marks the primary reason why the Sung dynasty did not 
become a "sixth" dynasty in a succession of five earlier military takeovers."152
Immediately after the coup he rewarded his old comrades with positions of supreme
military authority. On 18 April 961 however, Murong Yanzhao and Han Lingkun
were removed from their commands, Supreme Commander of the Palace Corps
and Commander in Chief of the Imperial Guard respectively, and given military
governorships.153 Shi Shouxin replaced Han, but Murong's position was left
vacant. It was never again filled.
The next step was to remove Taizu's remaining old comrades from positions
of central authority. Song Taizu was the first emperor in two centuries to have a
central government army stronger than any of the military governors' armies. It
was vital that the control of that army be firmly in the his hands. This was the
clearest sign of how the balance of power had shifted from the provinces to the
central government. In order to insure the stability and safety of the new dynasty,
Taizu convinced powerful generals to become military governors.
152Edmund Worthy, T h e  Founding of Sung China, 950-1000: Integrative Changes in 
Military and Political Institutions”, Ph.d. diss., Princeton University, 1976,106.
1S3XCB 2/5a. Murong became military governor of Shannanxi circuit lit f̂ i Bail. Han 
became the military governor of Chengde
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We now come to the famous drinking party in which Taizu convinced his 
old comrades Shi Shouxin, Wang Shenqi, Gao Huaide and Zhang Lingduo to 
relinquish their central government positions.
On 20 August 961 Zhao Pu convinced Taizu of the danger presented by 
his former comrades. Taizu invited them all to a drinking party and explained 
that, while he didn't suspect their loyalty, their subordinates might force them to 
try to become emperor. As a way to remove that danger, he suggested that they 
become military governors and retire from court life. They could establish mansions 
with dancing girls and live out the rest of their lives enjoying themselves. Taizu 
promised to create marriage alliances between his family and theirs. The next 
day they requested to be relieved of their posts.154
The advantage of Taizu's peaceful method of securing his throne was that 
he did not need to reward anyone for doing it. Taizu was able to leave the 
highest positions of the military command structure vacant because he was 
beholden to no one. He was thus able to internally balance the power of the 
military by truncating the pinnacle of the command hierarchy. The cavalry and 
infantry commands were now separated in both the Palace Corps and the Imperial 
Guard. Only the emperor stood above them all.155
154XCB2/10b. Also see Sima Guang SushuiJiwen i&iKiEKI, 1-6-7. Worthy
translates the entire passage in Worthy, op. cit., 174-5. The fact that Taizu needed to be 
convinced of the danger his former comrades presented may be a bit of sugar-coating to make 
him seem less suspicious and scheming.
lS5The changes were not immediate. It was not until October that Shi Shouxin actually 
relinquished the title of Commander in Chief of the Imperial Guard, although the title had held little 
power for some time. In the Palace Corps Han Chongyun held the number three position of 
Commander in Chief until 967, but he was something of a mediocrity and no danger to the
dynasty. For a chart showing the vacancies in the command structure see Worthy, op. cit., 167.
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Taizu focussed exclusively on consolidating his rule until 963. He spent 
three years establishing internal stability before he turned his attention to external 
conquest, a fact usually overlooked in discussions of his subsequent military 
success. What truly distinguished Taizu from most of his predecessors in the 
10th century was that he knew that external wars did not solve internal problems. 
Conquest brought territory into the state’s borders, but it took time to integrate 
new territory into the state’s administration and establish real control over it. 
Acquiring new territory also distracted the central government from internal reform. 
Taizu was able to establish firm control over the state by focussing exclusively on 
internal reform before he launched any campaigns of conquest. His military 
success was predicated on internal stability. By 963 Taizu felt that he was firmly 
enough in control of the Song state to consider expanding its territory. The 
question was, how to go about it?
The Myth of the “South-First” Strategy
In January of 963 Taizu met with his younger brother and Zhao Pu to 
discuss strategy.156 The meeting is alleged to have established Taizu's decision 
to take the south first. The plan Taizu agreed to was a reiteration of Wang Pu's 
earlier south-first strategy for Zhou Shizong. As we discussed in chapter three, 
Zhou Shizong did not follow the plan put forward by Wang Pu. Song Taizu was
1sal agree with Li Tao and Worthy’s dating of the discussion. See Worthy, op. cit., 89-90 
n.7 for a discussion of the dating of this policy discussion.
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just as much of an opportunist as Zhou Shizong. His order of attack was dictated
much more by opportunity than by a pre-established blueprint.
Li Tao also connected an exchange between the Northern Han ruler and
Taizu to the strategy session. In the exchange of letters, Taizu pledged not to
destroy the Northern Han.157 Worthy interpreted Li Tao's intentions in connecting
the two events as follows:
"In sum then, Li T'ao's purpose in inserting the passage [regarding the 
Northern Han] under the 7/968 date is to reveal that contrary to the 
"south first" strategy worked out and agreed upon early in the dynasty, 
T’ai-tsu launched an attack against the Northern Han before all the 
south was pacified."158
This of course assumes that there really was a south-first strategy. Although
Chinese historians since Ouyang Xiu (1007-72) have assumed that there
was an explicit south-first strategy to be critical of, and Edmund Worthy has
largely accepted this interpretation, I would argue that the actual campaigns of
Taizu argue against it. Certainly if there had been such a strategy, he didn't
follow it.
Taizu began conquering China in 963. His first efforts were directed
against the small countries of Jingnan and Chu A request for aid from
Chu to put down a rebellion gave Taizu the opportunity to take both countries.
Following that brief campaign, Taizu took advantage of a revolt by some middle-
ranked officials later in the same year in the Northern Han to launch an exploratory
raid. The opportunity did not turn out to be as advantageous as he had hoped,
157XCB 9/6ab. Translated in Worthy, op. dt., 18-20.
158Worthy, op. dt., 90 n.7.
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and nothing more developed out of it. Late the following year Taizu began a 
campaign against Shu. It was quickly concluded early in 965 after the Shu army 
rapidly, and unexpectedly, disintegrated. The excesses of the Song soldiers 
started a rebellion in Shu that was finally put down in early 967.
Taizu began preparing for a campaign against the Northern Han on 10 
September 968. The newly installed Han ruler had been assassinated little more 
than sixty days after he had assumed the throne. Once again, internal disorder 
in the Northern Han seemed to present an opportunity for the Song. Taizu began 
his campaign against the Northern Han on 5 October. Despite Taizu's presence, 
the campaign failed the following year and was withdrawn in May of 969. In 
October 970 Taizu launched a campaign against the Southern Han. It surrendered 
the following year, in March 971. Taizu spent the next three years consolidating 
his control over his newly conquered territories. In 974 he attacked the Southern 
Tang. He finally destroyed it in late 975. The following year Taizu again attacked 
the Northern Han. His death in Novermber 976 ended the campaign.
The individual campaigns will be examined in detail below, but the pattern 
of the campaigns shows that the Northern Han were never very far from Taizu's 
mind. He tried to take advantage of every opportunity to destroy the Northern 
Han. It simply proved to be much more stable than the southern kingdoms. He 
didn’t conquer the north first because his campaigns failed, not because of a 
south-first strategy.
Let us turn now to the campaigns themselves.
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The Campaign Against Chu and Jingnan159
The kingdom of Jingnan lay on the north bank of the Yangzi. It was 
composed of three prefectures: Jingzhou ^j'M, Xiazhou ii$#{ and Guizhou M'Hi. 
The capital was in Jingzhou, 630 miles from Kaifeng. It was a strategic crossroads 
for all directions.160 In 961 it was ruled by the fairly young Gao Jichong MMft- 
The kingdom of Chu was on the south side of the Yangzi, across from Jingnan. 
Chu was comprised of ten prefectures covering most of what is modern Hunan. 
Up until 951, it had been ruled by the Ma Jjf family. In that year the Southern 
Tang had briefly taken control of it. It then fell into the hands of Zhou Xingfeng H 
ffM , He died in October 962 leaving it to his eleven year old son Baoquan 
One of the generals that Xingfeng had failed to kill earlier, Zhang Wenbiao 
H, took advantage of the succession to try to seize the throne. An army was 
sent out to oppose him while a request for aid was sent to Jingnan and the Song.
On 1 February Taizu sent Lu Huaizhong Zhang Xun 3.Wl, and
Kang Yanze to Xiangzhou H#( (also known as Xiangyang HB§) with
several thousand infantry and cavalry troops. On 3 February 963 Murong Yanzhao 
was appointed Chief Administrative Officer of the Hunan Circuit Expeditionary 
Army tfTO and Li Chuyun Director in Chief. They gathered an army at Xiangzhou, 
ostensibly to put down Zhang Wenbiao. Of course, they had to pass through
1S9The campaign against Chu and Jingnan is chronicled in XCB 3/10b-4/6a and SS 1.13.
160See Wang Gungwu’s essay The Middle Yangtze in T’ang Politics,” in Arthur F. Wright 
and Denis Twitchett, eds., Perspectives on the T’ang, (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press. 1973), 193-235.
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Jingnan to get to Chu territory. This allowed them to take both kingdoms by 
"borrowing passage". It was a classic Spring and Autumn period strategy.
Taizu well aware of the political and military situation in Jingnan. He had 
sent Lu Huaizhong to scout the area in January 963. At that time Lu reported 
that: "Although Gao Jichong's army is orderly, it contains no more than 30,000 
combat troops. Even though the harvest has just come in, the people's lives are 
hard because of high taxes. To the south it [Jingnan] connects with Changsha M 
$>. To the east it reaches to Jiankang i t  If. To the west it borders Shu W. To 
the north it pays tribute to the court. As I see it, [they pay off all of these 
countries but] they cannot supply them all. They would be easy to conquer." 
Taizu said to his ministers: "Jiangling (Jingnan) is a divided country. Now 
we will 'borrow passage' to send troops there and conquer them, taking everything." 
On 5 February Li Chuyun left for Jingnan after receiving final instructions from 
Taizu.
Gao Jichong relied upon his officials to manage his affairs. On the civil
side he was advised by Sun Guangxian and on the military side by Liang
Yansi When Li Chuyun arrived at Xiangzhou, Murong Yanzhao was sick.
Li sent a request to Gao Jichong for permission for the Song army to pass
through Jingnan, and for provisions for the army. Gao and his advisors were
wary of the request. They made a counter-offer to provision the Song army 35
miles from their border, but did not give the Song army permission to pass
through their country. Li ask again for passage and supplies. Li Jingwei
tried to persuade Gao to take an aggressive stance: “The imperial army now
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asks pass through our country in order to take Chu. As I see it, I fear that, as a 
consequence (of borrowing passage) they will attack us. I would like to contribute 
my strength to serve you. Let me borrow three thousand soldiers. I will set up 
an ambush in the strategic and narrow pass at Jingmen fRfffi. When they are 
marching at night, I will attack the leading general of the imperial army, forcing 
them to retreat. Then I will use the army to capture Zhang Wenbiao and present 
him to the Song court. In this way you will gain great merit. Otherwise, you will 
be just like a kept dog."
Gao was unimpressed by Li's comments. On the one hand he didn't 
believe that the Song would attack him and on the other, if they did, Li was 
certainly no match for Murong Yanzhao. Gao's other advisors were all for 
surrendering early. The size of the Song army made Song intentions clear. It 
was far larger than necessary to capture Zhang Wenbiao. Liang Yansi and his 
uncle, Bao Yin (SH, would be sent to present meat and wine to the Song army. 
After the decision to surrender had been reached, Li Jingwei left and committed 
suicide.
Zhang Wenbiao was executed on 24 February, having been defeated and 
captured the previous day.161 On 7 March the Song army arrived at Jingmen, 35 
miles from Jiangling. Li Chuyun met with Liang Yansi and his entourage, treating
1811 have attempted to make sense of the order of events by presenting Zhang Wenbiao's 
capture and execution after Gao’s discussion with his advisors. Even though the discussion is 
listed under March 1, the two references to Zhang indicate that he was still at large when it took 
place. Therefore it must have occurred before February 23*24 when Zhang’s death is recorded. 
Given the distances involved and the importance of Zhang to the events I think it unlikely that the 
news of his public execution in the market would have taken more than five days to reach the
Jingnan court.
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them very well. He asked them to stay the night and return first thing the next 
day. Liang was so pleased by the treatment that he sent a messenger back to 
Gao in Jiangling telling him not to worry about the Song intentions. That night 
Murong Yanzhao invited Liang and the others to dine in his tent. While they were 
dining, Li Chuyun led several thousand light cavalry on a forced march to Jiangling. 
When Gao heard that a large army had arrived he could only anxiously go out to 
welcome them. He met Li 5 miles north of Jiangling. There they awaited the 
arrival of Murong, who would be the first to enter the city. Jingnan added three 
prefectures with seventeen counties and a population of 142,300 households to 
the Song empire.
The bloodless takeover of Jingnan left the Song forces hopeful that Chu 
would also capitulate without a fight. While the Song army prepared to march on 
Langzhou SP#{, Zhou Baoquan called in Li Guanxiang 3SR& to discuss the 
situation. Li said: "Before, we asked the Song for reinforcements to capture 
Zhang Wenbiao. Presently, Wenbiao has been captured but the imperial army 
has not returned [to the Song], They must intend to conquer us. We used to be 
allied with Jingnan to the north, and relied on them like lips and teeth. Now the 
Gao family has submitted. Langzhou is not in a strong position. If you submit 
you will not lose fortune." Zhou was going to accept this advice when Zhang 
Congdang W&W; and others opposed it, presenting a plan to defend the kingdom.
Murong Yanzhao sent Ding Deyu to reassure the Chu government. When
Ding arrived at Langzhou, Zhang and the others would not meet him. The
bridges were cut and the boats all sunk. Timber had been cut down and used to
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make road blocks. Ding couldn’t fight, so he withdrew and waited for instructions. 
On 26 March Taizu sent an ultimatum to Zhou Baoquan and his generals. When 
they did not capitulate, Murong Yanzhao ordered the Naval Director in Chief, Wu 
Huaijie JSHEffJ, to launch a multi-pronged assault on Yuezhou ■£§■#{. Wu badly 
defeated the Chu navy at Sanjiangkou HtUP, capturing over seven hundred 
ships, executing more than four thousand men and taking Yuezhou.
At the beginning of April Zhang Congdang marched out of Lizhou MiHi 
and fought the Song army south of the city. Before the fighting even began, the 
Chu army surrendered and scattered. Li Chuyun chased the remaining forces to 
Aoshan Fort UcLbliP. They quickly abandoned the fort. The Song captured a 
large number of Chu soldiers. Li then had several dozen fat prisoners divided up 
and eaten by his troops. A few prisoners were then released and allowed to go 
to Langzhou. When the people heard that the imperial troops were eating prisoners, 
they set fire to the city and fled. Zhang Congdang fled to the western mountains. 
On 6 April the Chu general Wang Duan JESS kidnapped Zhou Baoquan and his 
family and hid out in a Buddhist temple on the south bank of the Yangzi. Li 
Chuyun sent Tian Shouqi to recover Zhou. Wang Duan abandoned Zhou 
and fled. Tian then took Zhou to Li Chuyun. Hunan added fourteen prefectures 
consisting of one i£ and sixty six counties containing 97,380 families to the 
Song.
The Song now had a foothold on the south side of the Yangzi river. They
also controlled Shu's access to the rest of Chinese territory, had a clear route to
the Southern Han kingdom and were another step closer to encircling the Southern
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Tang. The entire campaign had been carried out with little bloodshed and at 
minimal cost to the Song. The navy had once again proven useful, even though 
the exact details of its activities were seldom mentioned.
The Raid Against the Northern Han162
Wang Quanbin Guo Jin Chen Wantong $1, Gao Xingben
jtr f f#  and Cao Bin W& raided Northern Han territory on 30 July, capturing 
several thousand prisoners. Soon after the Song raid a group of middle-ranked 
Northern Han officials rebelled against their ruler. The rebellion was put down by 
21 August, but it encouraged the Song. The same Song commanders who had 
launched the 30 July raid attacked the Northern Han again on 29 August. This 
time their attack was more sustained. The Leping county Commander of the 
Guard Wang Chao 3EM surrendered to the Song with eighteen hundred
troops. He Guichao and Wei Jin Hfjfl led a Han army to relieve Leping. 
They fought and were defeated three times by the Song army, leaving Leping in 
Song hands. On 7 September the commanders of 18 Northern Han forts 
surrendered to the Song.
In September the Northern Han ruler induced the Liao to attack Pingjin 
fM?. Taizu sent Guo Jin, Zhang Yanjin fJkjgM, Cao Bin and Chen Wantong to 
relieve Pingjin with a mixed force of ten thousand infantry and cavalry. When 
they were slightly more than a day’s march from Pingjin, the Liao army withdrew.
162Taizu’s raid on the Northern Han is chronicled in XCB 4/14b-5/4b and SS 1.14-17.
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On 15 December Taizu ordered the border generals to raid Northern Han territory. 
The attacks were not well coordinated and the generals were soon forced to 
return. On 14 January Cao Bin and Wang Jiyun were ordered to capture
Jinzhou and Luzhou JjHfi, respectively. Zhao Yanhui t&jBffli and Li Jixun 
mmW] were ordered to unite their forces and attack the Northern Han border 
region from Liaozhou jgjffl to Shizhou Hffl.
Given the ongoing campaign it is not surprising that Wang Ming 3E9B 
submitted chentu to the emperor on 24 January, proposing that the Song 
attack Youzhou ®#f, the key to the Sixteen Prefectures. Taizu rewarded him 
but took no further action. On 13 February Zhe Deyi reported defeating
several thousand Han troops outside Fuzhou 0#{.
In the midst of the Song onslaught, the Northern Han ruler received a 
letter from the Liao emperor on 14 February. The Liao emperor expressed his 
general displeasure with the Han ruler. The Han ruler’s father had been much 
more tractable, and consulted with the Liao before acting. The present ruler 
acted more independently. The Liao emperor was also unhappy with the results 
of the Northern Han involvement with Li Yun. When he received the letter, the 
Northern Han ruler was very scared and sent back several envoys to patch up 
the rift.
His efforts were successful enough that he was able to call on Liao help
when the Song attacked Liaozhou in February of the next year. Li Jixun, Kang
Yanzhao USES and Tou Yinxun MWSh attacked Liaozhou with an army of more
than ten thousand infantry and cavalry. The Northern Han relief army under He
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Guichao MMM was badly beaten in front of the city. After the defeat, the city's 
defenders surrendered with three thousand troops. A combined Liao-Northern 
Han army of sixty thousand infantry and cavalry counter-invaded and Li Jixun 
was forced to temporarily withdraw. He returned presently with Luo Yanxiang H 
iBM Guo Jin and Cao Bin, leading an army of sixty thousand troops. They 
inflicted a severe defeat on the Liao-Northern Han army before Liaozhou.163
The defeat of the Northern Han-Liao army resolved the status of Liaozhou 
for the next two years. Neither side was interested in making a major effort either 
to follow up the victory or to avenge it. This incident has been largely ignored or 
downplayed by historians, but it deserves some attention. Raiding across the 
border by the Song or the Northern Han was a regular occurrence until the 
former finally extinguished the latter. In this case, the Song took advantage of 
the Northern Han revolt and their diplomatic rift with the Liao both to acquire 
some territory and to put pressure on the Northern Han. Liao aid effectively 
curtailed the Song effort, despite their battlefield success. They were not ready 
to face the Liao in a large war. Neither were the Liao ready or willing to begin a
large war with the Song, at least over the Northern Han.
183Li Tao points out that SS does not include Northern Han forces in the second army, 
only Liao.
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CHAPTER SIX 
Song Taizu II
The Campaign Against Shu D  (8 December 964 -11 February 965)164
In December of 964 the ruler of Shu sent a secret message to the ruler of 
the Northern Han proposing that they attack the Song simultaneously. His couriers 
carried the message to Song Taizu instead. Taizu was happy to obtain a casus 
belli for Shu. The two Shu couriers also provided intelligence of the terrain and 
defenses that an invader would have to overcome. Taizu immediately assembled 
an invasion force of sixty thousand infantry and cavalry. It would attack by two 
widely separated routes, one from the north and one from the east, up the Yangzi 
river.
On 8 December Taizu appointed Wang Quanbin Chief Administrative 
Officer of the Xichuan Expeditionary Army and Fengzhou I S j l l f T l f M f f i ,  with Cui 
Yanjin as his second in command and Wang Renshan iEClSt as Director 
in Chief. Their army would invade from the north. Liu Guangyi gij;)fe|t was 
appointed Assistant Chief Administrative Officer of the Guizhou Circuit 0-J'H with 
Cao Bin as his Director in Chief. Their army would invade from the east, up 
the Yangzi river. Shen Yilun fcfcHffH was the Army Provisioning Commissioner 
and Cao Han It'll was the Southwest Area Provisioning Commissioner.
184The Campaign against Shu is chronicled in XCB 5/16a-6/2a and SS 1.18-2.21.
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Before invading, Taizu made a proclamation offering rewards to Shu officials 
who switched sides and surrendered cities. He also offered rewards to men who 
could lead the army through Shu territory. It was further announced that anyone 
burning houses, bothering the people or digging up graves during the invasion 
would be subject to military law (which was harsher than civil law). Finally, a 
mansion with more than five hundred rooms was prepared for the Shu ruler near 
the Bian River rf7fc.
On 9 December Taizu feasted the army and distributed gold and jade 
belts, clothing, silk, saddles, horses and weapons to the officers according to 
their rank. Taizu told the officers: "All of the weapons, armor, fodder and provisions 
that you find in the cities and forts that you defeat must be registered. The 
money and cloth should be shared among all the troops." Taizu thus made a 
private contract with his officers which contradicted his public proclamation that 
the people would not be bothered.
The Shu ruler heard about the impending Song invasion on 5 January. He 
appointed Wang Zhaoyuan £EBgjS Campaign Commander of the Northern Area 
Expeditionary Army, Zhao Chongtao Director in Chief, Han Baozheng $$
<SIE Bandit-suppression Commissioner and Li Jin Assistant Bandit- 
suppression Commissioner. They were sent to oppose the Song. The Shu ruler 
said to Wang Zhaoyuan: "Today you have summoned the troops. You had 
better bring me some merit."
Wang had read a lot of books on military strategy and considered himself
quite profficient at it. The Shu ruler ordered his prime minister and subordinate
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officials to feast the army's officers outside Chengdu, the Shu capital. Wang held 
an iron ruyi like that of Zhuge Liang as his symbol of authority over the 
army.165 After drinking too much wine, Wang rolled up his sleeves and said to 
the prime minister Li Wu "Why should I stop at defeating the enemy? With 
these twenty or thirty thousand hawk-faced troops, taking the central plains would 
be as easy as turning over my hand!"
On 24 January Wang Quanbin overran Ganqudu Wanren MW,
Yanzi jBr? and several other Shu forts. Wang then captured Xingzhou PH'H, 
defeating seven thousand Shu troops and capturing more than four hundred 
thousand piculs of military provisions. The prefect Lan Siwan fell back to 
defend Xi county j5JKL Wang continued his assault and overran more than 
twenty forts including Shitu H®, Yuguan and Zishuige §7f<:fiil.
On 3 February Han Baozheng, hearing that Xingzhou had fallen, abandoned 
Shannan to defend Xi county. Shi Yande marched there with the Song 
vanguard. Han took up a defensive position, assembling his force of several tens 
of thousands of men in front of the city wall, with the mountains protecting his 
flanks. Shi attacked, driving off Han’s army and then pursuing it. Han was 
captured along with his second in command Li Jin. Shi also took more than three 
million pecks of provisions. Cui Yanjin and Kang Yanze pursued the Shu
troops past Sanquan to Jiachuan l£ jl|, killing and capturing a multitude of
185The ruyi was a sort of “s” shaped baton. A similar baton was supposed to have been 
earned by the Three Kingdoms period military strategist Zhuge Liang. “Ruyi” means “as you 
wish." Its association with Zhuge Liang is particularly significant in this instance because he was 
the chief advisor to Liu Bei, the ruler of Shu during the Three Kingdoms period.
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them. As a result of the defeat, the Shu ruler ordered the rope bridges cut and 
withdrew his troops to Jiameng WiM-
Meanwhile on the eastern front, Liu Guangyi began his campaign up the 
Yangzi gorges. He reduced Song Mu San Hui =■#, Wu Shan MUj and 
several other forts, killing the Shu general Nan Guanghai and over five 
thousand others. The Shu Commander in Chief of the Navy, Yuan Dehong MW 
and more than twelve hundred men were captured alive. Liu also seized 
more than two hundred war ships and killed or captured more than six thousand 
naval troops.
Taizu had given Liu Guangyi specific instructions for capturing the Shu 
pontoon bridge at Lajiang M.IL in Kuizhou M'Xi There were three towers on the 
bridge and it was defended by trebuchets and ballistae. Taizu told Liu to first 
drive off the Shu forces on the banks, thus isolating the bridge, before attacking 
the bridge towers with his ships. Liu followed Taizu’s plan and, when he was 
slightly more than 10 miles from Lajiang, disembarked from his ships and attacked 
the bridge by land. Then he attacked the bridge with his navy and captured it 
intact. The Shu army then reinforced Baidimiao 3 ^ 0 .
When it was reported that the Song army was advancing west, Gao Yanchou 
Si/HHI said to his second in command Zhao Chongji and the Army
Supervisor Wu Shouqian "It is dangerous for us to face the Song army.
It is to their advantage to fight quickly. Let us dig in and wait them out." Wu 
replied: ’The bandits have advanced to our city [Bai Di Miao] walls and we have 
not attacked them. How can we wait?"
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On 31 January Wu Shouqian independently led more than one thousand 
Shu troops out to attack the Song army. Liu Guangyi sent a Song force under 
Zhang Tinghan to meet Wu. They fought at Zhutoupu Wu lost
and fled. Zhang exploited his victory by scaling the city walls. Gao Yanchou put 
his troops in order and was going to lead them out to fight, but Zhang had 
already entered the city. Gao fought desperately, but the situation was hopeless. 
He was wounded more than ten times and all his attendants fled. Gao then 
returned to the government offices. Luo Ji MlM wanted Gao to flee. Gao 
refused: "I previously lost Taichuan and now I have been unable to defend this 
place. If the ruler does not execute me what face will I have to look at people in 
Shu?" Gao also feared for his family back in Chengdu. If he returned defeated 
their lives would all be endangered. By choosing to die there he preserved them. 
He gave the seals of office to Luo Ji to take back. Gao then changed into his 
formal clothes, prayed to the northwest, ascended the tower of the government 
offices and killed himself by setting the building on fire. Several days later Liu 
Guangyi had his bones dug out of the ashes and given a proper burial.
On the northern front, the main Song army was preparing to advance
along the Luo River HJII route into Shu. The retreating Shu army had torn up
the wooden reinforced roads that ran along the cliff-faces. Wang Quanbin was
concerned that the destruction of the wooden roads would prevent the main army
from advancing. Kang Yanze said to Cui Yanjin: “The Luo River route is dangerous
for a large force. It will be difficult if we cross it together. It would be better to
divide army, repair the roads and then arranging a time to meet the main army at
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Shendu $ i$ tn Cui reported the plan to Wang and he agreed to it. In a couple of 
days the dispersed forces advanced by separate roads. They attacked Jinshan 
Fort and broke Xiaomantian Fort Wang then marched the
main army to Shendu by the repaired Luo River route.
When the Song army reached Shendu the Shu army arrayed for battle 
near the river bridge. Cui Yanjin sent Zhang Wanyou to attack them.
Zhang captured the bridge at sunset, forcing the Shu troops to withdraw to 
Damantian Fort The next day Cui, Kang Yanze and Zhang Wanyou
launched a three-pronged assault on the fort. They overran the fort, capturing its 
commander Wang Shenchao 3E#jtg, Zhao Chongwo M&M, the Army Supervisor; 
and Liu Yanzu SljSEfo the Army Supervisor of Sanquan HU. Wang Zhaoyuan 
retreated with the remnants of the Shu army, pursued by the Song army. Wang 
was finally able to break away from the Song army north of Lizhou fijffl. After 
surreptitiously breaking camp, the Shu army crossed the river at Jiepaijin fnTfi# 
and then burned the pontoon bridge. But Wang continued to fall back until the 
Shu army reached Jianmen »!JF1. On 4 February Wang Quanbin entered Lizhou, 
taking posession of the eight million pecks of military provisions left behind by the 
Shu army.
The Shu ruler heard that Wang Zhaoyuan had been defeated on 6 February.
He was shaken and desperately tried to increase the number of soldiers defending
Jianmen. Then he appointed his heir apparent, Yuanzhe 7cff, Marshal 7cSfi.
The Director of the Chancellery, Li Tinggui and Manager of Affairs, Zhang
Hui'an 31J§&, were assigned to advise him. Yuanzhe brought his entourage of
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courtesans and entertainers with him. When he marched out of Chengdu everyone 
who saw him laughed.
Meanwhile, Wang Quanbin had marched from Lizhou to Jianmen. When 
the Song army reached Yiguang Wang called a meeting to plan their strategy. 
He said: "Jianmen is an extremely dangerous place. In ancient times it was said 
that one man with a spear could hold off ten thousand there. If anyone in the 
army has a plan whereby we can capture it, he should present it." Xiang Tao [rI 
H  said: "Surrendered Shu soldiers said that from Yiguang, on the east side of 
the river, past several large mountains is a place called Laisu The Shu 
troops have built a stockade on the west bank of the river, where it can be 
forded. From this point we can bypass Jianmen 7 miles to the south, at Qingjiangdian 
and control the road. If the main army marches on this route then 
Jianmen will be in great danger."
Wang Quanbin and his officers wanted to immediately roll up their armor 
and go.166 Kang Yanze said: "The Shu troops have been defeated several times. 
They are fearful and have low morale. They can be quickly attacked and defeated. 
But Laisu is a precipitous pass and it is not appropriate for a high ranking officer 
to personally go. Instead we can send a lower ranking commander. If the force 
arrives north of Qingjiang and the main army attacks Jianmen, then Wang Zhaoyuan 
must withdraw completely." Wang Quanbin and everyone else agreed.
Shi Yande was ordered lead a force of soldiers to Laisu. He crossed the 
180The path was so narrow that they would be unable to wear their armor while traversing
it
171
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
river using the pontoon bridge. When the Shu troops saw him they abandoned 
their fort and retreated. Shi pursued them to Qingjiang. When Wang Zhaoyuan 
heard that there were Song troops at Qingjiang he fled toward Hanyuanpo iliS t 
leaving his Deputy General to defend Jianmen. Wang and Zhao Chongtao 
were overtaken by elite Song troops near Hanyuan. Zhao arrayed his troops for 
battle and fought. But Wang Zhaoyuan was unable to get up from his camp 
stool.167 Zhao himself killed several men, but he was defeated. Wang discarded 
his armor and fled.
The Song army pursued the Shu army, overrunning Jianzhou &U#[ and 
killing over ten thousand Shu soldiers. A patrol of Song cavalrymen found Wang 
Zhaoyuan hiding in a barn. Yuanzhe, the heir apparent, and Li Tingkuei had 
been enjoying themselves and not paying attention to military affairs. When they 
reached Mianzhou fiBJN they heard that Jianmen had already fallen. They decided 
to fall back to Dongchuan ^ jl|.  The next day they left the army and returned 
west. As they retreated they burned all of the granaries and houses.
When the Shu ruler found out that Jianmen had fallen and that his son had 
also retreated he was in a desperate panic. He asked his attendants if any of 
them had a plan. An old general named Shi Fengjun said: "The eastern 
troops have come from far away. They cannot maintain their attack for long. 
Please collect the soldiers together in order to firmly defend the country. This is 
my unworthy plan." The Shu ruler replied: "My family has provided clothing and
187There is no reason given for Wang being unable to get up. Presumably it was due to 
fear. Here I translate as “camp stool” after Needham, Vol. IV :3 ,136. He notes that the 
“barbarian bed" can also refer to a folding chair with a cloth seat.
172
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
food to the soldiers for forty years. When they finally meet the enemy they are 
unable to fire even one arrow in defense of my eastern territory. Now who is 
there that is willing to give their life to defend us?" Li Hao sent the Shu ruler a 
proposal suggesting that he surrender. He agreed.
After the Shu surrender the Song troops, except for those under the command 
of Cao Bin, engaged in an orgy of looting and destruction that was to have 
severe repercussions for the pacification and reintegration effort. The campaign 
which had so quickly and effectively destroyed the Shu government engendered 
a rebellion of the populace in its aftermath that took almost two years to subdue. 
The rebellion was probably responsible for putting a temporary hold on Song 
expansion efforts.
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The First Campaign Against the Northern Han (10 September 968-3 July 
969)168
Li Tao had connected a promise by Taizu concerning the Northern Han to 
a strategy session between Taizu, his younger brother Kuangyi169 (who would 
succeed him as Taizong) and Zhao Pu that occurred in 963 or late 962 (see 
chapter five). The entire entry was inserted under the seventh month of 968, just 
before the first real invasion of the Northern Han by the Song. Taizu promised 
to: "Leave Liu Jun § ! l ( t he  Northern Han ruler) a way to exist." Accordingly, 
Taizu didn’t invade the North Han "during the Xiaohe reign." Worthy translated 
this last part as: "Thus throughout his life the emperor did not (raise) a major 
army to attack the north."170 Perhaps unintentionally, this translation might imply 
that Taizu did not attack the Northern Han at all during his lifetime. But "Xiaohe" 
was Liu Jun's posthumous temple name. The Songshi account reads: "...therefore 
during Jun's life [Taizu] did not raise troops." Taizu's promise not to attack the 
Northern Han was confined solely to Liu Jun's lifetime. If he did, in fact, make 
this promise then he kept it to the letter. Taizu began preparing to invade the 
Northern Han shortly after Liu Jun died.
168Taizu’s campaign against the Northern Han is chronicled in XCB 9/6a-10/11b and SS
2.27-29.
189l have modified Zhao Kuangyi’s name from the text for consistency. He is 
referred to as Guangyi His name was originally Kuangyi gX. He changed his name to 
Guangyi when his older brother became emperor in order to avoid using characters in the
emperor’s name.
170Worthy, op. cit., 20.
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Liu Jun had adopted three nephews, Ji’en ALU, Jiyuan M il  and Jizhong 
because he hadn’t produced any heirs. Ji’en succeeded to the throne upon 
Liu Jun's death in July of 968. Ji’en had been acting as regent since Liu Jun had 
fallen ill, with Guo Wuwei the prime minister, to advise him. In just over
sixty days Ji’en was assassinated, possibly by an assassin sent by Guo.171 Early 
in October Jiyuan succeeded to the throne.
When Jiyuan succeeded to the throne, the Song army had already invaded. 
On 10 September Taizu had ordered troops to concentrate at Luzhou in 
preparation for an invasion of the Northern Han. Two days later he established 
the top command of the force. Li Jixun was appointed Chief Administrative 
Officer of the Hedong Expeditionary Forward Army, Dang Jin his second in
command and Cao Bin iM # his Director in Chief. He Jiyun was appointed
the Administrator of the Vanguard and Kang Yanzhao H38IS? his Director in 
Chief. Zhao Zan itH? was appointed Administrator of the Fenzhou Route ftHM, 
Si Chao rI I I  his second in command and Li Qianpu his Director in Chief.
One of Jiyuan's first acts as ruler of the Northern Han state was to request 
aid from the Liao. He then sent an army under Liu Jiye gUHH and Feng Jinke
to hold Tuanbogu ill# }# .172 Ma Feng was appointed Commissioner 
of the Bureau of Military Affairs to supervise their army. When Ma arrived the
171There are two versions of the assassination given in XCB. In one, Ba Yong, the 
assassin, brings Ji’en’s head to Guo after killing him. Ba is then killed in order to silence him. In 
the other, Ba acted without direction and was killed shortly after killing Ji’en in the same room.
SS places the assassination after the Song invasion had already reached Taiyuan.
172SS says Tuanbeigu H i t # .  XCB is correct.
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Dongguo River P U M  he met the Song vanguard under He Jiyun. He Jiyun 
defeated the Northern Han army, beheading more than two thousand men,173 
taking five hundred horses and capturing General Zhang Huan 3S3g.
Shi Bin chased the Han army to the Fen River bridge, beneath 
the walls of Taiyuan, and burned the Yanxia Gate SEJEP1. The Northern Han 
ruler sent the Palace Attendant troops out to fight under the command of Guo 
Shoubin They were also defeated. Guo was struck by an arrow and
retreated into the city. On 21 October the Assistant Commander of the Victorious 
Army, Li Qiong surrendered to the Song.
In mid-November Taizu sent a letter to the Northern Han ruler ordering 
him to surrender. He also sent similar letters to Guo Wuwei, Ma Feng and more 
than forty other Han officials. Guo turned all of the letters in except one, which 
he kept secretly for himself. It was at that time that he began to shift his 
allegiance to the Song. When a Song soldier was captured, Guo knew he was a 
spy but didn't question him. He even had a Northern Han soldier, who told Ma 
Feng that the man was a spy, beheaded to silence him.
A Liao relief army approached Taiyuan in mid-December. The Song army 
raised its siege when the Liao army raided Jinzhou H'Hi and Jiangzhou in 
force. The Song army pulled back to regroup. Although little or nothing happened 
over the next month, Taizu had not abandoned his plans. With his reconnaissance 
in force driven off by the Liao demonstration, Taizu moved to a much larger
173SS reports thirty which is too small. Clearly the top stroke of the T  got separated and 
added to the — above it.
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invasion.
Taizu ordered troops concentrated to invade the Northern Han on 13 
February 969, and again on 17 February. On 26 February Taizu ordered Cao 
Bin, and Dang Jin to precede him to Taiyuan. Li Jixun was re-appointed Chief 
Administrative Officer of the Hedong Expeditionary Forward Army on 2 March, 
with Zhao Zan as Provost Marshal of the Cavalry and Infantry. Li and Zhao were 
also sent ahead to Taiyuan.
Taizu left the capital for Taiyuan on 7 March. Han Zhongyun had 
an audience with Taizu on 10 March. Taizu said: "The Liao know that I am 
invading and must lead a large force to come and reinforce [the Northern Han]. 
They think Zhending U S  is unprepared and will enter our territory by that route. 
You will force march [to Zhen Ding], where they do not expect you, and break 
them." He then made Han the Chief Administrative Officer of the North Area and 
Qi Tingyi i13££ii his second in command.
Seasonal rains halted Taizu at Luzhou on 18 March. While there, he 
heard that the military supply system was in chaos, with carts jamming the 
streets of the city. He was going to punish the Transport Commissioner'74 in 
charge of the supplies in Luzhou, but Zhao Pu stopped him: "Our armies are all 
here now. When the enemy hears that you have arrested the Transport 
Commissioner they will think that our supplies are insufficient. This is not the 
way to distantly manifest your dignity. Instead, you should select someone who
174The Transport Commissioners of the early Song, whose function was that of army 
quartermaster, later became Fiscal Intendants. This may explain the large number of men of
military background in the fiscal aspects of the early Song government.
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can manage these difficulties and put him in charge." The next day Wang 
Youquan =E?frfS was put in charge of supplies at Luzhou and the problems were 
quickly cleared up.
The Northern Han army commanded by Liu Jiye and Feng Jinqi was 
camped at Tuanbogu. On 19 March Liu and Fen sent several hundred cavalry 
under Chen Tingshan to reconnoitre Li Jixun's forward position. Chen
promptly surrendered with his command. Liu and Ma saw that they were vastly 
outnumbered and retreated to Taiyuan. The Northern Han ruler was furious and 
sacked them. As a consequence of the their retreat, Taiyuan was surrounded.
Taizu had been at Luzhou for eighteen days when a Northern Han spy 
was captured. When questioned about the conditions in Taiyuan he replied: 
"The people in the city have been suffering for a long time. Day and night they 
wait for Your Majesty to come and save them." Taizu laughed, gave the man 
clothing and had him released.
Taizu left Luzhou on 4 April. On 7 April Li Jixun reported defeating a
Northern Han force beneath Taiyuan, cutting off more than a thousand heads
and capturing six hundred horses. Taizu reached Taiyuan three days later. He
inspected the army south of the city on 12 April, and ordered the construction of
a long rampart. The following day he went to the Fen River and had a new
bridge constructed. Tens of thousands of corvee laborers were drafted from the
surrounding counties and brought to Taiyuan on 14 April. The next day, Shi
Zhaowen the Administrative Assistant of Xianzhou HM-H, surrendered his
prefecture and city. Taizu made him prefect of the surrendered territory and
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rewarded him with clothes, a jade belt, caparison and a horse.
Taizu ordered the construction of a long dike connected to the Fen River 
on 17 April. This followed a suggestion made by Chen Chengzhao 
When some of the generals were advocating concentrating the army and making 
a direct assault on Taiyuan, Chen said: "Your Majesty already has several tens 
of millions of troops here. Why not use them?" Taizu didn't understand so Chen 
pointed to the Fen River with his riding whip. Taizu laughed loudly and put Chen 
in charge of building the dike. The next day Taizu announced that he would 
drown the city.
Command of the Song army around Taiyuan was divided as follows: Li 
Jianxun's army was on the south side of the city, Zhao Zan's army on the west, 
Cao Bin's army on the north and Dang Jin's army on the east. On 19 April Taizu 
ordered all four commanders to build fortifications in order to tighten the siege.175 
That night a Northern Han force sallied out and attacked the west fortifications. 
Zhao Zan led the fight to drive them back, getting struck in the foot with a 
crossbow bolt in the process, but the Han troops did not retreat. Earlier, Dang 
Jin had sent his Director in Chief, Li Qianpu, from the fortifications east of the city 
to cut timber for the army in the West Mountains. Li reinforced Zhao Zan and 
drove back the Northern Han troops. The same day, Liu Jiye led several hundred 
cavalrymen on a surprise attack on the east Song fortifications. Dang Jin personally 
pursued Liu. Liu was forced to hide in the trenches until a rescue force from the
175lt is unclear from the text or subsequent events whether they were ordered to build 
forts or ramparts. I have therefore opted for the more general term “fortifications.”
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city came out to save him. He climbed a rope to ascend the walls and avoid 
capture.
He Jiyun the Administrative Officer of Shilingguan was
camped at Quyang When Taizu heard on 24 April that one of the approaching
Liao relief armies would pass through Shilingguan, he gave He Jiyun several 
thousand picked cavalry to stop them. He Jiyun badly defeated the Liao force 
north of Yangqu county capturing Wang Yanfu 3EBW, the Liao prefect of
Wuzhou along with more than a hundred other officers. He also beheaded 
more than a thousand Liao troops, captured more than seven hundred horses 
and took a large quantity of weapons and armor. He Jiyun sent his son to report 
the victory to Taizu. Taiyuan had resisted the Song army for a long time, but the 
defenders were relying on the Liao to relieve them. Taizu had the captured 
equipment and the heads displayed to undermine their morale.
Jie Qiluo the Northern Han prefect of Linzhou ShHi, surrendered
his city on 18 May. The Liao sent an army to relieve Dingzhou on 20 May. Han 
Zhongyun and Chen Jiashan l& lllij were waiting for it. When the Liao
saw the Song flags and pennons they wanted to retreat. Han quickly attacked 
and badly beat them, capturing several hundred horses.
Taizu ordered the water from the Fen River let into the new dike to flood 
Taiyuan on 26 May. The Song army then began using small boats with strong 
crossbows to attack the inner and outer walls of the city.176 Wang Tingyi ££§X
176The crossbows were probably large multi-bowed siege weapons served by several
men.
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was in the forefront of the attack but was not wearing a helmet. He was struck in 
the head by an arrow and died the following day. The same day that Wang died, 
Shi Hanqing 531® was hit by an arrow. He fell into the water and drowned.
On 14 June Guo Wuwei decided to flee Taiyuan. He asked to personally 
lead troops in a night attack on the Song army. The Northern Han ruler believed 
Guo and selected one thousand elite soldiers for him. Liu Jiye and Guo Shoubin 
were made his subordinates. The Northern Han ruler ascended to the top of the 
Yanxia gate SDtF6! and personally saw Guo Wuwei off. Earlier that night it had 
been clear, but then the wind picked up and it began to rain. Guo Wuwei 
marched out to the North Bridge. But Liu Jiye's horse injured its hoof, so Liu 
went back into the city with his men. Guo Shoubin got lost and did not meet up 
with Wuwei. Since Wuwei could not reasonably attack with only a thousand 
troops he was also forced to return to Taiyuan.
By 19 June flood waters reached the Yanxia Gate and began to open a 
gap in the outer wall. When the defenders tried to erect a wall to block the water, 
the Song army drove them back with missile fire. The Northern Han troops were 
unable to endure the fire and couldn't approach the gap. Then hay and grass 
from within the city washed into the gap by itself and plugged the hole. The Song 
crossbows couldn't penetrate the obstruction, which allowed the Northern Han 
troops to wall off the gap from the inside.
At about that time, Guo Wuwei was indicted and executed for treason.
Guo’s execution improved the morale of the people of the city. Even so, the
Northern Han army was still unable to drive off the Song army. A large Northern
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Han sally on the west side of the city, aimed at burning the Song siege machinery, 
was counter-attacked and driven off, losing over ten thousand men.
On 20 June Li Huaizhong led an assault on the city, but was
repulsed. He was hit by an arrow and almost died. Taiyuan continued to hold 
out contrary to all expectations. Zhao Tinghan led several companies of 
guardsmen $ j±  in kou towing to Taizu. They begged to lead an assault on the 
city, sacrificing themselves for victory. Taizu replied: "You are all soldiers that I 
personally trained. There is not one of you who is not worth a hundred men. 
You are the troops I have prepared for a vital crisis, who share hardships and 
fortune with me. I would rather not take Taiyuan than send you to certain death." 
They were all touched and cried out: "Ten thousand years!"
The Song army was camped in marshy ground which, combined with the 
summer rains, had made most of the troops sick with diarrhea. At the same time, 
another Liao relief army was marching to Taiyuan. On 23 June Li Guangzan 
:ytHH convinced Taizu to raise the siege and retreat. Li pointed out that not only 
was the Northern Han a small and unimportant state, but if the Song army wore 
itself out besieging Taiyuan, other states might take advantage of Song weakness. 
He was also concerned that overflowing rivers might obstruct Taizu from returning 
to the capital. Li proposed positioning troops at Shangdang where they 
could raid the Northern Han in the summer and fall to steal their harvest. Zhao 
Pu approved the plan and on 24 June Taizu began planning the Song army’s 
withdrawal.
Jia Huaguang further refined Li’s proposal: "Generally, in cutting
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down trees, one first cuts off the branches and then harvests the trunk. Now, 
from the outside, Hedong [the Northern Han] is helped by the Liao. From the 
inside it relies upon its people. With these, I fear we will be unable to conquer it 
for a long time. It is appropriate to build forts north [of Taiyuan] at Shiling, Hebei, 
Xijie, Shandong, Jingyangcun, Lepingzhen, Huangzeguan and Baijingshe in order 
to block the Liao from reinforcing [the Northern Han] with soldiers. We should 
then take the people within [the Northern Han] to our western capital [Kaifeng] 
and apportion them land. If we do this, then in a few years it will be easy to 
conquer [the Northern Han]." Accordingly, on 30 June the Song army began 
moving the people living near Taiyuan to Song territory. Ultimately they moved 
over ten thousand families to Shandong and Henan.
Taizu left Taiyuan on 3 July. The Northern Han had been so seriously 
exhausted by the siege that they had to rely upon the abandoned supplies of the 
departed Song army. They recovered three hundred thousand units of grain and 
several tens of thousands of units of silk.
After the water had receded from Taiyuan the city walls crumbled. Han
Zhipan, the Liao envoy, commented: "The Song army led the water to inundate
the city. They knew the first step but did not know the second. If you know how
to do it correctly, first you inundate, then you drain and the walls fall." Liu Jiye
urged the Northern Han ruler to let him attack the Liao relief army presently
camped at Taiyuan and then to submit to the Song. He figured that they could
capture several tens of thousands of horses and use the attack as a basis for
submission on good terms. The Northern Han ruler rejected his plan. After a few
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days the Liao army returned north.
The Campaign Against the Southern Han (3 October 970-22 March 971 )177
In September of 970 Taizu decided to conquer the Southern Han. The 
Southern Han ruler had refused repeated diplomatic requests to surrender to the 
Song. Taizu did not mention a casus belli in any discussion of the campaign. He 
proceeded directly to confrontation without the slightest fig-leaf of justification. 
On 3 October Taizu appointed Pan Mei M il Chief Administrative Officer of the 
Hezhou Route Expeditionary Army MM. Yin Chongke his second in
command and Wang Jixun EEMffl] Director in Chief of the Expeditionary Cavalry. 
Taizu then ordered army units from several prefectures to converge on Hezhou.
The Southern Han was poorly prepared for war. Due to a great deal of 
infighting in the royal family, most of their generals had been impeached and 
executed, leaving the military was in the hands of a few eunuchs. The walls and 
fortifications were in disrepair across the state, the warships were unprepared 
and the weapons and armor were decrepit.
On 21 October Pan Mei reported that he had defeated a Southern Han 
force, killing more than ten thousand soldiers and taking Fuzhou S ffl.178 The 
Song invasion shocked the Southern Han court. The Southern Han ruler quickly
177The campaign against the Southern Han is chronicled in XCB 11 l8a-XCB/Yongle 
Dadian 12306/1 b and SS 2.32.
178Correcting T#P toTE.
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despatched Gong Chengshu WlltWi to Hezhou, to reassure the troops there. 
But the Southern Han soldiers in Hezhou hadn’t been paid for a long time. They 
expected Gong not only to pay them what they were owed, but to give them a 
bonus as well. When they discovered that all he had was a decree, their morale 
collapsed. Shortly after Gong arrived in Hezhou, the Song army captured Macheng 
MM and its vanguard reached Fanglin Gong fled back to the Southern 
Han court just before the Song army surrounded Hezhou.
The Southern Han ruler called ail his officials in to discuss the situation. 
They all recommended putting Pan Chongche in charge of defending the 
state. Pan had previously been sacked. He was still discontent because of that, 
and refused the appointment, claiming to have an eye ailment. The Southern 
Han ruler was furious: "Why must we use Pan Chongche? Is Wu Yanrou 
without strategies?" Consequently, he sent a force under Wu Yanrou to relieve 
Hezhou.
As Wu approached the Song army on 22 October, the Song army withdrew 
about 7 miles, leaving behind soldiers hidden on the south bank of the river. 
That night, when Wu's force disembarked on the south bank, the Song soldiers 
ambushed Wu. The Southern Han army was thrown into chaos. The Song 
troops beheaded Wu and killed seventeen other soldiers.179 They showed Wu's 
head to the defenders of Hezhou, seriously demoralizing the besieged troops.
Wang Ming 3E93 said to Pan Mei: "We should attack immediately, otherwise
179Seventeen people seems to be a rather small number, but I see no textual way to 
resolve this doubt. Perhaps the small number was due to the attack being directed against Wu
personally.
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I fear [the Southern Han] will try to relieve [Hezhou] again." Most of the other 
generals disagreed with him. Wang donned his armor, prepared his own unit of 
more than a hundred men and recruited several thousand transport and work 
troops to assault the city. They quickly filled in the moat in front of the city gate. 
The people in the city were terribly frightened by this and opened the gate, 
surrendering the city to the Song army.
The Song army at Hezhou was upstream of Guangzhou J§#{, the capital 
of the Southern Han. Since the He River g f ll was navigable, the Song army 
could now advance very quickly on the Southern Han capital. This danger 
overcame the Southern Han ruler’s dislike of Pan Chongche, and Pan was put in 
charge of thirty thousand troops. Pan took a defensive position at the mouth of 
the He River, but didn’t advance toward the Song army. Meanwhile, the Song 
army had divided in two, one part heading west and one part heading east. The 
western force had already reached Zhaozhou ©#[, and the West River ffitL, by 
the time Pan Chongche was at the He River. Pan was only positioned to prevent 
a Song advance down the He or West Rivers. He could do nothing about the 
eastern Song force. Once the eastern force reached Shaozhou ggffi and the 
North River it could also quickly strike downstream at the Southern Han 
capital. But Pan and his army were pinned down as long as the western force 
stayed upstream of him on either the He or West River. The western force 
remained a significant threat the entire campaign.
The western Song army broke Kaijian Fort H H S  on 24 November, killing
several thousand soldiers and capturing its general Jin Hui HfBlg. Tian Xingchou
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EHfrflS, the prefect of Zhaozhou, fled his city and retreated, as did Li Chengjin ^  
the prefect of Guizhou M X i The Song army then captured Zhaozhou and 
Guizhou.
The eastern Song army overran Lianzhou §1X1, forcing Lu Shou to 
fall back to Qingyuan jfM . The Southern Han had evacuated Guizhou and 
Lianzhou ahead of the Song army. The Southern Han ruler hoped that Song 
army would stop at conquering Zhao, Gui, Lian and He prefectures. He was 
wrong.
On 20 January the eastern Song army had almost reached Shaozhou Hg 
-XI Li Chengwo arrayed a Southern Han army of more than a hundred
thousand troops beneath Lianhuafeng Mountain blocking the Song
army’s route to the capital. War elephants, each carrying more than ten men, 
were placed at the front of the Southern Han formations to strengthen them. The 
Song army concentrated its crossbow fire on the elephants, causing them to 
flee.’“  All the soldiers riding on the elephants were thrown off and trampled as 
the elephants stampeded back into the Southern Han formation. The Song army 
attacked the shatterred and disorganized Southern Han army, destroying its 
remaining cohesion. Li Chengwo barely escaped with his life. Shaozhou was 
then captured along with its prefect, Xing Yanwo
Xing Yanwo sent a message from captivity to the Southern Han ruler 
suggesting that he surrender to the Song. Li Tuojian opposed surrendering.
He said that the people of the country were just afraid following the recent
1S0The Song solution to fighting war elephants was exactly the same as the Romans.
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defeats. The Southern Han ruler wanted to build a palisade east of the capital to 
defend it against the Song army. He neededa capable general to take charge of 
the operation. Liang Luanzhen suggested his adopted son [Liang was a 
eunuch], Guo Chongyue The Southern Han ruler appointed Guo Bandit-
suppression Commissioner with General Zhi Tingxiao to
assist him. Guo camped his sixty thousand troops at Majing MU and erected a 
rampart facing the approaching Song army.
In February of 971 the eastern Song army took Yingzhou HW and Xiongzhou 
$£#[. Pan Chongche then surrendered. The Song advance down the North 
River had made Pan's position irrelevant. When the Song army reached Longtou 
MM. the Southern Han ruler sent an envoy to ask for peace. Longtou was a 
strategically important area with difficult terrain. Pan Mei was concerned about 
being ambushed so he took the envoy hostage in order to quickly pass through 
the strategically important points. On 25 February theSong army reached Zhakou 
HP, 3 miles from Majing. The following day Pan Mei marched to Shuangnu 
Mountain flrjfcUj, overlooking Guo Chongyue's palisade.181 Guo’s army was the 
last obstacle between the Song army and the Southern Han capital.
Song cavalry patrols challenged the Southern Han troops to fight but Guo 
would not allow it. His army was made up of the defeated and wounded troops 
from Shaozhou and Yingzhou, whose moral was completely exhausted. Zhi 
Tingxiao wanted to fight but Guo refused. He only intended to defend the 
rampart, while praying to the gods day and night.
181The M  should be H .
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It was at this time that the Southern Han ruler decided to flee his country. 
He had more than ten ships prepared with gold, treasures and concubines so 
that he could escape to the sea. But when it came time to leave, he discovered 
that his eunuchs and soldiers had sailed without him. Now really frightened, he 
sent a letter of surrender to the Song army. Pan Mei sent the messengers 
bearing the letter on to Taizu and continued with the campaign.
On 28 February Zhi Tingxiao said to Guo Chongyue: "The northern army 
has crossed the river and rolled up our position. Their sharpness cannot be 
withstood. We have many soldiers, but they are all wounded. This strategy of 
not advancing is just one of waiting for death." On 3 March Zhi arrayed the 
vanguard of the Southern Han army for battle, with the river across his front. 
Guo commanded the rearguard. The Song army crossed the river and attacked. 
Zhi fought vigorously but lost and died. Guo fled back behind the rampart.
Pan Mei said to Wang Ming: 'Their rampart is made of wood with interwoven 
bamboo. If we attack with fire and bum it they will certainly be sent into confusion. 
Then we can use the confusion to attack them. This is a flawless plan." Five 
thousand Song troops, each carrying two torches, snuck up to the rampart. At 
twilight they all lit their torches and threw them in. A great wind also sprang up 
raising dust and smoke. The Southern Han army was badly defeated and Guo 
Chongyue was killed in the confusion.
Gong Chengshu, Li Tuo and Xie Chongyu set fire to all the storehouses
and palace buildings in the Southern Han capital. They hoped that the Song
army would withdraw once the treasure of the state was gone. Everything was
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destroyed in one night.
The next day the Song army reached Baitian The Southern Han 
ruler put on ordinary clothing, came out and surrendered. After entering Huangzhou, 
Pan Mei sent an official report of the triumph to the court. It arrived in the capital 
on 22 March. The defeat of the Southern Han netted the Song sixty prefectures 
with two hundred and fourteen counties and a population of 172,263 households.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Song Taizu III
The fall of the Southern Han left Taizu with very few targets for further 
conquest. He could try to conquer the Northern Han again or attack the Sixteen 
Prefectures. He could also continue his efforts in the south and attack the 
Southern Tang. Both northern options would involve fighting the Liao. But it was 
one thing to fend off Liao border incursions, it was quite another to face their 
regular army in the field. Liao cavalry was superior to Song cavalry in both 
numbers and quality. It was also very difficult to supply the army in the north, 
where there were fewer navigable waterways than in the south. Balanced against 
the possible value of the territorial gains, which were minimal, the northern option 
was clearly less attractive than further campaigns in the south. The Southern 
Tang was still a fairly wealthy country, even after losing the Huainan region (now 
part of the Song empire) to Zhou Shizong, and the Song could bring their superior 
naval strength to bear.
Taizu had some compunctions about attacking the Southern Tang without 
a casus belli. The best he was able to manufacture was that the Southern Tang 
ruler would not surrender to him peacefully. This rather pathetic excuse was 
apparently enough to assuage Taizu’s conscience, or at least conform to Confucian 
historiography. Since, in retrospect, Taizu possessed the Mandate of Heaven, it 
was perfectly reasonable for him to expect the rulers of smaller states to submit
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to him. As one of the last holdouts the Southern Tang ruler really had no excuse 
for not submitting to Taizu.
Cao Bin was put in overall command of the Southern Tang campaign 
because he was the only general who adequately controlled his troops during the 
conquest of Shu. Taizu wanted to avoid a repeat of the rebellion that the 
depredations of the Song army against the residents of Shu had caused. Before 
sending the generals to conquer the Southern Tang, Taizu admonished them not 
to bother the common people during the campaign. Cao Bin assured Taizu: "If 
any of the subordinate generals don't obey this command I will behead them." 
Pan Mei and the other generals all turned white. Although the Song avoided a 
costly and prolonged rebellion, it still took more than a year of hard fighting to 
conquer the Southern Tang.
The Campaign against the Southern Tang M If (6 October 974-5 January
976)182
Taizu began concentrating troops for a Southern Tang campaign on 6 
October 974, sending a force under Cao Han to Jingnan fflW- On 9 
October Taizu sent additional forces under Cao Bin Li Hanqiong ^  
and Tian Qinzuo EHifcTF to join Cao Han. On 10 October Taizu sent a letter to 
the Southern Tang ruler asking him to submit to the Song. The Southern Tang
18aThe campaign against the Southern Tang is chronicled in XCB/ Yongle Dadian 
12307/2b-12308/1 a and SS 3.42-46.
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ruler was initially inclined to submit, but Chen Qiao objected: "Your Majesty 
and I received the final commands of Yuanzong tcth (the previous ruler of the 
Southern Tang). Now, if you go [to the Song court], we must see the end of it. 
What about our sovereignty? How will I be able to face Yuanzong in the afterworld?' 
Zhang Ji also opposed submitting. Since Zhang and Chen were Li Huang's 
closest advisors, he agreed with them. The same day that Taizu received the 
Southern Tang ruler’s refusal, he sent further forces under Pan Mei f§H, Liu Yu 
SPJIS and Liang Jiong to Jingnan.
Taizu inspected the Song navy in the Bian practice basin on 27 October, 
before sending it southeast to participate in the Southern Tang campaign. Two 
days later he watched the naval exercises of several more squadrons before 
sending them to the south. The Southern Tang ruler was still unaware that Taizu 
had decided to attack him. Although he had refused to go to the Song court and 
submit to Taizu, he did send his heir apparent to pay his respects. The heir 
apparent was not allowed to return to the Southern Tang.
The campaign opened on 4 November when the Song army invaded the 
Southern Tang from Jingnan. On 9 November Taizu appointed the ruler of 
Wuyue Military Pacification Commissioner in Chief of the Shengzhou Southeast 
Area Expeditionary Army and bestowed two hundred war horses on
him. He also sent Ding Deyu with a thousand Song infantry and cavalry
to act as the Wuyue vanguard. Ding was also expected to advise the Wuyue 
ruler.
Cao Bin crossed the Yangzi from Qiyang $rR§ on 11 November and
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overran Xiakou Fort AfcPl!. He killed eight hundred of the garrison and captured 
two hundred and seventy others, including the fort commander. On 16 November 
Taizu appointed Cao Chief Administrative Officer of the Shengzhou Southwest 
Area Expeditionary Army and Navy, Pan Mei Director in Chief, and Cao Han 
Commander in Chief of the Vanguard.183
Previously the Song army sent annual patrols down to the Southern Tang 
border near Chizhou ?&#(. The Song troops would set up camp along the river, 
near the city. When the Southern Tang defending general of Chizhou, Ge Yan 
realized that the Song army was really invading he fled the city. Cao Bin 
entered Chizhou unopposed on 21 November.
Cao Bin’s first objective was to secure the upper reaches of the Yangzi 
above Jinling the Southern Tang capital. He marched east, downstream, 
systematically driving the Southern Tang army and navy from the river. But if the 
Song army was going to besiege Jinling, it would need a reliable transport link 
across the Yangzi much closer to the city. Taizu ordered Hao Shoujun to 
build a pontoon bridge able to span the Yangzi at Caishiji 35511. No one had 
ever built a pontoon bridge at Caishiji before because the river was both broad 
and deep there. Hao set up the bridge at Shipaikou SJftP first, to prove it would 
work.
Cao Bin defeated the Southern Tang army at Tongling on 29 November. 
Tongling was 37 miles northwest of Chizhou. The Song captured more than two 
hundred warships and more than eight hundred men. Cao reached Dangtu mm
183l have no explanation for the delay in making the command appointments.
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on 4 December, having already captured Wuhu $f$l. Wei Xi surrendered 
Dangtu to Cao. The Song army was now at Caishiji, facing a Southern Tang 
army of more than twenty thousand men. Cao defeated the Southern Tang army 
defending Caishiji on 9 December, capturing more than a thousand officers and 
men, and three hundred warhorses.
A Song force attacked Pingxiang on 17 December, defeating its 
Supervisor, Liu Mouzhong 8I/355&. Li Congshan the military governor of
Jitaining surrendered to the Song on 25 December, along with more than
thirteen hundred Southern Tang sailors. On 26 December the pontoon bridge 
was moved from Shipaizhen to Caishiji. The work was completed in three days.
When the Southern Tang ruler heard about the bridge he asked Zhang Ji 
about it. Zhang said: "Since ancient times there has never been this sort of 
thing. This cannot be.” The Southern Tang ruler responded: "I, too, say that this 
is a child's tale." That day he sent a naval force with ten thousand sailors under 
Zheng Yanhua and an army with ten thousand soldiers under Du Zhen tfc
;R to fight the Song army. Upon dispatching them he said: "Two forces, navy 
and army, supporting each other cannot fail to achieve victory."
Li Nu 3 ^  defeated a more than three thousand man Southern Tang 
naval force from Ezhou on 31 December, capturing more than forty warships. 
On 5 January 975 Cao Bin reported defeating several thousand Tang soldiers at 
Xinlin Fort and capturing thirty warships. On 13 January Zheng Yanhua 
and Du Zhen met the Song army. Du fought with the Song forces but Zheng held
back his naval force. Du was defeated because Zheng didn’t support him.
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Ning Guangzuo defeated more than three thousand Southern Tang 
troops of the Ezhou navy on the north bank of the Yangzi on 18 January. On 30 
January the King of Wuyue surrounded Changzhou He captured two
hundred and fifty Southern Tan soldiers and eighty horses beneath Changzhou's 
walls. On 3 February the King captured Licheng Fort flM U , defeating a Southern 
Tang army of more than three thousand men, capturing more than six hundred. 
Cao Bin defeated a Southern Tang army at Xinlingangkou 0 rW in  on 6 February, 
beheading more than two thousand men and burning more than sixty warships. 
On 11 February the King of Wuyue defeated a Southern Tang force of more than 
ten thousand troops on the northern border of Chang prefecture. Fan Rushui M 
the acting prefect of Chizhou, defeated four thousand Southern Tang troops 
on the border of the prefecture on 16 February.
Wu Shouqian defeated more than ten thousand Southern Tang
troops at Wuchang 5£|! on 21 February, killing seven hundred and taking Fanshan 
Fort The same day, Tian Qinzuo defeated more than ten thousand
Southern Tang soldiers on the Li River beheading their Campaign Commander,
Li Xiong On 24 February Wang Ming reported defeating more than three 
hundred troops from Ezhou on the southern bank of the Yangzi. On 26 February, 
under Fan Ruoshui's orders, Wang Shen defeated more than four thousand 
Southern Tang troops on the border of Xuanzhou.
Cao Bin reached Jinling, the Southern Tang capital, on 2 March. Li 
Hanqiong led a Song force across the Qinhuai River, south of Jinling. He then
attacked Jinling’s water fort (a line of ships guarding Jinling’s moat), using fire-rafts.
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When the wind rose he lit the ships and sent them at the fort. Li followed up the 
rafts, storming the fort and beheading several thousand men. When Pan Mei 
reached the Qinhuai River, a Southern Tang army of more than a hundred 
thousand troops was arrayed with its back to the Jinling. Pan Mei had no boats. 
He said to his officers: "I have tens of thousands of brave and determined 
troops. When I fight I am always victorious. When I attack, I always take the 
enemy. How can this narrow belt of water prevent me from advancing?" Pan 
then led his own bodyguard forward in crossing the water. The rest of the 
imperial army followed and the Southern Tang forces were badly defeated. The 
Southern Tang sent a force to cut the pontoon bridge at Caishi. Pan Mei quickly 
defeated them, capturing their Commander of the Divine Guard Zheng Bin 
IP f t  and six other high officers.
As Pan Mei was establishing himself near Jinling, Cao Bin and the rest of 
the Song army began to pick off nearby Southern Tang positions. Their goal was 
to isolate Jinling and destroy any forces that might come to rescue it. Shi Xi 
defeated a Southern Tang force of more than two thousand men in Yuanzhou on 
18 March. Cao Bin defeated a Southern Tang force of more than ten thousand 
men at Bailu Islet on 25 March, beheading more than five thousand men, 
capturing more than a hundred and seizing fifty warships.
A Song force climbed over the walls and snuck into Shengzhou on 27
March. The Song soldiers killed more than a thousand Southern Tang troops,
another thousand drowning as they fled. Zhang Jin 36H, the Office Manager
and Commander of Tiande and eight other Tang officers surrendered. Hou
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Zhi defeated more than one thousand Southern Tang soldiers at Xuanhuazhen 
iL itM  on 4 April. Xing Qi fflSig captured Yian Fort H e llion  28 April, beheading 
more than a thousand Tang soldiers. Cao Bin defeated a Southern Tang force of 
more than three thousand men on the Yangzi on 1 May, capturing another five 
hundred.
On 16 May Wang Ming reported defeating a Southern Tang force on the 
border of Jiangzhou and beheading over two thousand men. The King of Wuyue 
surrounded Changzhou on 24 May. The prefect, Yu Wancheng MMM. surrendered 
the city. On 2 June Cao Bin reported defeating a force of more than two 
thousand men at Qinhuaibei On 24 June the King of Wuyue reported
that Jiangyin Ningyuan and all of the forts along the Yuan River UXL 
had surrendered. On 7 July Wang Ming reported defeating a Southern Tang 
force of more than ten thousand men at Wuchang, and capturing more than five 
hundred ships.
Up until that time, Chen Qiao and Zhang Ji took care of all the affairs of 
the Southern Tang kingdom. They had ordered all of the cities and forts to 
defend themselves firmly in order to wear out the Song army. They hadn’t even 
disturbed the Southern Tang ruler when the Song army invaded. Every day he 
stayed in a back garden with Buddhist monks and Daoist masters reading sutras 
and discussing The Book of Changes. Chen and Zhang decided which military 
reports to show him. The Southern Tang ruler was unaware that the Song army 
was besieging Jinling several months after it had surrounded the city.
All of the old Tang generals had died, leaving Huangfu Jixun the
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Commander in Chief of the Divine Guard #$r,in charge of Tang military affairs. 
Huangfu was both young and arrogant. He had no intention of dying for his 
country. Although Huangfu wanted his ruler to quickly surrender, he said nothing. 
But when he spoke to anyone else he said: 'The Northern Army is very powerful, 
who can oppose them?" If he heard of a defeat he got a pleased look on his 
face. He would say: "I already knew that they could not win."
Huangfu Jixun had an adopted son named Shaojie Jixun had Shaojie 
secretly suggest to the Southern Tang ruler that they surrender to the Song, but 
the Southern Tang ruler did not agree. Huangfu Jixun had the brave troops who 
wanted to make a sally from the city at night and attack the Song beaten and 
imprisoned. While Huangfu and his son were arousing popular discontent, Huangfu 
also often refused attend court, saying he was too busy with military affairs. 
When he was ordered to come he arrived late.
On 11 July the Southern Tang ruler personally went out on the city walls 
and examined the situation. He found the Song army's stockades outside of the 
walls and their banners filling the fields. It was then that he realized that he was 
being deceived by his attendants and began to be concerned about the situation. 
He had Huangfu Jixun and Shaojie arrested and executed. Their bodies were 
exposed in the market, where the soldiers barbecued their flesh and ate it. In a 
short time their bodies were entirely consumed. In reality, military affairs were 
controlled by Zhang Ji. Huangfu Jixun and his son were made scapegoats for 
Zhang’s policies.
The Southern Tang ruler ordered Zhu Lingyun to relieve the capital.
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Zhu was upstream at Hukou with a force of one hundred thousand troops. His 
subordinates suggested taking advantage of the high tide to quickly go downstream. 
Zhu said: "If I advance now, the enemy will certainly attack my rear. If we fight 
and win that will be alright. But if we are not victorious then out supply lines will 
probably be cut. Then the damage will be very deep." He then sent an order to 
Chai Kezhen to replace him at Hukou. Chai was sick and didn't come.
Zhu was also afraid to move. The Southern Tang ruler pressed him several 
times, but Zhu didn't obey the order.
On 13 July Cao Bin reported defeating a force of more than twenty thousand 
men beneath the walls of the Southern Tang capital, capturing several thousand 
ships. On 16 August Du Guangjun reported defeating more than three
hundred Southern Tang soldiers from Xuanzhou on the south bank of the Yangzi.
Taizu again ordered the Southern Tang ruler to surrender on 21 August. 
He personally wrote the edict demanding that he surrender. In addition, Taizu 
ordered his generals to slow down their attack while he waited for a reply. On 27 
August the King of Wuyue was ordered to return to his country, leaving his troops 
to follow the Song army. On 23 August the King sent a messenger to the Song 
court to pay tribute, and give thanks, forTaizu's benevolence.
Hou Zhi was caught taking a bribe on 7 September. He was taken to the
capital for trial. Hou was a good friend of Lu Duosun. He asked Lu to help him.
At that time, Jinling had not fallen and Taizu was tired of war. The land in the
south was low and moist, it was the hottest time of the summer and there were
many outbreaks of disease in the army. Taizu was considering ordering Cao Bin
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to pull back to Huangling to rest the men and horses. Lu Duosun strongly 
opposed this, but was unable to prevail in the argument. Hou Zhi had just been 
brought from Huangling and knew that Jinling was in dire straits. Lu informed 
Taizu and, when Taizu was discussing the issue, he ordered Hou to come to 
court. Hou was ill and had to be supported by some palace attendants. In a loud 
voice he said: "The Southern Tang will be subdued at any moment, how could 
Your Majesty intend to stop fighting? I promise that you will soon take them. If I 
am wrong then I request that Your Majesty execute three generations of my 
family." Taizu sent away his other attendants and had a private conference with 
Hou to discuss the situation. He changed his earlier idea of withdrawing the 
troops and pardoned Hou.
On 14 September Hu Gongba SE&ff, the prefect of Jizhou H? #(, surrendered 
to the Song. On 1 October Ding Deyu reported defeating more than five thousand 
Southern Tang soldiers beneath the walls of Runzhou At that time Ding 
and a force of Wuyue soldiers were besieging Runzhou.
When the Song army began its invasion, one of its objectives was to take
Jingkou. Liu Cheng g |g  was sent to defend Runzhou for the Southern Tang.
He had been a companion of the Southern Tang ruler's while growing up. On the
point of departure the Southern Tang ruler said to him: "You don't want to leave
me. I too find it hard for you to go. Still, in this matter you cannot fail to aid my
mind." Liu cried and accepted the orders. He returned home and gathered all of
his gold and jade in departing. He told people: "All of this was given to me. Now
the country is in trouble. I want to disperse it to promote loyal service." The
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Southern Tang ruler heard this and was very pleased.
The Wuyue army, under Ding Deyu, was besieging Runzhou. They had 
not yet completed their circumvallation of the city. Liu Cheng turned down a 
suggestion that he make a surprise sally from the city: "If we win it will be alright, 
but if we don't we will be taken captive." He needed assistance if he was to fight 
while there was still a chance for success. The Southern Tang ruler sent a naval 
force from Jinling with eight thousand men under Lu Jiang jgjfc to relieve Jingkou. 
Lu Jiang disembarked his soldiers at Jingkou and fought with the Wuyue army. 
The Wuyue soldiers retreated a little and Lu entered the city. Then the besiegers 
reclosed the encirclement.
Liu and Lu defended the city firmly for several months. But they mutually 
suspected each other. Liu knew that Lu really wanted to surrender. He was 
worried about Lu's plans. He said to him: "A scout reported that the siege of the 
capital is getting worse every day. If the capital isn't defended, then how can this 
also be defended?" Lu also knew that the capital would fall. He replied: "You 
are the defending general. You cannot leave the city and go. Given that, it is 
appropriate for me to go." Liu made a bad face and, after a while, said: "It 
should be as you say."
Lu prepared to leave. Lu was angry at a subordinate general and intended
to kill him. Liu spoke to the general secretly and said: "Lu is angry at you.
You’re doomed." The subordinate general cried and asked Liu what he should
do. Liu replied: "I have one thing to say to you. If you don't leave tonight you
will die. Moreover, if you want to get lucky, you must report that we wish to
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surrender. You must first leave and contact the besiegers." The subordinate 
general replied: "My family is in the capital, how can I do this?" Liu responded: 
"Matters now are very anxious, we must think of ourselves. My family has a 
hundred people but I don't dare to think of them."
The subordinate general escaped and fled from the city. Lu was unaware 
of it. The next day, when Lu and Liu were eating together, an officer reported the 
escape. Liu made a face and said: "I said that you should already have 
beheaded him. How is this following orders, letting him escape?" After Lu left, 
Liu gathered all the generals and soldiers together: "I have defended this city 
several fortnights. I don't want to cheat the country. But we must find a way to 
survive. What do all of you think?" The generals and soldiers all cried out loudly 
and wailed greatly. Liu feared that there might be some who loved their country 
so he also cried: "I have received benevolence and firmly resisted with you. 
Moreover, my father and mother are in the capital. It would have been better if I 
didn't know loyalty or filiality, but our strength is unable to resist them. Have all of 
you not heard the story of Chuzhou? When Zhou Shizong surrounded Chuzhou 
it didn't fall for a long time. When it did, they killed everyone." In this way Liu 
convinced his men to surrender. On 16 October Liu opened the gates and asked 
to surrender. Lu Jiang went to Xuanzhou, where he satisfied himself with drinking 
and eating. Ding Deyu accepted the surrender of Runzhou on 23 October.
That month Li Congyi went to Jinling to present Taizu's edict, demanding
surrender, to the Southern Tang ruler. At first, the Southern Tang ruler intended
to surrender. But Chen Qiao, Zhang Xi and Kuang Chenfu thought that Jinling
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could hold out. The Song army had attacked day and night but had retreated. 
They convinced the Southern Tang ruler not to surrender. Once Taizu’s edict 
was rejected the Song army resumed its offensive.
There was a Daoist named Zhou Weijian H fflf t if  at the Southern Tang 
court who often discussed the The Book of Changes. Zhang Xi brought it to the 
Southern Tang rulers attention that Zhou had a farsighted plan. He would be 
able to get an armistice from the Song by talking and joking. The Southern Tang 
ruler sent Zhou and Xu Xuan to the Song court. At the same time, he 
ordered Zhu Lingbin to select soldiers from Hukou to relieve Jinling. The Tang 
ruler then instructed Xu Xuan: "If you can get them to stop I will not order the 
relief force to come east." Xu replied: "It is not certain that I can settle this. It is 
hard to resolve these difficulties. The people inside the city are waiting for the 
relief force. How can you not send it?" The Southern Tang ruler replied: "Seeking 
peace while sending the soldiers is a contradiction. Under these circumstances, 
how can you not be in danger?" Xu replied: "You must concern yourself with 
sovereignty. Do not think of me." The Southern Tang ruler cried and promoted 
him. Knowing that Zhou Weijian was rather high-minded and not interested in 
glory, the Southern Tang ruler personally wrote a more than ten-page letter to 
Taizu asking to stop the war and expressing his desire to retire due to illness.
On 6 November Cao Bin had Xu Xuan and Zhou Weijian escorted to the
Song court. Xu considered himself a famous Southern Tang minister. He intended
to quickly convince Taizu not to destroy his country. Song officials told Taizu that
Xu was a very talented speaker, and that Taizu should prepare for him. Taizu
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laughed: "You can all just go, you do not understand my preparations." Then Xu 
entered the court and respectfully said: "Li Yu (the Southern Tang ruler) is 
innocent. Your Majesty has sent troops without reason." Taizu ordered Xu to 
approach him. Xu continued: "Li Yu is a small [ruler] serving a large one.184 It is 
like a son serving a father. Li Yu has never committed offence. How is it that he 
is attacked?" He spoke at some length. Taizu replied: "You speak of a father 
and son, how can this be when there are two families?" Xu could not reply.
Zhou Weijian then approached with letter from the Southern Tang ruler. 
Taizu read it and said: "I didn't understand a word of what your master said." 
Taizu was thus not convinced to slow down the Song offensive, though he 
continued to treat Xu and Zhou well. On 9 November Xu and Zhou returned to 
the Southern Tang.
On 24 November the Southern Tang ruler again sent an envoy to seek a 
delay in the Song advance. But the following day Zhu Lingbin set sail from 
Hukou to relieve the siege of Jinling. He falsely claimed to have one hundred 
and fifty thousand men. The Southern Tang soldiers had tied trees together to 
make giant rafts to transport the soldiers. Their large warships held more than a 
thousand men each. The first objective was the pontoon bridge at Caishi. Wang 
Ming camped his troops at Dushukou □, in preparation for Zhu’s attack. He 
then sent his son to ride quickly to Taizu and request the building of an additional 
three hundred warships in order to make a surprise attack on Zhu. Taizu said: 
"This is not a timely policy. At any moment, Zhu will arrive at Jinling to break the
184Quoted from Mencius.
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siege."
The Yangzi was shallow at that time of the year. Ships could not easily 
advance. Zhu's flagship alone was ten stories. When Zhu reached Huankou ^  
□  a Song force under Liu Yu SIM vigorously attacked him. Zhu's situation was 
desperate. He tried to use flaming oil on the river to save the situation. A north 
wind arose and drove the oil back onto the Southern Tang armada. The Tang 
troops were all dispersed. Zhu Lingbin was captured alive the next day along 
with his Provost Marshal of the Navy, Wang Hui and other officers. Zhu’s
relief force was Jinling’s last hope for outside help.
The Southern Tang ruler again sent Xu Xuan and Zhou Weijian to have an
audience with Taizu. On 8 December the pair went to the Bian Hall. Xu Xuan
said that Li Yu served the great country of Song with very respectful propriety. It
was only illness that prevented him from visiting court. He begged for an armistice
for the whole country. His words were very urgent. Taizu repeated his questions
several times. Xu's voice became increasingly harsh. Taizu got angry and,
putting his hand on his sword, said to Xu: "You must not say anymore. What
crimes have the people of Jiangnan (the Southern Tang) committed? The world
is one family. How could I bear someone snoring beside my bed?" Xu was afraid
of Taizu and retreated. Taizu then berated Zhou Weijian. Zhou became increasingly
afraid: "I originally lived on a mountain, it was not my idea to enter court. It is
only that Li Yu sent me. I have heard that Nanshan has a lot of efficacious
medicine in the winter. I have always wanted to go there." Taizu pitied him and
let him go. He then richly rewarded each of them and gave them an edict to
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return.
On 17 December Wang Ming reported defeating more than ten thousand 
Southern Tang troops at Hukou. He captured five hundred warships and a 
corresponding amount of weapons. Cao Bin had erected three forts near Jinling 
as bases of operation for the siege. Pan Mei commanded the north fort. When 
Taizu saw a plan of the siege he pointed to the north fort: "This must be deeply 
entrenched for strong defense. The Southern Tang will certainly sent troops 
during the night to attack it." A messenger was quickly dispatched to tell Cao 
Bin.
Cao Bin heeded Taizu's warning and drafted corvee labor to dig out a 
moat around the fort. As expected, the Southern Tang sent five thousand troops 
to attack the north fort one night. Each man carried a torch. They rose in a great 
clamour and attacked. Cao Bin waited for them to assault the fort and then 
vigorously attacked them, scattering the Southern Tang troops.
The Song army had besieged Jinling from the spring to the winter. It had
defeated the Southern Tang army several times, and the morale of the people in
Jinling had been broken. Cao Bin wanted the city to surrender. If he took the
city by storm it would be impossible to keep the army from destroying it. He sent
a messenger to the Southern Tang ruler: "This month on the twenty seventh day
the city will certainly be broken. You should prepare early for this." The Southern
Tang ruler did not believe it. He ordered his son, Zhongyu, to go to the Song
court. After a long time, he still hadn't left. After several days, Cao Bin sent a
message reproving the Southern Tang ruler. He said: "You needn't go so far [as
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to send Zhongyu to the Song court]. If you come to the fort then I will stop the 
attacks." The Southern Tang ruler finally began suspecting what everyone around 
him said. He had thought that the city was firmly resisting. Cao Bin’s confidence 
was unnerving him. He sent back a reply: "Zhongyu has not finished packing 
and we have not finished his departing feast. On the twenty seventh day he will 
leave. Cao sent another messenger. He said: "If the twenty sixth day passes it 
will also be too late." The Southern Tang ruler didn't listen.
Cao Bin suddenly feigned illness and didn't attend to affairs. All of the 
generals asked after his health. Cao said: "My illness cannot be cured by 
medicine or acupuncture. It is necessary that you all make a pledge that, when 
the city falls, you do not kill even one person. Then my illness will be cured." 
The generals all accepted the pledge. They then burned incense together and 
made their pledge. Cao suddenly became better.
By 2 January Jinling's morale had collapsed. Chen Qiao and Zhang Xi 
had both originally pledged to die together with their country before surrendering. 
But Zhang Xi had no intention of dying. Zhang led his wife and children to the 
palace. He went in at the same time as Chen Qiao to see the Southern Tang 
ruler. Chen said: "I have failed Your Majesty. You should execute me. If the 
anyone in the [Song] court asks, please blame me." The Southern Tang ruler 
replied: "The time has already passed and the country died without profit." Chen 
said: "You Majesty will not kill me. I also have no face with which to look at the 
people of the country." He then went and hung himself. Zhang then spoke:
"Chen and I controlled things together. Now the country is lost. We are all dead.
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Now Your Majesty must attend [the Song] court. Who can explain the situation 
for Your Majesty? Therefore, I have not killed myself in order to serve you."
Cao Bin arrayed the army in front of the palace wall. The Southern Tang 
ruler then presented his letter of surrender and, with his officials, bowed in 
welcome at the gate. Cao selected one thousand elite troops to guard the 
outside of their gate. The victory over the Southern Tang was reported on 5 
January 976. In total the Song took nineteen prefectures, containing three 
commanderies and one hundred and eight counties. The population was 655,065 
households.
Taizu had now completely conquered southern China. Only the Northern 
Han and the Sixteen Prefectures remained unconquered in north China. The 
Northern Han was clearly the easier target and Taizu launched his third invasion 
of it later in 976.
Taizu's Third Campaign Against the Northern Han (9 September 976-3 January
977)185
On 9 September 976 Taizu ordered an attack on the Northern Han. He 
appointed Dang Jin Chief Administrative Officer of the Hedong Circuit
Expeditionary Army Pan Mei his Director in Chief and Yang Guangmei (*§
his Provost Marshal.
185The third campaign against the Northern Han is chronicled in XCB/ Yongle Dadian 
12308/9a-16a and SS 3.48-51.
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On 13 September Taizu appointed Guo Jin f f l t i  Director in Chief for the 
Hedong Circuit Expeditionary Army The invasion began on 18 September.
Hao Chongxin and Wang Zhengzhong j£®:& attacked from Fenzhou 
-Hi Yan Yanjin HU/t^t and Ji Chao WM attacked from Qinzhou fo-Hi Sun 
Yanxuan MiHtE and An Shouzhong attacked from Liaozhou SlHi Ji
Yanchen WfiiW and Mu Yanzhang attacked from Shizhou 5 Hi Hou Mei 
and Guo Jin attacked from Xinzhou and Daizhou.
Dang Jin reached Taiyuan on 4 October. He defeated a Northern Han 
force of several thousand men north of Taiyuan, capturing more than a thousand 
horses and more than six hundred weapons. Dang then established a fort south 
of the Fen River. On 13 October Guo Jin reported capturing 37,000 people in the 
Shanhou iliW: prefectures.
On 29 October An Shouzhong reported burning more than forty Northern 
Han forts and capturing several thousand cattle, sheep and people. The same 
day, Ji Zhao reported defeating a Northern Han force of five hundred men, 
capturing thirty. On 1 November Guo Jin reported overrunning Shouyang county 
MMU, capturing ninety people. Dang Jin reported defeating a Northern Han 
force of more than a thousand troops north of Taiyuan.
Song Taizu died in the Wansui Hall MMMk on 14 November 976. But the 
Northern Han campaign continued. On 23 November Li Guangrui reported 
overrunning Wubao Fort He beheaded more than seven hundred soldiers,
and captured the fort commander, along with several thousand cattle, sheep and 
sets of armor.
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Song Taizu was succeeded by his younger brother, posthumously known 
as Song Taizong. Taizong’s most important task immediately after becoming 
emperor was to secure his own position. In order to do that he had to make sure 
that he had the military firmly in control. But a large number of troops under the 
command of generals of uncertain loyalty were on campaign against the Northern 
Han. Accordingly, Taizong ordered the end to the Northern Han campaign on 30 
December. All the generals were ordered to return to the capital and all of the 
troops to their garrisons. By 3 January Pan Mei and Dang Jin had returned from 
the field.186
1 “There is an error in the dating of Taizong’s order to end the campaign. It reads 5  E  
which is chronologically impossible. The closest possibilities are H E  and £ ^ .  I have 
arbitrarily chosen the latter, giving the date 30 December. The alternative date would have been 
24 December.
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Chapter Eight 
Song Taizong
Zhao Kuangyi, posthumously known as Song Taizong, succeeded his 
elder brother to the Song throne in 976. Taizong inherited the military machine 
that had conquered all of southern China. The generals’ loyalty, however, remained 
with Taizu. Taizu had earned it by personal valor and military skill. Taizong had 
no such reputation to support him. In order to prove himself, he personally led the 
campaign against the Northern Han, as well as the first campaign for the Sixteen 
Prefectures.
The Northern Han capitulated. Much of the credit for the rapid victory was 
due to the preparations Taizu made after his last, unsuccessful, campaign. Taizong 
undertook the Northern Han campaign with the advice and consent of Cao Bin W 
#2. The emperor acted, therefore, in accordance with the wisdom of his military 
officials. Both Zhou Shizong and Song Taizu had demonstrated their military 
acumen by going against the advice of their officials and succeeding. Taizong 
wanted to show that he was his elder brother’s equal in military skill. He also 
wanted to win over the generals. Unfortunately for Taizong, he was neither a 
skilled strategist nor a particularly good leader. It is clear that he did not take 
criticism well. When his plans failed, he blamed his subordinates.
Perhaps the most bothersome historiographical problem relating to Taizong’s 
campaigns is that the Song sources were selectively edited by government officials
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during his reign to cover up his failures and, where that was not completely 
possible, to shift the blame to his generals. While the practice of glorifying an 
emperor’s successes and downplaying his failures was common, the extent to 
which those officials did it under Taizong was not. The battle at Gaoliang River, 
in which Taizong was nearly captured and the Song campaign for the Sixteen 
Prefectures collapsed, is entirely absent from Song sources. When Taizong 
decided to continue immediately on to the Sixteen Prefectures after Taiyuan 
capitulated, all of the generals except for Cui Han were afraid to oppose him. 
Despite that, after the campaign failed, the Xu Zizhi Tongjian Changbian noted 
that all of the generals had agreed with Taizong’s decision.
Taizong’s unsuccessful Sixteen Prefectures campaign was a great personal 
failure. It also began a period of intermittent war with the Liao lasting until the 
Treaty of Shanyuan in 1005. That quarter century of war was not inevitable. The 
Song and Liao empires had developed a modus vivendi before Taizong’s invasion, 
notwithstanding their clashes over the Northern Han. It was the Song who 
overturned the existing relationship. The Liao then faced the problem of restoring 
a stable relationship with the Song in the face of a belligerent Chinese emperor. 
It is unlikely that Taizong would have accepted the humiliating treaty which 
ultimately restored diplomatic relations between the Song and Liao empires. In 
any case, it was a problem he left to his son.
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The Northern Han Campaign (6 February-19 June 979)187
From when he first took the throne, Taizong talked about conquering the 
Northern Han. On 6 February 979 Taizong asked Cao Bin, the Commissioner of 
the Bureau of Military Affairs, about it: "Zhou Shizong and our Taizu both personally 
went to Taiyuan. At that time, they were not strong enough to take it. Was the 
reason they could not get close to it due to the strength and integrity of its walls 
and ramparts?" Cao replied: "During Shizong's campaign Shichao was 
defeated at Shilingguan People were afraid and therefore they withdrew.
Taizu had camped his soldiers within an area of sweet grass [thus moist and 
swampy] and many soldiers in the army suffered from diarrhea. It was because 
of this that they stopped, and were unable to get close to the city walls."
Taizong said: "I now intend to attack Taiyuan. What do you think?" Cao 
replied: "The country's armor and weapons are sharp and the people's hearts 
are happy and support you. If you attack it will be [as easy as] breaking dried 
branches or pulling up rotted plants. How could you not succeed?" Grand 
Councilor Xie Juzheng P ftlE  objected: "Previously when Shizong went to war, 
Taiyuan relied upon support from the north. They stayed within their walls and 
did not come out to fight, confident that the imperial army would tire and withdraw. 
Taizu broke the enemy at Yanmenguan fRRBB. He moved the people to the 
area between the Luo and Yellow Rivers, so that the territory is now empty 
187The Northern Han campaign is chronicled in XCB 20/1a-10b, SHY:B 7/5a-7b and SS
4.60-62.
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and barren. The difficulties are great and what you would accomplish would be 
unimportant. There are insufficient food supplies. It will be a disaster. I beg 
Your Majesty to deeply consider this."
Taizong said: "Now the issue is the same but the situation is different. 
They are weak and we are strong. Previously, Taizu broke the enemy, removing 
their people to empty the land just so we could take care of the matter today. I 
have made my decision. You officials should not speak of it again." He then 
ordered that preparations be made to send military provisions from the various 
prefectures to Taiyuan.
On 9 February Pan Mei f iH  was appointed Northern Route Chief Bandit- 
suppression and Military Commissioner j t& .  Cui Yanjin was assigned to 
attack the east side of Taiyuan; Li Hanqiong was assigned to attack the 
south side; Cao Han WH was assigned to attack the west side; and Liu Yu §0i§ 
was assigned to attack the north side. Hao Shoujun was appointed
Director in Chief of the Western Area Ramparts and Forts Mi Xin
and Tian Zhongjin EHItjl were respectively appointed the Commanders in Chief 
of the Expeditionary Cavalry and Infantry.
The following day Taizong appointed Guo Jin fflSi Chief Administrative 
Officer of Shilingguan 5&WI; Tian Renlang and Liu Xu g !llf were given 
the responsibility of inspecting the trenches and stockades on all four sides of 
Taiyuan, as well as the ladders, battering rams and siege machinery.
Taizong feasted Pan Mei and the other officers at the Changchun Hall on
14 February, at which time he personally handed them the campaign plans.
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Management of the Song army’s supplies was divided between Houzhi the 
Transport Commissioner of Hebei Mifc, and Lei Dexiang WWM, the Transport 
Commissioner of Shaanxi on 16 February.
Taizong announced on 2 March that he was going to make a tour of the 
border areas. He left the capital on 15 March. On 20 March Xie Hui the 
prefect of Junzhou sent Zhe Yanyun to attack Longzhou HHii
Taizong reached Zhendingfu (Zhenzhou) on 31 March. He paused there 
while his armies secured the area around Taiyuan. The same day, he ordered 
Yin Xun to attack Longzhou. The Northern Han army had prepared Longzhou’s 
defenses by walling up the main passes leading directly to it. Taizong divided 
the army into smaller columns and sent them to surround Longzhou by other 
routes.
On 1 April Taizong ordered Ji Yanchen and Hou Mei to lead
separate columns to attack Meng county Shilingguan reported on 3 April 
that three hundred and thirty people from Yangqu Fort had surrendered. 
Guo Jin reported on 7 April that he had defeated a Northern Han force at 
Xilongmen Fort and captured more than one thousand soldiers. He
sent them to Taizong's temporary palace. On 8 April Hou Jilong was
ordered to attack Qinzhou rM I and Wang Zhuan was ordered to attack 
Fenzhou.
On 12 April Wang Gui 3EH was ordered to attack Qinzhou. On 15 April
Zhe Yuqing #fffiJJ0I and Yin Xian were ordered to attack Lanzhou H-Kl Guo
Jin badly defeated several myriad of Liao cavalry at Shilingguan. The defeat of
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the Liao relief force effectively isolated Taiyuan. Guo also captured a messenger 
sent by the Northern Han ruler to tell the Liao of his desperate situation. Guo 
displayed the captured messenger beneath the city walls of Taiyuan. The defeat 
of the Liao and the failure of their messenger seriously damaged the morale of 
Taiyuan.
Shi Ye overran Yingyang MM  on 16 April, beheading and capturing 
a great number. On 20 April Wang Shen and Liu Wensu were sent 
to reinforce Shilingguan. Mi Xin defeated a Northern Han force beneath the 
walls of Taiyuan on 26 April.188 He killed their Commander of the Household 
Guard, Pei Zheng HIE, and presented his head to Taizong.
Zhe Yuqing reported on 29 April that he had attacked Lanzhou and defeated 
a force of more than one thousand Northern Han soldiers. On 30 April Ji 
Yanchen reported the surrender of Meng county. Zhe Yuqing captured Kelan 
prefecture on 5 May, killing a great many and capturing their Military 
Commander, Zhe Lingtu fH. He presented Zhe Lingtu to the court.
With the area around Taiyuan secured, Taizong continued his march. He 
left Zhendingfu on 12 May. Xie Hui attacked the main west gate of Longzhou on 
14 May. Yuan Jizhong and Xu Jun scaled the wall first. Xu was
wounded eight times in the process. They killed more than three hundred soldiers 
and captured six officers, including Li Xun Bandit-suppression Commissioner, 
who were presented to the court.
188No location is provided for this battle so I have followed Li Tao and assumed it was 
beneath the walls of Taiyuan. See his note in XCB 20/6a.
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Taizong composed a poem on 16 May called: "Hearing of Longzhou's 
Fall." Zhe Yuqing fought successfully outside Lanzhou again on 18 May. He 
killed Huo Yi St$B,189 the prefect of Xianzhou, and captured seven other officials 
including Ma Yanzhong JUS®, Military Governor of Kuizhou H#|. They were 
presented to the court.
Taizong reached Taiyuan on 20 May. He established himself at a temporary 
palace east of the Fen River. He toured all of the encampments and stockades 
around the city the following day, and inspected the attacking equipment, the 
ballistae, leather shields, ladders and battering rams. Taizong dismounted and 
talked with the generals and soldiers operating the siege machinery. When he 
returned to his temporary palace, he issued an edict to Liu Jiyuan, the Northern 
Han ruler. In it, Taizong promised to take care of Liu and his descendants if he 
surrendered.
Taizong went to the west of Taiyuan just before midnight on 22 May and 
supervised his generals firing stones at the city. Jing Si , Commandant of 
the Heavenly Martial Army led his men in scaling the city wall. He killed
several Northern Han soldiers. In the process, both his legs were pierced by 
arrows and a ballistae stone broke two of his teeth. Taizong saw this and 
immediately rewarded him with a brocade robe and silver belt.
Taizong inspected the stockades on 24 May and supervised the assault 
on Taiyuan. On 25 May, before midnight, he returned to the circumvallation wall 
and ordered Ma Renyu Bai Zhonggui S IM :; and Li Jisheng to
’“ According to SS, Huo Yi’s name was Guo Yi. Cit!
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attack the city in several places simultaneously. Taizong observed the attack on 
the gates of the city. Li Hanqiong lead his men scaling the city wall. Many 
arrows struck his head and one struck his finger but he continued to fight. 
Taizong was impressed and had him brought to his tent to have his wounds 
attended to. He wanted to personally go and reassure the troops fighting beneath 
the gate. Li Hanqiong cried and said: "Taiyuan’s ramparts are precarious, like 
an egg and a millstone. The generals risk their lives and the soldiers fight 
bravely. Arrows and stones fall like rain on the gate. How can you risk everything 
to go there? If you do not listen to me, then I beg to die first.” Taizong then 
relented. Taizong went to the west side of Taiyuan on 27 May and supervised a 
strong assault on the city from a tower in the circumvallation wall.
On the night of 29 May, Taizong put on armor and supervised a vigorous
attack on the southwest corner of the city. They stopped at dawn, having taken
the horse and goat wall (see chapter two) and captured Fan Chao?£SI, the
Northern Han Commissioner of Palace Attendants. Fan Chao was then beheaded
beneath his large banner. He had come out to surrender, but they suspected
that he was attacking. Guo Wanchao U$HS, Commander in Chief of the Northern
Han Army, surrendered on 31 May. Taizong went to the south side of Taiyuan
on 1 June to supervise a water attack on the city. Previously, he had had dikes
constructed to block up the Fen River. That day, he had the dikes opened,
causing the waters to break through the outer wall at the southeast corner and
enter the space between it and the inner wall. The Northern Han ruler was very
concerned and personally supervised the people trying to plug the hole with
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dirt.190 Taizong said to his generals: "Tomorrow is the fifth day of the fifth 
month.191 We should have our feast in the city." He personally drafted an edict to 
Liu Jiyuan letting him choose imminent destruction, or a rapid surrender with a 
comfortable retirement.
Taizong returned to the south of the city the following day to supervise 
another assault. The soldiers approached the wall with ladders and battering 
rams, protected by a hail of arrows and stones. The Song army had nearly 
overwhelmed the wall’s defenders, but the Northern Han soldiers wouldn’t give 
up. Taizong feared that there would be a slaughter when his men finally broke 
through, so he signalled the army to pull back a bit. That night, Liu Jiyuan sent Li 
Xun ^S& to Taizong with his terms for surrender. Taizong bestowed clothes, a 
gold belt, silver cup, silk and horse with saddle on Li and ordered Xie Wenbao ^  
jc g  to return to Liu Jiyuan with his imperial edict accepting Liu’s surrender.
That night, Taizong went to the north of Taiyuan where a feast was prepared. 
He received Liu Jiyuan's surrender at the feast. Taizong then wrote an essay 
called "Pacifying Jin" and some five and seven-line poems. He ordered his 
officials to match the poems. The conquest of the Northern Han added ten 
prefectures and one commandery, containing forty counties. It also added a 
population of thirty five thousand families and thirty thousand troops.
Taizong went to the Hesha Gate tower on the north side of Taiyuan on 15 
June. He sent messengers to move all of the people out of the city to a new city.
190The incident involving attacking the city with water is cited by Li Tao in XCB 20/8b.
191The Dragon Boat festival.
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Once the people had all left, he ordered Taiyuan razed. The official buildings 
and people's dwellings were all quickly destroyed. A great many young and old 
people rushed to the gates, but didn't make it out in time and were killed in the 
fire. Taizong made his temporary palace into a Buddhist temple on 19 June, 
bestowing on it the name "Pacifying Jin Temple" and writing an inscription to be 
carved in stone.
The Sixteen Prefectures Campaign (26 June-1 August 979)192
With Taiyuan destroyed, Taizong withdrew to Zhenzhou, arriving there on 
26 June. His first campaign as emperor was a success, which caused him to 
overestimate his own strategic sense and the strength of the Song army. Unlike 
his older brother, Taizong’s campaign experience was fairly limited. He didn’t 
understand that, after some four to six months in the field, his troops were 
exhausted. They also expected to be rewarded for their success. Taizong not 
only failed to reward them, but, by razing Taiyuan, prevented them from looting 
the city. These errors could have been corrected had Taizong been amenable to 
criticism or advice. He was not, and his generals knew it. Thus, when he 
decided to invade Liao territory immediately after the fall of Taiyuan, in order to 
capture the Sixteen Prefectures, no one opposed him. Cui Han presented a 
memorial to Taizong saying: "You have an opportunity to resolve this issue
19aThe Sixteen Prefectures campaign is chronicled in XCB 20/10b-13b, SHY:B 7/8a-9a,
SS 4.62-63 and LS 9.102.
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which is not likely recur. It will be very easy to take advantage of this great 
victory. At this time it cannot fail." Taizong was pleased by the memorial and 
ordered Cao Bin to discuss marching orders for the soldiers.193
Taizong marched north from Zhenchuanhu H JIIIi on 9 July. He reached 
Jintaidun on 15 July, and camped north of it, in Liao territory. Taizong
then hired a hundred tribesmen to be guides, paying them two thousand cash 
each. Kong Shouzheng ?LtFIE was sent ahead to Qigouguan That
night he reached the fence in front of the drawbridge. He persuaded the Gate 
Commissioner, Liu Yu §PĴ ,194 that, since a large army would soon arrive, it would 
be prudent to open the gates and surrender. Kong then returned and reported to 
Taizong.
Taizong donned armor and led the army to Qigouguan on 16 July. Liu Yu 
led the officials in opening the gates and welcoming the imperial army. Taizong 
stationed a garrison of one thousand troops in the city. The same day, Fu Zan W 
W. and Kong Shouzheng marched to Zhuozhou They attacked the Liao 
there and captured more than five hundred men. Taizong reached Zhuozhou on 
17 July. Liu Yuande surrendered the city. Taizong stationed Zhang
Huaixun iBHHM in Zhuozhou with his troops and continued on to Yangoudun m 
fitM  the following day.
1S3ln a note to this entry, Li Tao includes a discussion of the decision to continue the 
campaign in which Zhao Chang M U  said that taking Youzhou would be as easy as “Turning over 
a hot cake in a pan.” Hu Tingzan R  objected to this: “The words of a literary man are not 
enough. I believe this cake will be hard to turn.” Li Tao doubted that this occurred because Zhao 
Chang was referred to as a Participant in Determining Governmental Matters a title
which did not exist at that time. XCB 20/11a.
1WXCB records a variant character for Liu Yu’s name In the text I have followed SHY.
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Taizong arrived south of the city of Youzhou before dawn on 19 July. A 
Liao force of more than ten thousand men was camped north of the city. Taizong 
personally led an attack on the Liao troops. The Song army beheaded more than 
a thousand men and drove off the rest.
With the area around Youzhou secured, Taizong ordered his generals to 
attack the city from all sides on 21 July. The Song army besieged Youzhou until 
1 August. But despite Taizong’s personal supervision of the siege, and eight 
hundred ballistae, the city did not capitulate.
When Taizong began the siege of Youzhou, he had placed troops under 
Cao Han and Mi Xin in reserve at the southeast corner of the city. While the 
troops were digging, they found a crab and presented it to Cao Han. Cao said to 
the other generals: "The crab is a water animal, but this one was found on land. 
He has lost his home [he is in the wrong place]. It has many legs, which signifies 
that the enemy relief force will soon arrive. Also, ‘crab’ g  (xie) sounds like 
‘release’ M {jie). Doesn't this mean that our troops will withdraw?"
The Battle at Gaoliang River (1 August 979)
Cao Han’s prediction was quickly proven correct. A Liao army commanded
by YelQ Sha attacked the Song at Gaoliang River on 1 August.
Yelu Sha’s initial attack drove the Song back slightly. Xiu Ge ft:IF and Xie Zhen
then attacked from the flanks and routed the Song army. Taizong himself
narrowly escaped the Liao army, fleeing to Zhuozhou on a donkey. The
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Liao killed or captured a large number of troops and took vast booty in weapons, 
armor, provisions and other equipment.
The battle at Gaoliang River is absent from Song sources, as are all of the 
subsequent Liao victories. Although it is impossible to determine even the most 
vague outlines of the battle, its impact on Taizong’s campaign makes it clear that 
it was a rout. The Song expeditionary army collapsed and Taizong fled back to 
Kaifeng. While the initiative shifted to the Liao, the Song army adopted a defensive 
posture in preparation for a Liao invasion.
Taizong on the Defensive195
According to Song sources, the army withdrew from Youzhou on 2 August. 
Taizong gave the order that night because, due to the extended siege, the 
soldiers were ill, transport of supplies was difficult and Liao might come to relieve 
the city. Taizong’s order was irrelevant. The main army was already retreating. 
The order was given after the fact to provide historiographical camouflage for 
Taizong’s failure.
Taizong reached Dingzhou on 6 August. He halted there for a few days 
and established the command dispositions for defense against the Liao. Cui Han 
and Meng Yuanji were ordered to defend Dingzhou; Li Hanqiong to defend 
Zhenzhou; and Cui Yanjin to defend Guannan. Taizong said to them: "The 
195Taizong defensive period is chronicled in XCB 20/14a-21/3b, SHY:B 7/9a-10a and LS
9.102.
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Qidan will certainly come and invade our border. If you set up ambushes and 
attack them when they come, you can achieve a great victory."
Taizong arrived in Kaifeng on 23 August. His defeat at the hands of the 
Liao was more than just a military failure, it was a personal humiliation. Taizong 
had set out to prove himself worthy to succeed his older brother by, if not 
equalling his military exploits, at least demonstrating that he was also a competent 
general. While it was true that he destroyed the Northern Han, that victory was 
at least partly due to the measures instituted earlier by Taizu. Li Tao’s account 
directly contradicts the commentary in the Songhuiyao to the effect that all of the 
generals had supported Taizong in his decision to attack Youzhou following the 
fall of Taiyuan.196 The generals were afraid to oppose Taizong. Taizong, for his 
part, began to blame the generals for the failures of his campaigns.
Although Taizong had personally withdrawn from the battlefield, the war 
with the Liao had just begun. The Liao characterized the attack at Gaoliang 
River as merely a “stroke with the back of the sword". They may well have been 
surprised by the magnitude of their victory. It is clear that they were not prepared 
to take immediate advantage of it. While the Liao mobilized, the Song continued 
to arrange their defenses, appointing Pan Mei Chief Administrative Officer of 
Sanjiaokou in Hedong on 10 September. It took until 26 September for the Liao 
to organize their invasion. Han Kuangsi & ||[ip j was appointed Campaign 
Commander, and Yelu Sha, Army Supervisor. Xiu Ge, Xie Zhen and Mo Zhi W 
K  would each raid the Song at the head of their personal units. Shan Bu 
196SHY:B 7/9a. XCB20/10b.
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would invade by several routes with the troops of Shanxi [ii® .
Taizong sent an edict to the border forts in Xin, Lan and Xian prefectures 
on 28 September prohibiting raids on Liao territory. Zhang Shaoqing fflsBWi and 
Li Shenyou were sent to reinforce Dingzhou on 2 October. Taizong
inspected the army in Jianlong M il on 16 October.
The Liao army invaded Song territory on 23 October. Liu Yanhan f iM It  
led a blocking force across their invasion route, arraying his troops at the Xu 
River Cui Yanjin led troops north along the Heilu Dike JSgtEl, to a pass in 
the Great Wall. He marched to the Liao rear, with his soldiers' mouths gagged. 
Li Hanqiong and Cui Han also led troops to link up with him there.
Taizong had given the generals chentu^M  (battle formations) which 
divided their forces into eight formations. When the main army arrived at Mancheng 
the Liao cavalry was already arrayed for battle. Zhao Yanjin ascended to 
an elevated point and looked over the Liao army. It was both numerous and 
concentrated. In Taizong’s chentu, the Song formations were spaced one hundred 
paces apart. The soldiers distrusted Taizong’s formation and, consequently, their 
morale was low. Zhao said to Cui Han and the other generals: "The emperor 
has entrusted border affairs to us. He expects us to destroy the enemy. The 
enemy cavalry is concentrated, but our army is spread out like stars in the sky. 
Their formation and ours are so different. If we fight how can we be successful? 
It is not as good as uniting to attack them. Then we can have a decisive victory. 
Won't if be better if we disregard the orders, achieve victory and benefit the 
country?"
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Cui Han and the others replied: "In case we are not victorious, then what 
shall we do?" Zhao said: "If we are defeated then I alone will step forward to 
take the blame." Cui Han and the others were still reluctant to change Taizong's 
orders. Li Jilong said: "Adapting to change is very important during war. How 
could we establish beforehand what we would do? I will bear responsibility for 
disobeying the emperor's orders alone." Cui Han and the other generals then 
began to change their minds. They divided the troops into two formations one in 
front of the other. The soldiers were all relieved.
They clashed with the Liao three times and badly beat them. The Liao 
army retreated to Xishan jSiJj. The Song army then pursued the Liao to Suicheng 
W$L- They beheaded more than ten thousand men and captured more than a 
thousand horses. In addition, the Song army captured three tribal leaders, more 
than thirty thousand civilians and a great many weapons, carts and sheep.
The Liao, under Han Kuangsi, counter-attacked on 11 November and 
decisively beat the Song at Mancheng. Shen Si j§|,H then beat the Song at 
Huoshan 4ctil on 17 November. The Liao established stockades at Daizhou, 
Yanmen, Xijing, Huguo and Nanchuan on 26 November. Zhe Yanyun 
with Dong Siyuan M@Jg, Liu Xu 29i£ and Hou Mei, attacked them. They badly 
beat the Liao, capturing a very great number of saddled horses and weapons.
Taizong announced that he was going on a tour to the Two Rivers area,
between the Yellow and Yongding Rivers on 2 December, to reassure
the troops. He left the capital on 5 December. The following day, Guannan
reported defeating a Liao force of more than ten thousand, beheading more than
229
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
three thousand men and capturing fifty-three camels.,97 Taizong reached Damingfu 
on 11 December. That day, a report arrived that the Liao had withdrawn from 
Xiongzhou. The Song army defeated a Liao force of more than one thousand at 
Sanjiaokou on 15 December. They defeated another Liao force of several thousand 
at Xinzhou 't/rifi on 17 December, beheading forty-five soldiers and capturing 
sixty. The prisoners were presented to court, along with captured saddled horses 
and armor. Taizong reached Darning on 6 January 980.
Pan Mei reported from Sanjiaokou on 29 February, that, when he was in 
Daizhou on an inspection tour, one hundred thousand Liao troops raided Yanmen 
Jjf F I He ordered Yang Ye and his unit of several hundred cavalry from 
Xixing to ride to the north opening of Yanmen by a small pass. Yang’s force 
was thus behind the Liao raiders. Pan Mei attacked northward and Yang attacked 
southward. The Liao force was badly defeated. Their military governor, Xiao 
Duoluo was killed and Li Zhonghui the Liao Cavalry Commander
in Chief was captured. The Song also took a great amount of
armor and saddled horses.
197There is a large discrepancy between the SHY and XCB numbers. XCB reports that a 
force of several tens of thousands was broken and more than ten thousand heads taken. I have 
followed SHY’s more modest figures.
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Stalemate196
Military operations quieted down after February 980 while both sides 
prepared for another major effort beginning later in the year. In preparation for 
operations against the Liao, on 18 November Yang Zhongjin and Mao
Jimei led their troops to Guannan; Cai Yu and Chen Tingshan 
I_U led their troops to Dingzhou; and Lu Hanyun lULWkW led his troops to Zhenzhou. 
Taizong planned to make a tour of the Northern border. Laborers were sent from 
the capital to Xiongzhou to open the road and repair the camps on 29 November. 
Mi Xin Guo Shouyun IPtF®, Li Bin and Jiang Jun all marched 
their troops to Dingzhou on 4 December. The generals and subordinate 
commanders along the Hebei border were all given tea, mutton and wine.
At the same time, the Liao were preparing to invade the Song. The Liao 
emperor made sacrifices to the gods of war on 11 November. He ordered 
the invasion of the Song on 21 November. Two days later, the Liao emperor 
arrived in Yanzhou. On 27 November he went through the ritual of firing “ghost 
arrows" %LWi, carried out before major military undertakings. The Liao emperor 
then went to Gu’an and, on 30 November, carried out sacrifices to heaven and 
earth. By 9 December the Liao army surrounded Waqiaoguan. The following 
night, a Song attack was beaten off by Xiao Gan I f #  and Yelu Hende 
Xiu Ge defeated a Song force led by Zhang Shi 31©, east of Waqiao on 12 
December.
198This period is chronicled in XCB 21/9a-13b and LS 9.103-105.
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The same day, a Liao army reached Xiongzhou and occupied Longwan 
Dike HWH. Jing Si jftjjpl led one thousand soldiers in a strong attack on them. 
At that time an Imperial Commissioner was in Xiongzhou to inspect the walls and 
ramparts. He was surrounded by the Liao in the suburbs. Song units rushed to 
rescue him and many were injured. Jing Si and his troops got lost during the 
night. At three drums (3-5 a.m.) he broke out of the encirclement and went to 
Mozhou. The Liao constructed a bridge to cross the river. Jing Si attacked them 
when they were part of the way across, killing and capturing a great many.
The Song army arrayed for battle on the south side of the river near 
Waqiao on 18 December. Xiu Ge forded the river and defeated them. He 
pursued the Song troops to Mozhou, killing and wounding a great number. The 
Song army returned the next day. The Liao attacked and virtually annihilated 
them.
Taizong announced on 19 December that he would tour the northern 
border. He left the capital on 22 December. Guannan reported defeating a Liao 
force of more than ten thousand, beheading more than three thousand men, the 
following day. Taizong reached Shanzhou on 26 December. The Liao army 
withdrew the same day. Taizong reached Deqingjun on 27 December. When he 
stopped at Damingfu the following day, a report arrived from Xiongzhou that the 
Liao had withdrawn.
The Liao emperor withdrew to Yanzhou on 4 January. Since the Liao had
withdrawn, Taizong wanted to advance and attack Youzhou. He established the
command of the invasion force on 17 January. Li Fang opposed the
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campaign. Taizong relented in the face of Li’s opposition and returned south. 
Although both the Liao and Song emperors withdrew from the border, sporadic 
fighting continued.
Taizong returned to the capital on 24 January. On 30 January a Liao 
force of more than ten thousand was beaten near Jiaozhou, and two thousand 
three hundred and forty-five men beheaded. When Taizong returned to the 
capital many officials urged him to capture Youzhou and Jizhou. Zhang Jixian Wk 
WW opposed the campaign. He pointed out that the recently taken territory of 
the Northern Han was only newly pacified. Transport into Youzhou and Yanzhou 
was very difficult. Several prefectures were as yet without forts and that even the 
Liao were not well supplied. He then quoted Sunzi that: “Winning a hundred 
times in a hundred battles is not as good as winning without fighting." Zhang 
advised heightening the walls and deepening the moats. He also said that 
choosing good soldiers was not as good as choosing good generals. Taizong 
again backed off in the face of this criticism.
Border raiding by both sides continued, but neither launched any large 
invasions. The Liao attacked Mancheng in April of 982. They were beaten off 
and withdrew the following month. The Liao emperor, Jingzong died on 13 
October of the same year at the age of thirty-four. He was succeeded by his 
eldest son, posthumously called Shengzong While the Liao dealt with the 
succession, they were relatively inactive on the Song border. In the absence of a 
major provocation, the Liao were willing to accept the status quo.
The same was not true of the Song. Neither Taizong nor his officials were
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satisfied with the Liao controlling the Sixteen Prefectures. From a purely military 
perspective, it left the Liao in a strategically advantageous position that was easy 
to defend and excellent as a jumping-off point for an invasion of Hebei. The 
open terrain of Hebei meant that any invasion threatened Kaifeng itself. There 
were also two emotional considerations in addition to the purely military ones. 
First, there was the desire to control all “Chinese" territory. Second, Taizong had 
been personally humiliated at Gaoliang River. He wanted to avenge his earlier 
failure.
From the Song perspective then, the situation as it existed in 982 was 
unacceptable. Neither the Song nor the Liao had any reason to trust that the 
other side would remain peaceful. The fact remained, however, that the Liao 
position was fundamentally strong. It would take a major effort to overcome 
them. The Song army would have to conduct several major sieges and keep 
itself supplied in the face of massive cavalry attacks by the Liao. It is not 
surprising then, that it was only in 986 that Taizong again decided to try to 
conquer the Sixteen Prefectures.
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Taizong’s Second Sixteen Prefectures Campaign (20 February 986-18 June 
986)1"
Taizong returned to the problem of the Sixteen Prefectures in 986. After 
some encouragement, he resolved, once again, to conquer the territory. His plan 
held back most of the army, while smaller raiding forces secured the route of 
march to Youzhou. Ideally, the Liao emperor would overreact to the initial incursions 
and exhaust his army trying to destroy them. Once the Liao army was worn 
down, the main Song army would advance, crushing any opposition. The plan 
relied upon the Liao emperor strenuously defending his territory from the earliest 
stages of the invasion. Unfortunately for the Song, that sort of defense was 
much more typical of their thinking than the Liao leaders’. Intentionally or otherwise, 
the Liao emperor kept most of his forces out of the fray until the Song army 
overextended itself and began to fall back. He then attacked, annihilating a large 
part of the main Song army.
Several officials continually sent memorials to Taizong urging him to conquer 
the Sixteen Prefectures. They claimed that the Liao had broken the treaty since 
the Song took Taiyuan. In addition, the Liao ruler was young and his affairs were 
being controlled by his mother, with military affairs being run by General Han 
Derang who everyone hated. Taizong was inclined to personally lead
’"Taizong’s second Sixteen Prefectures campaign is chronicled in XCB 27/1a-14b,
SHY:B 7/1 Oab and LS 11.120-122.
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the campaign. On 20 February 986, Li Zhi sent up a memorial which said:
"Youzhou is the barbarian's right arm. If the imperial army attacks there 
then they will certainly come and oppose us. Since we will use not less 
than several tens of thousands of troops to attack the city, our cost will be 
great. We must prepare for the situation carefully. Whatever day you 
want to take the city, we must still prepare a hundred days of provisions.
I don't know if the border provisions are adequate for this. Furthermore, 
the barbarian city is situated in a flat area, far from the mountains. Getting 
stones will be very difficult. Their defenses are like metal walls and boiling 
moats.200 If we cannot obtain stones to shoot, how can we take them?"
Li went on to say that the best plan was for Taizong to remain in the capital. The
second best plan would be for him to go to Damingfu to coordinate the campaign
and to encourage the soldiers. If Taizong insisted on going to the front then Li
would “hold onto the hem of his robe to stop him or presume to cut the strap of
his saddle” to prevent him.
Song Qi sent up a memorial giving an extremely long and detailed
plan encompassing every aspect of the campaign including the best route to
take, the characteristics of the various barbarian tribes in the border areas, how
to deploy the army and what provisions were necessary. Song recommended
against marching to Yan City by way of Xiongzhou or Bazhou. That route would
take the army through flat land and the army would end up surrounded in Yang
City. The open terrain would expose the army to enemy attacks. He recommended
following the route successfully used by Zhou Dewei fflWM during the Latter
Tang of the Five Dynasties. They would go west along the mountains and gather
at Yizhou. Marching along the north of the Hu mountains where there was
sufficent water, they would go from the Sangang River to Anzu Fort.
100A standard phrase for invincible defenses.
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In February of 986, Taizong announced another campaign to recover the 
Sixteen Prefectures. In his edict he noted that the territory was originally Chinese 
but, during the past fifty years of barbarian control, Chinese culture was being 
replaced by barbarian culture. He appointed Cao Bin Commander in Chief of the 
Expeditionary Forward Army, with Cui Xiujin as his second in command. Taizong 
then forbade stealing, felling trees, taking livestock or kidnapping people on pain 
of death. He also promised to confirm all surrendering Liao officials in their posts 
and to promote them when Youzhou was captured. Taizong originally intended 
to take part in the campaign but a Song defeat at Qigouguan, around the time of 
his edict, dissuaded him.
In April, Pan Mei marched from Yanmen and entered Liao territory from 
the west. He encountered a Liao force, defeated it and took five hundred heads. 
Marching north, Pan reached Huanzhou, taking another five hundred heads along 
the way. The prefect of Huanzhou, Zhao Yanxin, surrendered his city on 23 
April. Cao Bin clashed with the Liao east of Zhuozhou. Li Jilong, Fan Tingzhao 
and others were all struck by arrows but continued to direct the battle. Their 
resolute courage drove off the Liao. They exploited their victory and successfully 
stormed the north gate of Zhuozhou. They captured the rest of the city the 
following day. The same day Zhuozhou fell, Zhao Xizan surrendered Shuzhou 
city after being surrounded by Pan Mei.
The Liao emperor was informed of the Song invasion on 17 April. Xiu Ge
reported that Cao Bin, Cui Yanjin and Mi Xin were advancing via Xiongzhou; Tian
Zhongjin was advancing via Feihu; and Pan Mei and Yang Jiye were advancing
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via Yanmen. The territory, but not the cities, of Qigou, Zhuozhou, Gu’an and 
Xincheng were all occupied by the Song at that time. The Liao emperor mobilized 
his forces, dispatching Xiu Ge to the front and putting Yelu Weizhi in charge of 
leading the main army south. Yelu Pode defeated a Song force at Gu’an on 19 
April. Xiu Ge cut off their supplies and captured the Song commander. He also 
took a large quantity of horses, sheep and weapons.
Tian Zhongjin reached the north border of Feihu. Da Pengyi came 
to reinforce the Liao forces. Yuan Jizhong said to Tian Zhongjin: “The enemy is 
numerous. The advantage of cavalry lies in level ground. The best plan is to 
take advantage of the strategic places and to attack them first." The prefect of 
Qizhou, Tan Yanmei, said: "The enemy relies on numbers to easily overwhelm 
us. If we go out and attack them unexpectedly, we can defeat them."
Tian's troops were deployed along the east slope of a mountain. He 
clashed with the Liao repeatedly, but inconclusively. At dusk, Tian ordered Jing 
Si to march around the west slope of the narrow mountain cliffs and attack the 
Liao from behind. Jing went along the cliffs and then descended, beheading 
more than a hundred Liao. The Liao retreated to Tuling leaving behind more than 
a thousand dead.
Huang Ming fought with the Liao inconclusively. Jing Si said to him: "You 
just prepare your troops. When you hear my call, reinforce me and we will take 
them." They fought hard and defeated the Liao, pursuing them for more than fifty 
li. Jing chased them to Cangtou and then returned. He also took Xiaozhi and 
Zhensu Forts.
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Jing Si camped his men at Zhensu for several days. The Liao sent 
cavalry to challenge him. The forces were uneven, but Jing joined together with 
Zhang Zhongjin and attacked them. The Liao withdrew but they returned at night 
surrounding Zhensu and Shimen Forts. Zhang sent a messenger to Jing saying: 
"Right now I only have five hundred men and the enemy has more than twenty 
thousand. Our strength cannot oppose them." He then asked Jing what to do. 
Jing replied: "Tan Yanmei has two thousand troops at Xiaozhi. I will send a 
messenger to secretly ask him what we should do." Tan replied: "The enemy's 
disposition is like this. How can we do anything?" Jing said: "Just lead your 
whole army to Pingzhou and arrange the formations with their banners. Then 
send another two or three hundred men with white pennons along the road. I will 
then lead my unit of five hundred men to quickly advance on them. When they 
see the flags and pennons from afar they will suspect there is a large army there. 
The masses of the enemy can thus be broken." They agreed to follow his plan.
Jing clashed with the Liao half a dozen times on 26 April, but the results 
were inconclusive. He was going to withdraw when Zhang Zhongjin took advantage 
of the situation to attack with his force. The Liao cavalry broke and ran. Da 
Pengyi was captured along with Awantong, a Cavalry Commander. The Song 
also captured more than a thousand Liao soldiers from Bohai and beheaded 
several thousand men. Seven hundred people, young and old, horses, cattle, 
and more than ten thousand pieces of armor fell into Song hands. Da Pengyi 
was well known in the border region for his bravery and powerful appearance.
His capture was a significant loss for the Liao.
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Cao Bin entered Zhuozhou and sent Li Jixuan with a force of light cavalry 
across the Zhuo River to scout the Liao positions. A Liao army attacked U on 28 
April. Li counter-attacked, defeating them south of the city. He beheaded one 
thousand men, captured five hundred horses and killed He Si their Grand 
Councilor . Pan Mei attacked Yingzhou on 30 April. The Liao military 
governor, Ai Zheng 3tIE, and Song Xiong surrendered the city.
Tian Zhongjin surrounded Feihu. He ordered Da Pengyi to go before the 
city wall and talk to the defending general, Lu Xingde. Lu refused to surrender, 
so Tian vigorously attacked the city. Lu Xingde surrendered on 4 May. Tian 
Zhongjin then surrounded Lingqiu. Mu Chao, the defending general, surrendered 
the city on 9 May.
Pan Mei captured Yunzhou on 14 May, beheading one thousand men.
Tian Zhongjin broke a Liao relief army north of Feihu, beheading one thousand
men and capturing more than four hundred soldiers. Mi Xin defeated a Liao
force at Xincheng on 15 May, beheading three hundred men. The Liao regrouped
and forced Mi to retreat a short distance. They then cut off and surrounded Mi
with his three hundred personal guards, the Dragon Guard Soldiers. The Liao
rained arrows down on the Mi and his men, killing most of them. Mi was able to
hold them off until dusk, personally shooting down several Liao. As dusk fell, he
took up a large sword and broke out with his remaining cavalrymen, now slightly
more than a hundred. They killed several dozen Liao troops. Just then, Li Jixuan
arrived, sent to rescue Mi by Cao Bin. Li and Mi attacked the Liao and defeated
them northeast of Xincheng, beheading a thousand men and capturing a hundred
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horses.
Tian Zhongjin attacked the Liao north of Feihu again on 22 May. He killed 
two leaders, beheaded one thousand men and captured three hundred horses. 
Tian Zhongjin reached Weizhou on 28 May. Li Cunzhang, Xu Yanqin and others, 
killed the Liao commander, Xiao Duoluo, and his one thousand defending troops. 
Geng Shaozhong surrendered the city. Cao Bin and Mi Xin had crossed the 
Juma River two days earlier and found themselves facing Xiu Ge, dug in behind 
a long rampart. They challenged Xiu to battle and camped their armies on a 
north-south line spread over 2 miles. The Liao emperor was 17 miles east of 
Zhuozhou. On 27 May he ordered Xiu Ge and the other generals to strictly guard 
the water routes in order to prevent Song soldiers from reaching Zhuozhou. The 
following day, 28 May, Xiu defeated a Song army. The Liao recaptured Zhuozhou 
on 29 May.
When Cao Bin and the other generals first had their audience with Taizong 
to receive his departing words, the emperor had said: "Just send the generals to 
Yun and Ying prefectures. You, with more than one hundred thousand men, say 
that you are going to take Youzhou. You should hold back the main advance and 
march slowly. Do not greedily pursue short-term gains. When the enemy hears 
your announcement, they must send soldiers to Youzhou. Their soldiers will rush 
there. Because of that, they will not be relaxed and will be unable to reinforce 
Shanhou."
Taizong's plan called for a carefully paced advance. The forward Liao
positions, either intentionally or unintentionally, fell rapidly to the Song advance
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force. Pan Mei captured Huan, Shu, Yun, and Ying prefectures. Tian Zhongjin 
captured Feihu, Lingqiu and Weizhou. Cao and the others captured Xincheng, 
Gu’an and Zhuozhou. It seemed like the Song army was well on its way to an 
overwhelming victory. Taizong, however, became increasingly worried with each 
report of a victory that Cao was advancing the army too quickly and that the Liao 
could cut off his supply lines. Cao retreated from Zhuozhou because, after 
staying there for more than ten days, he had exhausted his grain supply. He 
retreated to Xiongzhou in order to resupply himself with provisions from the 
reserve troops. Taizong was very anxious when he heard about the retreat. He 
said: "How can he retreat in order to resupply from the reserve troops when the 
enemy is before him? He is not following the plan." He quickly sent messengers 
to stop it and ordered them not to advance again. Cao was to lead his troops 
along the Baigou River and join up with Mi Xin in order to raise morale and 
strengthen the disposition of forces in the west. Cao and Mi were then to wait for 
Pan Mei to completely capture the Shanhou area. Finally, they would link up with 
Tian Zhongjin and march east to Youzhou.
Cao retook Zhuozhou on 28 May. At that time it was very hot and the
soldiers were tired. Moreover, they had not been resupplied, so they again
returned to the border. At first, Cao wanted to leave Lu Bin to garrison Zhuozhou
with ten thousand troops. Lu said to him: "Zhuozhou is deep inside the northern
territory. Outside there is no reinforcement and inside there is no food. The
census is incomplete. Losing this position is certainly not advantageous. It
would be better if these ten thousand men were deployed outside the city. This
242
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
would be a hundred times better than having them defend the city." Cao followed 
his suggestion. He ordered Lu Bin to take the residents of the city south. Cao 
and the main army retreated in some disorder, followed by the Liao.
The main Liao army reached Gu’an on 3 June and surrounded it the 
following day. Pode was the first to scale the wall and the city was retaken. The 
Liao army pursued Cao to Qigouguan. They fought a major battle there on 12 
June, with the Liao army badly defeating the Song army. Cao gathered his 
remaining troops and forded the Juma River at night, camping south of the Yi 
River. Tens of thousands of soldiers were killed or drowned. The Liao pursued 
the shattered Song army to the Juma River. Li Jixuan counterattacked and drove 
off the Liao. Li pursued them to Hushanfang. With the Song army defeated, the 
main Liao army withdrew from the border on 15 June.
Wang Ji'en arrived at court from Yizhou on 18 June and reported the Song 
defeat. Taizong ordered the generals camp their units along the border. He also 
ordered Cao Bin, Cui Yanjin, and Mi Xin to attend court. Tian Zhongjin led the 
entire army to Dingzhou. Pan Mei returned to Daizhou.
Before Cao Bin and the others had returned, Zhao Pu personally wrote a 
memorial to Taizong. In it he criticized the invasion, describing it as "shooting a 
pearl at a sparrow" or "setting a trap for a rat."201 Zhao accepted that he might be 
severely punished for criticizing the invasion, especially because he was the only 
official speaking against it. He argued that trying to take territory from nomads 
was useless. The best policy was wuwei (inaction) and the Liao would have no
201 Metaphors for efforts that pursue worthless ends.
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choice but to come and accept Chinese culture.
Taizong personally wrote a reply to Zhao in which he praised his loyalty in 
criticizing the invasion but explained that he had not intended to really invade and 
that his original plan had failed because Cao Bin and his subordinates had not 
followed his instructions. Cao was supposed to wait with his hundred thousand 
troops for a month or two at Xiong and Ba prefectures while Pan Mei and Tian 
Zhongjin pacified the Shanhou region. They were then to advance together on 
Youzhou. He just wanted to cause the Liao to flee far into the desert. The 
problem was that Cao Bin's subordinates each pursued their own plans. The 
troops quickly advanced and then retreated, which wore them out and used up 
their supplies. Thus it wasn't his fault that the action failed.
The failure of Taizong’s second Sixteen Prefectures ended any further 
ambition to distinguish himself militarily. While he could place the blame for his 
failures on the generals, he still had to acknowledge that the Liao were far more 
formidable than he had previously believed. Unfortunately, his belligerence
engendered a fair amount of ill feeling on both sides.
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Chapter Nine 
Zhenzong
Zhenzong ascended the throne in 998 with the issue of the Sixteen 
Prefectures still unresolved. Taizong’s failed efforts to capture the territory from 
the Liao had inflamed the leaders of both empires. To the Liao, Taizong’s 
invasions had been unwarranted attacks on their territory. They had accepted 
Taizong’s subjugation of their client state, the Northern Han, without using that as 
a reason to begin a general war with the Song. In spite of Liao forbearance, and 
the beginnings of more or less cordial diplomatic contacts, Taizong had invaded 
their territory. To the Song, the only casus belli that Taizong needed was that the 
Sixteen Prefectures had been part of the Tang dynasty’s territory. It was a 
culturally and historically-based claim that no Song Chinese statesman or emperor 
questioned. The simple fact that the Liao empire held the territory was sufficient 
reason to go to war.
There was no peaceful way to resolve the issue of the Sixteen Prefectures. 
Although Song Taizu had once mentioned the possibility of purchasing the territory 
from the Liao as an alternative to war,202 Taizong’s failed invasions made clarification 
of the relative military strengths of the Song and Liao empires a prerequisite for a 
lasting settlement. Taizong and his advisors had determined that the Song army 
was incapable of wresting the Sixteen Prefectures from the Liao. After his
^XC B  6/8b and 19/14ab, WXTK 23.227bc. Cited in Worthy, op. cit., 22-23.
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second failure, Taizong was unwilling, or unable, to mount any further campaigns 
against the Liao. He blamed the army and its generals for his humiliating failures.
By the time Zhenzong became emperor the Song government had already 
adopted a defensive military posture, ceding the initiative to the Liao. The Liao 
army, sometimes led by the Liao emperor and the dowager empress,203 regularly 
raided Song territory from the Sixteen Prefectures. Their raids served two purposes: 
maintaining their initiative and probing Song defenses. Song counter-raids were 
always limited to local actions, so they were not a credible threat to the Liao 
empire. On the other hand, Liao raids often held the possibility of being the 
beginning of a major, dynasty-threatening invasion.
But if the Liao were trying to maintain their military initiative and probe 
Song defenses, what was their ultimate goal? And why did they invade so 
strongly in 1004? As we discussed in chapter one, the Liao were not trying to 
conquer Song China. They were trying to stabilize their border with the Song 
and convince the Chinese empire to accept their control of the Sixteen Prefectures. 
A secondary objective was to recover the Guannan area, taken from them by 
Zhou Shizong in 959. Rather than relying on their cities' defenses to blunt Song 
attacks and then attacking the overextended expeditionary armies, as they had 
done in 979 and 986, the Liao actively defended their border by regularly attacking
203The dowager empress Chengtian dominated Shengzong’s court until her death in 
1009. “-there was no question who was ultimately in control: ...the new emperor [Shengzong] 
was thoroughly dominated by his mother, who continued to browbeat and sometimes strike him in 
public even when he was a grown man." She also had her own ordo of ten thousand cavalry. 
Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, The Liao,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 6, 
eds. Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 90-91.
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the Song. Although their strategic aim was defensive, the exigencies of pursuing 
that goal with a cavalry army forced the Liao to act offensively on the tactical, that 
is to say battlefield, level.
Of all of the raids mounted by the Liao during Zhenzong’s reign, the one in 
1004 was the most successful on both the tactical and strategic level. The Liao 
achieved more than they hoped for: the establishment of a peaceful Liao-Song 
border, an annual subsidy from the Song court and the opening of border markets 
for trade.204 The Treaty of Shanyuan that ended the 1004 invasion, and stabilized 
the border for more than a century, was also one of the most important events in 
Northern Song political history. It secured the Song from the only power that 
could have threatened the dynasty’s existence. The long, stable peace established 
by the treaty made the great cultural achievements of the 11th century possible. 
But we would be wrong, or at least excessively sinocentric, to characterize the 
1004 campaign as the culmination of a grand Liao plan directed toward the Song. 
It was one component of a linked Liao plan to secure all of the empire’s borders, 
one of which was with the Song.
204The Treaty of Shanyuan did not provide for the resumption of trade. Shortly after the 
treaty, however, trade was officially sanctioned. Jing-shen Tao, Two Sons of Heaven, (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1988), 16-17.
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Liao Foreign Policy (986-1005)205
The Liao empire secured its western border with the Xixia in 986, when Li 
Jiqian, the Xixia leader, became a vassal ruler under the Liao. Li had not 
submitted to the Song with the rest of the Tangut leaders in 982. He, and his 
successors, disrupted the northwestern border of the Song as long as their 
territories abutted one another. While the Liao-Xixia relationship was never as 
friendly as the Song court believed, it nevertheless stabilized the Liao empire's 
western border.
In 992-3 the Liao temporarily stabilized their eastern border, abutting the 
Koryo kingdom in Korea. Their methods presaged those used in dealing with the 
Song. A large Liao army invaded and advanced south, encountering limited 
resistance along the way. The Koryo king, Songjong, led a large force north to 
meet the Liao. Confronted by a powerful army, the Liao commander negotiated 
a settlement. The settlement transferred Koryo’s vassal status from the Song to 
the Liao, effectively stabilizing the border.
It is unclear why the Liao waited until 999 to begin attacking the Song in 
earnest. The Liao court may have been occupied with unrest around the empire 
(there was trouble with the Xixia in 992, and with other Tangut tribes in 997) or 
the shift may have been due to a change in the military leadership after the death
20&The account of Liao history during this period is based on Denis Twitchett and Klaus- 
Peter Tietze, The Liao,” op. cit., 100-110.
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of YelG Xiuge, the Liao commander in chief, in 998.206 In any case, in 999 the 
Liao began raids on the Song that might best be described as a series of 
reconnaissances-in-force. The Liao failed to capture Suicheng in 999, although 
they defeated a Song force nearby during the winter. A second Liao army 
defeated a Song army near Yingzhou the same year. The Liao withdrew early 
the following year as Zhenzong organized a Song counter-attack (but not a 
counter-invasion).
The Liao emperor personally commanded another invasion in the winter of 
1001. Once again the Liao defeated a Song army near Suicheng and withdrew 
as the Song counter-attacked. There were further clashes in 1002 and 1003. A 
Song official by the name of Wang Jizhong was captured during the 1003 attack 
on Dingzhou. Wang had been a personal confidant of Zhenzong, and became a 
key figure in negotiating the Treaty of Shanyuan in 1004-5.
In the late autumn of 1004 a Liao army commanded by the emperor and 
the empress dowager invaded Song territory. A second Liao army managed to 
capture Suicheng, but most of the Song cities were bypassed with little or no 
effort to take them. Liao forces rode directly south, destroying a Song force near 
Mingzhou, before reaching Shanyuan. There they faced a massive Song army 
commanded by Zhenzong himself. After an initial skirmish, both sides negotiated 
a settlement and the Liao army withdrew.
208Yelu Xiezhen, the Northern Commissioner for Military Affairs, died the following year in 
999, after the Liao emperor began mobilizing for the campaign against the Song.
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Zhenzong’s First Campaign (12 October 999-29 February 1000)207
In August of 999 the Liao emperor, Shengzong mobilized his troops 
for an invasion of the Song. He and his mother, the Dowager Empress Xiao, 
went to Yanzhou on 12 October. On 31 October he ordered the invasion. 
Shengzong began his campaign on 4 December when he attacked, but failed to 
capture, Suicheng in Dingzhou. Xiao Jiyuan WiMM., captured the stone fort in 
Langshanzhen Shengzong then marched to Yingzhou SWA, where he
fought and defeated a Song force. After capturing Leshou county 
Shengzong made another attempt to take Suicheng. The Song army took up a 
defensive position near the city with a river to its front. A force of Liao light 
cavalry crossed the river and made a surprise attack on the Song force. The 
Song army was almost completely annihilated. Despite his victory, Shengzong 
was still unable to capture Suicheng. His cavalry army was unable to take a 
fortified city.
Although Shengzong and the Liao army had, as yet, failed to capture any 
strategic cities, their presence in northern Hebei worried the Song court enough 
for Zhenzong to personally take the field. Zhenzong was not a great general, but 
his presence would bolster the morale of the Song army and demonstrate his 
determination to defend the country. Rather than portray his actions in defensive 
terms, Zhenzong’s expedition was presented as a campaign to capture the Sixteen
^Zhenzong's first campaign is chronicled in SHY:B 7/1 Ob-7/11 b, XCB 45/13a-15b, SS 
6.110 and LS 14.154-55.
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Prefectures. The campaign was announced on 1 January 1000.208 Zhenzong left 
the capital on 14 January. On 19 January Zhang Min reported that he had 
defeated a Liao force south of Jizhou. He killed more than one thousand Liao 
and captured one hundred horses. Wei Zhaomin reported attacking a second 
Liao force of five thousand cavalry south of Jizhou, capturing armor and equipment. 
He chased the Liao off without losing a single man.209
Zhenzong rode into Tianxiongjun on 24 January in the midst of a vast 
imperial army. That day the officials at Weilujun reported beating off a Liao raid. 
A report arrived on 27 January that Song Sigong, Zhe Weichang, and Liu Wenzhi, 
had raided Liao territory in Wuhechuan. They captured Bahantaiwei Fort, 
slaughtering the Liao garrison and burning more than fifteen hundred tents. They 
also took more than ten thousand war horses, cattle and sheep, along with one 
thousand swords, bows and armor.
Outside of the forces accompanying Zhenzong in Tianxiongjun, the largest 
concentration of Song soldiers in Hebei was under the command of Fu Zan in 
Dingzhou. Zhenzong's display of force was both a demonstration of resolve and 
a forward defense of the capital. Still, the emperor was far from the front and it 
fell to Fu Zan to actually deal with the Liao raids. Fu commanded a force of more
208There is a date discrepancy between SHY and XCB. Li Tao’s note in XCB points out 
that although the shilu dates the announcement of the campaign to the first day of the 12th 
month, matching the SHY date, he followed the SS date. I have chosen to follow SHY, as the 
edict it contains is more complete. XCB’s edict is also slightly different. In it, Zhenzong
announces that he will go to Hebei in the next month.
209Wei Zhaomin’s victory is recorded in a note by Li Tao. According to the shilu, the battle 
took place on 19 January. It was only recorded at Zhenzong’s temporary palace eight days later.
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than eighty thousand infantry and cavalry but adopted a passive defense in 
Dingzhou. He was accused of cowardice by most of his subordinates for not 
opposing the Liao army in the field. Fan Tingzhao, Fu’s Director in Chief, even 
compared Fu unfavorably to an old woman. Whether due to cowardice or clear­
sighted analysis, Fu adopted the most reliable strategy for dealing with the Liao 
army. While worrisome, the Liao invasion had, as yet, failed to capture any 
important cities. The Liao army had proven its weakness in siege operations 
time and again. They were unable to exploit their battlefield victories and secure 
territory or booty. By not taking the field, Fu denied the Liao the opportunity to 
either win glory, or weaken the cities’ defenses, by defeating the Song army.
Fu Zan’s strategy frustrated the Liao army by denying it victory. It was a
successful defensive strategy. But there were many officials at court and officers
in the army who were not convinced that a passive defense was sufficiently
effective. It also ran contrary to their idea of sovereignty to allow a foreign army
to ride through their country unopposed. The Liao succeeded in overrunning
several forts in Henshan at the beginning of February. But they subsequently
failed to capture Weilujun despite strongly attacking it for two days and nights.
Many Song officials and officers demanded an active defense, fighting the Liao
army directly by attacking its raiding forces and invading Liao territory. They
knew that the Song army had not won the majority of its encounters with the Liao
army in the field. They also knew that the Song army had not always lost when it
fought the Liao in the field. Thus, although the chance of defeat was fairly high,
there was a significant group of officials and officers who preferred directly opposing
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the Liao in the field to a more reliable passive defense relying on city walls.
Liao raiding continued into February. The Liao army freely roamed through 
and plundered Qi, Zhao, Xing and Ming prefectures. Their depredations drove 
the rural population into the city and suburbs of Zhending. The roads became 
impassable with refugees. This was the great weakness of a passive defense. 
The Liao could be prevented from capturing cities or defeating armies, but they 
could freely attack the unprotected populace. The Song court appeared to be 
impotent, unable to protect its people or territory. It was for this reason that a 
passive defense was unacceptable. Barbarians could not be allowed to invade 
at will while the Song court and army did nothing. A state which did not defend 
its territory failed in the most fundamental claim of sovereignty: control of its own 
land. More practically, if the Liao were allowed to invade unopposed it would 
encourage further raiding. They had to be driven out.
Fu Zan was indirectly encouraged by the Song court to adopt a more
active strategy. The fact that he was not directly ordered to do so by Zhenzong
suggests that the court itself had not reached consensus. Fu was neither sacked
nor explicitly ordered to conduct an active defense. Still, the court wanted Fu to
do something. Accordingly, Fu detached eight thousand cavalry and two thousand
infantry and put them under Fan Tingzhao’s command. Fan was ordered to
march to Gaoyangguan in preparation for an attack on Liao territory. Fu would
follow shortly with the rest of the army. Zhenzong sent a vanguard force under
Shi Baoji and Shang Guanzheng from Darning to Dingzhou to join with Fu in the
attack. But nothing came of the planned attack. Whether through cowardice, or
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conflicting orders, Fu stayed in Dingzhou.
Zhenzong ordered a policy review on 5 February. Despite an extensive 
discussion of the situation and possible plans, no decision was made. Several 
officials agreed that one of the main problems to be solved was cowardly 
commanders. They proposed executing Fu Zan just as Zhou Shizong did to Fan 
Aineng and He Hui after the battle of Gaoping (see chapter three). Despite their 
indecision, it was clear that the general opinion of the officials was tilting toward 
taking a more active approach. At the same time, the Liao were beginning to 
withdraw on their own. They had been campaigning for more than two months, 
during the winter, with little to show for their efforts. Since they lived off the land, 
they could not return to areas which they had already exhausted by raiding. 
Shengzong returned to Yanjing some time after 8 February.
Fu Zan and Fan Tingzhao attacked a Liao force at Peicun in southwest 
Yingzhou on 13 February. Kang Baoyi marched from Gaoyangguan with a force 
of elite troops to support their attack. He clashed with the Liao near sunset and 
fought through the next day until dusk. When Fu and Fan withdrew Kang chose 
to continue his attack. With Fu and Fan gone, the Liao were able to concentrate 
their forces against Kang. The next morning the Liao surrounded him. Kang 
decided to fight to the death rather than surrender. He and his remaining men 
were killed after a spirited defense. The Liao then plundered Ci and Ji prefectures 
and withdrew.
Fan Tingzhao reported on 19 February defeating a large Liao force 10
miles east of Mozhou. He beheaded more than ten thousand men and captured
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more weapons than could be successfully counted. As a result, the Liao were 
driven back across the border. When the report arrived at court, the officials all 
congratulated Zhenzong. Zhenzong personally wrote a "happy to hear of your 
victory" edict and also a five and a seven line poem for the wall of his temporary 
palace. He ordered the officials to match the poems. Although Fan’s success in 
driving the Liao back across the border was probably due to the fact that they 
were already withdrawing, it allowed Zhenzong to leave the front on a victorious 
note. He returned to Kaifeng on 29 February.
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From 1000 to 1004
Between 1000 and 1004 both the Song and the Liao launched sporadic 
raids on the others territory. The border area was highly militarized by this time 
and neither side could make any appreciable gains. The raids were part of a 
political and military contest of wills. On the political front they were trying to put 
pressure on the other side and to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the status 
quo.
For the Song the issue of the Sixteen Prefectures was still not settled. 
Although they were unable or unwilling to mount a major campaign to take the 
territory from the Liao, they could not let the Liao peacefully govern it. That 
would have been tantamount to letting their claim lapse. There was also internal 
pressure for military action at Zhenzong’s court. Rather than deciding either to 
negotiate for peace or go to war, Zhenzong once again temporized. Some raids 
were launched and some of the Liao raids opposed in the field. Militarily it was 
important for the Song army to maintain a high state of training, provide local 
defense by seizing the tactical initiative with preemptive strikes, and bolster morale 
by demonstrating its martial virtues. All of this was accomplished by an active 
defense in the border areas. It must be stressed that these measures were 
successful. They proved effective for local defense. What made them even 
stronger was that the Song could also fall back on their walled cities, cities which 
the Liao were unable to capture.
Liao raids on the Song were also due to Song dissatisfaction with the
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status quo. Raiding put pressure on the Song court to negotiate a settlement. 
The defense of Hebei was exceedingly costly, in men, material and political will. 
Every Liao raid was a sign of the inability of the Song to defend its own territory. 
In simple terms, the raids made Zhenzong look bad. The Liao were trying to 
force Zhenzong to accept their control of the Sixteen Prefectures by making his 
situation intolerable. He had to see that his best hope lay in reaching a peace 
settlement. But if the Liao were relying upon Zhenzong to make a decision, they 
had seriously misjudged the Song emperor. Zhenzong simply didn’t know what 
to do. The impetus behind the Shanyuan campaign (below) may have been 
either frustration or the growing realization at the Liao court that they would have 
to force Zhenzong into a decision by an overwhelming threat. Militarily the raids 
were necessary, as with the Song, to maintain training, establish tactical initiative 
and bolster morale. In addition, raiding allowed the Liao to gather intelligence 
regarding terrain and the state of Song defenses. Liao commanders were quite 
familiar with Hebei by 1004. But they had never captured a border city in all of 
their raiding. They did not, as a result, develop a siege train capable of overcoming 
city defenses. Instead, in 1004 the Liao army first attacked several cities to clear 
the Song army from the field and put them on the defensive behind their walls, 
and then simply by-passed the cities, riding directly toward the Song capital.
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The Shanyuan Campaign (24 September 1004-21 January 1005J210
On 24 September 1004 Shengzong announced that he would campaign 
against the Song. His edict came as no surprise to the Song court. Liao light 
cavalry had been reconnoitering in Song territory from at least 25 August. And 
Song border officials had reported that the Liao were planning to invade on 9 
September. Shengzong arrived in Yanzhou on 11 October to prepare for the 
invasion. He was once again accompanied by his mother, the Dowager Empress 
Xiao.
The Song prepared for the Liao invasion by reinforcing their border cities, 
particularly Dingzhou, and giving additional gifts of money to the soldiers. Since 
the Liao were planning to invade and the Song had a large number of troops in 
Hebei, on 2 October Zhenzong asked his officials if he should personally go to 
the front. It seemed to Zhenzong that he had an opportunity to achieve a 
decisive victory over the Liao which would settle the border. His officials were 
not enthusiastic, but they recognized that, at least for the moment, Zhenzong had 
already decided to go. Instead of fruitlessly opposing the emperor’s expedition, 
they tried to limit its range and delay its beginning. Bi Shi’an felt that
Zhenzong should rely upon the generals that were already in the field to handle 
the Liao. If the emperor was going to the front, he should not go any farther 
north than Shanyuan (modern Puyang $I6§). Even then, particularly with the
21'The Shanyuan Campaign is chronicled in SHY:B 7/12a-13b, XCB 57/1b-58/2lb, SS 
7.124-127 and LS 14.159-160.
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approach of winter, Shanyuan was not a suitable place for a large army to remain 
for a long time. An imperial expedition would require careful planning. Other 
officials echoed these concerns, proposing that Zhenzong go no farther than 
Shanyuan. Zhenzong apparently agreed with Bi Shi’an and the other officials. 
He would go to Shanyuan after careful preparation. The preparations took three 
months and Zhenzong had second thoughts about going, but he did go.
The Liao invasion followed the same route that almost all previous invasions 
had, opening with an attack on the approaches to Dingzhou. The Liao army 
badly beat a Song force at Tangxing i f  PL north of Dingzhou, on 31 October. 
The following day a Liao force under Xiao Talin defeated a Song army
at Suicheng, northeast of Dingzhou. With the Song army temporarily driven from 
the field, the Liao army camped at Wangdu Mffl on 4 November.
In response to the initial Liao advance, on 5 November Wang Chao 3EI§ 
led a large army to the Shuying Palisade WHW on the Tang River HM. The 
Tang river ran east-west in front of Dingzhou. Song troops from Beiping Fort j t  
and Weilujun J&MW- (Suicheng) badly beat a Liao force on 7 November. 
While the Song army was contesting the approaches to Dingzhou, Zhenzong 
was having second thoughts about going to the front. His doubts were being fed 
by some of his closest advisors. It fell to Kou Zhun the Chief Councilor of 
State, to stiffen the resolve Zhenzong held only a month earlier.
Although Kou Zhun had already convinced Zhenzong to go to the front, 
the Liao invasion was so threatening that on 7 November Wang Qinruo
211Xiao Talin’s name is given as Xiao Talan USE in SS.
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Participant in Determining Governmental Matters, secretly proposed that Zhenzong
flee to Jinling (Nanjing) and Chen Yaosou WM%, Notary of the Bureau of Military
Affairs, proposed that Zhenzong flee to Chengdu (in Sichuan). This set the stage
for a well-known display of patriotism by Kou Zhun. Zhenzong called Kou Zhun
in to discuss the idea of fleeing to Jinling or Chengdu. When Kou arrived, Wang
Qinruo and Chen Yaosou were already present:
Kou Zhun realized that Wang Qinruo had asked the emperor to visit the 
South because he was from Jiangnan and that Chen Yaosou had asked 
the emperor to visit the West because he was from Sichuan. Kou pretended 
that he didn’t know [who had proposed fleeing] and said: Those who 
devised such plans for Your Majesty should be condemned and beheaded. 
The reigning Son of Heaven has divine military qualities and the officers 
and commanders are united and in harmony. If the Imperial Chariot sets 
out for a campaign under the personal supervision of the emperor they 
(the Liao) would surely vanish. If not, issue a clever stratagem in order to 
destroy their schemes, safely guard [our territory] and exhaust their people. 
If they become tired of their endeavors, we can expect victory. How could 
we wish to abandon our ancestral temples and our altars to the spirit of 
the land and go as far away as Chu (the South) or Shu (Sichuan)?’ 
Thereupon the emperor desisted [from those plans].212
The Liao simultaneously attacked Weilujun, Shun'anjun Beiping
Fort and Baozhou on 9 November. All four attacks failed, although the Liao
defeated Beiping Fort’s troops in battle. Xiao Talin, whose forces had attacked
Weilujun and Shun’anjun, then linked up with Shengzong and the Dowager Empress
to attack Dingzhou. The Song army took up a defensive position behind the
Tang River, limiting their attacks to trying to drive off Liao reconnaissance cavalry.
It was at this time, according to the Song sources, that Wang Jizhong sent a
212My translation of Kou Zhun’s audience with Zhenzong, and the discussion of the 
events surrounding it, is closely based on Wolfgang Franke’s in, “Historical Precedent or 
Accidental Repetition of Events? K’ou Chun in 1004 and Yu Ch’ien in 1449," in Etudes Song in 
Memoriam Etienne Balazs, Frangoise Aubin ed., Series 1, Fascicle 3, 199-206.
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letter on behalf of the Liao to Shi Pu 5 h at Mozhou to discuss peace. Several 
days later, on 13 November, the Liao launched a diversionary attack on Kelanjun 
more than 200 kilometers to the west, on the far side of the Taihang 
Mountains. The attack was beaten off but it accomplished its purpose. Just like 
the other unsuccessful assaults on Song positions, the attack on Kelanjun put the 
Song on the defensive. With the Song army maintaining a static defense in the 
various cities and forts, the initiative was now firmly in Liao hands.
Having taken the measure of the Song forward defense system around 
Dingzhou, the Liao circumvented it. Liao forces crossed the Tang River east of 
Dingzhou. Rather than turning back to the west and attacking Dingzhou, a Liao 
army marched east and south, attacking Yingzhou SEW at dusk on 20 November. 
Shengzong and his mother personally directed at least part of the attack on 
Yingzhou. The assault continued for more than ten days. Song casualties were 
heavy, 30,000 dead and twice as many wounded, but the city held out. The 
attack on Yingzhou destroyed the city’s military strength. Although the Liao lifted 
their siege, they continued to occupy the surrounding territory. A second Liao 
army subdued Qizhou 3MI, west of Yingzhou on 28 November.
After the fall of Qizhou and end of the assault on Yingzhou, the Liao
paused for several weeks. There are three likely reasons for their pause. First,
Shengzong and his mother were waiting for the Song reaction to their peace
overture in light of their attacks on Yingzhou and Qizhou. Second, while they
were waiting for the Song to make them an offer, they were reorganizing, refitting
and resting their troops. Their forces had been campaigning fairly intensely
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throughout November. If they were going to continue into southern Hebei, the 
troops needed to be put back in order, and probably resupplied with arrows, 
before they faced the Song army again. Thirdly, they were bringing up fresh 
units now that they had a foothold in Song territory. All of the attacks on 
positions in northern Hebei had been carried out by relatively small, dispersed 
units. It is only in mid-December that we first get any sort of troop numbers for 
the Liao army in Hebei. The purpose of the early raids was to either draw Song 
troops out so that they could be destroyed in detail or to scare them into shutting 
themselves up behind their walls. The attack on Yingzhou and the capture of 
Qizhou ended the first stage of the Liao campaign. Since their military threat was 
not sufficiently frightening to convince Zhenzong to come to terms, they went on 
to the second stage. On 19 December a report reached the Song court that the 
Liao planned to ride south from Yingzhou with 200,000 troops through the gap 
between Beizhou M#i, Jizhou j&f-H, and Tianxiongjun "RMW-
Zhenzong ordered the commander of Deqingjun on 21 December
to lead all of his troops to Shanyuan if the Liao rode south. The Song continued 
to build up troops and defensive positions in Shanyuan. The Song government 
also continued to distribute extensive gifts of money, silk and wine to the soldiers 
and people of Hebei. Zhenzong commented to his officials on 23 December that 
they had better be prepared because Beizhou and Jizhou had been raided and 
Shenzhou $£#{ reconnoitred by the Liao. The Liao raiders left without accomplishing 
anything. Yelu Keli defeated and pursued a Song force at Mingzhou
W on 27 December.
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Shan Bu reported to Shengzong on 31 December that the Song sent
Wang Jizhong bows and arrows, secretly asking him to seek peace.
Zhenzong left Kaifeng on 3 January, riding toward Shanyuan. The Liao captured
Deqingjun % the same day. Shengzong reached Shanyuan on 5 January.
Zhenzong ordered corvee laborers to go up and down the Yellow River breaking
the ice to prevent the Liao from crossing it.
Although he was already on the road to Shanyuan, Zhenzong once again
reconsidered personally facing the Liao. He called on Kou Zhun again, just as he
had before, to discuss the idea put forward by one of his officials that he go to
Jinling in the south. A no doubt exasperated Kou replied:
Your advisors are cowardly and timid. They talk ignorantly, no different 
than farmers and old women. The invaders are now nearby and danger 
surrounds us. Your Majesty can advance a foot but cannot retreat an 
inch. All the armies in Hebei await your arrival day and night. The 
soldiers are very anxious. If you return a few paces then the multitude’s 
spirit will collapse. The enemy will take advantage of that and Jinling 
won’t be safe either.
Zhenzong still couldn't make up his mind. Kou went out and ran into Gao
Qiong the Commander in Chief of the Palace Corps. Kou said to him:
“You have been generously rewarded by the country. Will you requite it now?"
Gao replied: “I am a military man. I am sincerely willing to die for it." Kou
brought Gao into Zhenzong’s presence, where the general supported Kou’s advice.
Gao pointed out that everyone’s families were still in the capital. He also thought
that Zhenzong’s presence would increase the soldiers’ spirits and make defeating
the Liao easy.213 Wang Yingchang 3EJSH also supported Kou, finally convincing
213For a slightly different translation of Kou Zhun’s discussion with Zhenzong and Gao
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Zhenzong to continue forward.
The Liao captured Deqingjun on 7 January. Xiao Talin led an attack on 
Song positions just north of Shanyuan the same day. Gao Qiong and Li Jilong 2}e 
M$k brought up their forces and surrounded Xiao’s army on three sides. A 
sudden attack on the Liao by Song light cavalry drove the Liao to attack the 
arrayed Song army. Unable to make any impression on the Song troops, Xiao 
decided to withdraw. As Xiao led his vanguard away from the battlefield, concealed 
Song troops opened fire on him with crossbows and siege crossbows. Xiao was 
struck in the forehead by a bolt and died that night.214
At the same time that Zhenzong was approaching Shanyuan, Song-Liao 
negotiations were beginning in earnest. Zhenzong was in favor of peace, but he 
wasn’t certain that the Liao were trustworthy. They had already deeply invaded 
Song territory. Of even more immediate concern was the freezing of the Yellow 
River. The Liao army had already demonstrated that it could not be contained by 
dispersed static defense positions. Without the barrier of the Yellow River Kaifeng 
itself was threatened and Zhenzong could be cut off. Zhenzong expressed his 
resolve to have a single, decisive battle to annihilate the Liao invaders.
The Liao captured Tonglijun on 8 January. Zhenzong arrived in
the southern city of Shanyuan on 9 January. He was reluctant to cross the
Qiong see John Labadie, “Rulers and Soldiers: Perception and Management of the Military in 
Northern Sung China," Ph.d. diss., University of Washington, 1981, 67-68.
214There is a date descrepancy between XCB, SHY:B, SS and LS. The three Song 
sources all date the battle north of Shanyuan and Xiao Talin’s death to 7 January. LS dates his 
death 5 January. I have used 7 January because the accounts given in XCB and SHY:B are
more complete both in general and in this particular incident.
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Yellow River to the north city of Shanyuan. Kou Zhun pleaded with Zhenzong to 
go to the north city. He warned the emperor that morale would be destroyed if he 
did not cross the river. Gao Qiong again supported Kou. When Feng Zheng M 
M, Notary of the Bureau of Military Affairs, snorted in derision after Gao spoke, 
Gao angrily rebuked him: “You have established yourself through literary 
achievement. Now, when enemy cavalry is all around us you disparage me 
without respect. Why don’t you compose a poem and by reading it cause the 
enemy cavalry to retreat?"215 Zhenzong then agreed to continue on to the north 
city. But when he reached the pontoon bridge to cross the river, he stopped 
again. Gao Qiong beat on the palanquin bearers and hectored them until Zhenzong 
agreed to cross the river. When he reached the north city the emperor ascended 
to the top of the city gate. The imperial yellow dragon banners were unfurled and 
all of the soldiers cheered.
With the reluctant Zhenzong finally installed in the north city of Shanyuan, 
Cao Liyong WfUffl went to the Liao court to discuss peace on 10 January. The 
Liao court sent Han Qi U fa to the Song court to negotiate the settlement terms 
on 13 January. The Liao initially offered peace in exchange for the Guannan 
area. Zhenzong decided to reject a land-for-peace deal. Part of his reasoning, 
that the Song had controlled the Guannan area for a long time, could have been 
used equally well by the Liao regarding the Sixteen Prefectures. Instead of land, 
the Song court offered to make an annual payment of money and silk.
Cao Liyong returned to the Liao court on 16 January. He rejected any
^O p. cit., Labadie, 68.
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cession of land but offered an annual payment of 100,000 taels of silver and 
200,000 bolts of silk instead. Shengzong and his mother accepted the annual 
payment instead of the territory on 21 January. The Liao campaign was successful. 
All of the raids and attacks culminated not in a decisive battle, but in a decisive 
negotiation. Although they could not know it at the time, their efforts resulted in 
over a century of peace between the Song and Liao.
The Treaty of Shanyuan
Apart from the annual payments mentioned above, there were several 
other provisions of the treaty:
1. A clearly marked border between the two sides.
2. Enforcement of a peaceful border.
3. Extradition of criminals.
4. A ban on new fortifications or canals along the border. Old fortifications 
could be repaired.
Both sides solemnly swore to observe the treaty, invoking religious sanctions for 
failure to do so.216
The Treaty of Shanyuan has been described as “...a great success of
political realism over ideological pretensions.”217 The annual payments have
^Denis Twitchett and Klaus-Peter Tietze, “The Liao,” op. cit., 109.
217“lbid., 110.
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been called “blackmail.”218 “Humiliating” is one of the most frequent words used 
in discussing the treaty. From the Song perspective these views are accurate. 
But what about the Liao perspective? They started the war and they retained the 
initiative throughout the fighting and the negotiations. Song understanding, or 
misunderstanding, of Liao intentions certainly shaped the treaty. But the Song 
were reacting during the negotiations. What did the Liao want? Was the Treaty 
of Shanyuan a success for the Liao?
As we discussed above, Shengzong and his mother invaded Song territory 
in 1004 in order to force Zhenzong to accept Liao sovereignty over the Sixteen 
Prefectures. So, regarding that particular issue, they were successful. All of the 
Song primary sources documenting the campaign make it clear that the Liao 
asked for peace-talks before the Song. The Liao Shi only records Song requests 
for peace-talks. Who asked for peace-talks first tells us nothing when it is taken 
out of the context of the goal of the military action. The Liao probably tried to 
open peace negotiations before the Song. Their aim was decisive negotiations, 
not a decisive battle. It was therefore to their advantage to begin negotiating 
while their army was in the field winning battles. More than eight centuries later 
Clausewitz might write that “War was merely the continuation of policies by other 
means,” but he assumed that campaigns led up to decisive battles.219 The
218Jing-shen Tao, op. cit., 16.
219Russel Weigley forcefully and elegantly argued that, “War in the age of battles was not 
an effective extension of policy by other means...but the bankruptcy of policy.” The Age of Battles
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), 543.
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greatest weakness of that assumption is that battles are rarely decisive.220 One 
of the reasons that even a large battle involving tens of thousands of troops on 
both sides is not decisive is that the victor usually suffers as much if not more 
than the loser. Badly injured, the victor is in no condition to exploit his victory. 
His ability to threaten the loser with further destruction is compromised.
Even if the Liao had fought and won a decisive battle at Shanyuan they 
would have still been deep in hostile territory, in the middle of winter, without a 
reliable source of supplies. They would have suffered many casualties in the 
battle. Thus, they might have had to retreat at the height of their victory. By 
negotiating when they did, the Liao were able to credibly threaten further destruction 
or even a decisive battle. Zhenzong and most of his advisors were inclined to 
imagine that the most dire consequences would result from continued fighting. 
The theoretical consequences of fighting were balanced by certain concessions 
that Zhenzong felt he could not make. He could not cede new land to the Liao 
and he could not accept an inferior position to the Liao emperor. But implicit in 
these requirements was acceptance of Liao sovereignty over the Sixteen 
Prefectures. To Zhenzong it was a question of how much more he would have to 
give up in order to get peace.221 The Liao clearly understood this and began 
negotiations by demanding cession of the Guannan region, something they knew
^ F o r an exceptionally clear discussion of the problems of decisiveness see Jeremy 
Black,European Warfare 1660-1815 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994),
67-86.
^Zhenzong had apparently been willing to give up ten times what Cao Liyong agreed to. 
Jing-shen Tao, op. cit., 15.
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would be rejected. Demanding land for peace served two purposes: frightening 
the Song by manifesting their worst fears, and giving them something that they 
could save face with by rejecting. Cao Liyong was a hero for rejecting the Liao 
demand for land and substituting annual payments that would not be called 
tribute.222
The Shanyuan campaign and its resolution makes no sense without 
understanding why Shengzong and his mother invaded the Song. They were not 
trying to destroy the Song. Their aims were very limited. They seized and 
maintained a dominant bargaining position by convincing the Song court that 
their aims were unlimited, that they were both willing and able to destroy the 
Song state. The argument at the Song court was not whether the Liao wanted to 
destroy the Song state, but whether they were capable of doing so. The view 
that the Liao wanted to destroy the Song state persisted in the Song court until 
the Jin destroyed the Liao. When combined with a lack of faith in the effectiveness 
of the Song army, an opinion that the events of 1004-5 helped create, this view of 
the Liao kept the Song from breaking the treaty until the Jin were already destroying 
the Liao. Thus, for the next century, the Song court weighed the desire to 
conquer the Sixteen Prefectures, end the annual payments and reject the Liao 
ruler as an emperor, against their belief that the Song army was weak, the Liao 
army strong and that a failed attack on the Liao could result in the destruction of 
the Song state. They were unwilling to risk the destruction of the state. It was
^W hile the provisions of the Treaty of Shanyuan make it dear that the annual payments 
were not to be treated as tribute, the Liao court always described them as tribute to all of the 
other states that it had relations with except, of course, the Song.
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only the rise of the Jin that made the Liao army seem less strong and removed 
the possibility of the Liao destroying the Song state. Unfortunately, the Jin 
proved quite capable of capturing Kaifeng along with emperor Qinzong and the 
retired emperor Huizong.
The Treaty of Shanyuan proved long-lasting not just because the Song 
reluctantly accepted it, but also because the Liao accepted it. If the Liao really 
were far stronger than the Song, genuinely wanted to conquer China and deeply 
resented the loss of the Guannan area to Zhou Shizong, why did they accept the 
treaty? The Liao army may have suffered a sharp decline in effectiveness during 
the eleventh century.223 Whether the decline was real or only apparent, the Liao 
army was superior to the Song army only in the open field. And, while the idea of 
destroying the Song state may have occurred to some members of the Liao 
court, the Liao army was never capable of the task.224 Likewise, the Guannan 
area may have been important to some at the Liao court, but it would have been 
an exposed salient in Song territory. Unlike the Sixteen Prefectures, which were 
protected by mountains, the Guannan area was, as its name describes, south of 
the passes. It was, however, extremely useful in negotiations. Not only could 
the Guannan area be painlessly given up, as it was in 1005, but it could also be 
the gravamen of any future complaint. The Liao thus retained a useful claim on 
Song territory. It was a permanent casus belli. During the Song-Xixia war in the
2Z3Karl August Wittfogel and Feng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (Philadelphia: 
Transactions of the Amercian Philosophical Society, 1949).
“ “The Liao also fought a large, and indecisive, war with Koryo from 1011 -1019.
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early 1040s, it was precisely this claim that forced the Song to increase its annual 
payments to the Liao in order to keep them out of the war. From the Liao point of 
view their relations with the Song under the treaty were close to ideal.
War by Other Means
The Treaty of Shanyuan was initially seen by Zhenzong and his court as a 
diplomatic victory for the Song. Once the immediate crisis was over, however, it 
was increasingly regarded as a humiliating failure. By late 1007 Zhenzong was 
looking for a way to overcome the shame of the treaty. Since military action was 
out of the question, Zhenzong settled on the idea of performing the Feng and 
Shan #  sacrifices, a massive ritual display of imperial legitimacy. The appropriate 
auspicious omens were produced and the sacrifices took place in 1008. Zhenzong 
also sacrificed to the earth at Fenyin in 1011, a sacrifice second in status 
only to the Feng and Shan sacrifices.
Both Sima Guang W i l l a n d  the editors of the Song Shi explained the 
sacrifices as directed at the Liao. The Liao were allegedly a superstitious people 
who would be impressed by auspicious omens.225 Impressive displays of wealth 
and culture were not limited to the Song. The Liao erected a variety of dramatic 
Buddhist monasteries.226 These examples only hint at the ways that both the
^Susan E. Cahill, “Taoism at the Sung Court: The Heavenly Text Affair of 1008," in 
Bulletin of Sung and Yuan Studies (1980), 23-44.
^Nancy Steinhart alludes to this use of architecture in Liao Architecture, (forthcoming), 
240. Interestingly all of the extant buildings are in, or very close to. the Sixteen Prefectures. Not
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Song and Liao fought to assert their legitimacy and cultural superiority through 
non-military means. After the Treaty of Shanyuan, those were the only means 
they used for more than a century.
all of them were built after the treaty. All of the extant buildings are in areas that were primarily 
inhabited by Han Chinese subjects of the Liao.
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Chapter Ten 
C onclusion
The Northern Song state was formed by war. Conquest and control of the 
army preoccupied Song Taizu. Taizong tried to prove himself a worthy successor 
to his brother by conquest. Zhenzong inherited the issue of the Sixteen Prefectures 
exacerbated by his father’s failures. The Treaty of Shanyuan in 1005 effectively, 
though not favorably, from the Song perspective, resolved the final issue in the 
formation of the Northern Song state. With only minor exceptions, the extent and 
shape of Song territory did not change again until the fall of Kaifeng in 1127.
The military relationship between the Song and Liao empires defined the 
Song dynasty as a weak Chinese dynasty. Because the Song emperor had to 
accept equality or near equality with the Liao emperor, and because the Jin 
eventually destroyed the Liao and took north China from the Song, the problems 
of the Song army have usually been seen as the root of Song weakness. The 
Song military failed to do its job. It failed to capture the Sixteen Prefectures and 
humble the Liao, and it failed to defend the dynasty from the invading Jin. It also 
failed to crush the small state of Xixia. All this is true. By the standards of the 
Song emperors and officials after Taizu, the Song military was weak and 
unsuccessful. It could not accomplish the mission set for it. It is therefore wrong 
to dismiss the issue of Song military weakness. It was a very real and significant 
issue for the Song state. But Song weakness does not explain either the extended
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peace after the Treaty of Shanyuan or the events leading up to it.
It was not inevitable that the Song state would very nearly equal the 
geographical extent of the Tang or Han states before it. The Southern Tang and 
Northern Han put up strong resistance to Song conquest. If the other, smaller, 
states put up less resistance, it was due to the overwhelming force that Taizu 
concentrated on them. No one surrendered because they thought the Zhao 
family possessed the Mandate of Heaven. They surrendered because the Song 
army was the strongest army south of the Yellow River.
This was not true of the Liao. The Liao army was superior to the Song 
army. And, because of that superiority, the Liao emperor could not only claim 
equality with the Song emperor, he could make the Song emperor accept it. He 
could also make the Song emperor accept that, notwithstanding Chinese claims, 
the Sixteen Prefectures would remain part of the Liao empire.
Why was the Song army weak? Several reasons have been given for the
weakness of the Song military by commentators from the Song period through
the twentieth century. During the Song, many officials thought the problem was a
lack of good commanders, lack of sufficient cavalry mounts or lazy, disobedient
soldiers. Recent historians have pointed to the bureaucratization of the Song
military machine, control of the army by civil officials ignorant of military matters,
a failure to follow the wise practices established by Taizu and Taizong and the
fact that the Song faced a powerful steppe empire greater than anything the Han
or Tang dynasties had faced. Many of these problems, particularly the lack of
sufficient cavalry mounts, did significantly weaken the Song army. The effect any
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of these factors had individually at any given time, or over the course of the 
dynasty, is indeterminable. All these attempts to find a structural or institutional 
flaw at the root of Song weakness have produced unprovable conclusions. They 
have one other aspect in common: they all focus on the Song state as sole 
arbiter of its own fate. That is to say, if the Song was weak, it was due to 
something it did or did not do. Even the fact that the Song faced a united steppe 
empire on its northern frontier is presented as simply a more difficult problem 
than earlier dynasties faced. The Song had a bigger problem to cope with than 
the Han or Tang, and that is why it had a harder time solving it.
At no point has any previous consideration of the Song-Liao wars considered 
what the goals of the Liao emperors were. Why did they go to war? And, more 
significantly, why didn’t they? The sinocentric approach to Song military history 
has always assumed that the Liao were a constant threat, held off by continuous 
diplomatic and military effort. The violent, avaricious Liao were kept out of north 
China until any, or all, of the factors contributing to Song military weakness 
caused the army to buckle in 1127. But it was not the Liao who attacked the 
Song and captured Kaifeng, it was the Jin. If the Liao were so violent and 
avaricious, and the Liao army superior to the Song army, why didn’t the Liao 
conquer, or at least try to conquer, the Song? The 1004-5 invasion of the Song 
certainly seemed like an attempt to conquer the Song. As we discussed in the 
analysis of that campaign (chapter nine), the apparent invasion was simply an 
escalation of earlier attempts to force the Song to the bargaining table.
The strongest proof that the Liao had no interest in destroying the Song is
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the Liao rejection of Xixia suggestions of a joint campaign against the Song in 
1042, and the way the Liao negotiated a new demarcation of the Song-Liao 
border in Hedong between 1074 and 1076. In both cases, and in several other 
negotiations between 1042 and 1074, the Liao combined increased border patrols 
with demands for Song concessions. The Liao made effective use of credible 
threats to get as much as they could from the Song. If they didn’t get all they 
asked for, they didn’t go to war but waited and tried again, sometimes decades, 
later. The Liao army always presented a real threat to the existence of the Song 
state. Song officials had to take Liao threats seriously. They couldn’t risk a Liao 
invasion. This may well have contributed to the impression that the Song was a 
weak dynasty. It made concessions to an opponent who, after 1005, never really 
attacked the empire. Of course Song emperors and officials had no way of 
knowing the outcomes of their actions. If they had not responded vigorously to 
Liao diplomatic and military incursions, the Liao might well have been encouraged 
to try to get even more from them. It was in the Liao interest to always appear to 
be ready to invade the Song.
Ultimately Song emperors and officials cannot be faulted for suspecting
and fearing a state which constantly threatened and made demands of them.
Liao emperors and officials were quite effective in convincing the Song that they
were always a threat. It is not surprising that, despite over a century of peace,
the Song tried to make common cause with the Jin against the Liao. The Song
tried to conquer the Sixteen Prefectures while the Jin were destroying the Liao
empire from the north. The disaster that befell the Song after violating the Treaty
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of Shanyuan makes it clear why the sanction of Heaven was taken seriously
during the Song. As the Treaty reads near the end:
Whosoever repudiates this covenant shall be unable to enjoy the reign 
over [his] state, [for this covenant is] clearly manifested [to all] and scrutinized 
by Heaven, which along with [the offended state] shall surely destroy 
him.227
^Translated in David Wright, op. cit., 83.
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